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Defense Ministry Denies Nuclear Sales

92UM0295D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 31 Dec 91 p 3

[Unattributed Article: "Isn't It Time To Close the Subject?"]

[Text] A representative of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff refuted a report made by the Italian newspaper "Unita" that contraband deliveries of atomic weapons and radioactive materials were allegedly being made from republics within the former USSR to the Middle East, in which two officers of the "military information service," Oleg Petrovskiy and Vitaliy Dorchuk, were involved.

As was reported to a TASS correspondent, these officers were not listed among Ministry of Defense Information Management cadre. Concerning "military depots" from which fissionable materials were allegedly being stolen, "there simply are not any and will not be any" within the territory of the former USSR. "The Ministry of Defense has no need for long term storage of significant amounts of radioactive materials," said the General Staff representative.

"In relation to nuclear weapons being traded from within the territory of the former USSR, inflated rumors on this account have been stubbornly refuted on more than one occasion by the Ministry of Defense, the Main Military Procurator's Office, and other competent departments. One could consider this topic closed long ago," stated the General Staff representative.

Opening of All-Army Conference

PM2001150392 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 18 Jan 92 First Edition p 1

[Report by Vladimir Zelentsov, Vitaliy Potapov, and Vladimir Sheketov: "Hope of Restraint and Courage"]

[Text] These are not the easiest times for the Army and the Navy, the Black Sea Fleet in particular. Servicemen are being denied their daily bread, officers' wives cannot always hope for a hut to share with their beloved, and some sentries are having their weapons taken away from them, while others are offering those weapons of their own accord. For freely convertible currency. The headquarters of a district in a once fraternal republic is ringed with black and white flags: "The wolf hunt is on! The hunt is on!" Eighteen year-old deserters, mere children, are declaring hunger strikes under the watchful gaze of representatives of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers at Moscow's Lefortovo prison, and meanwhile the Ukrainian permanent representative is virtually stating unhesitatingly that the Russian fleet in the Crimea originated with the legendary Ukrainian sailor Koshka.

It will be very bad if this All-Army Conference of representatives of Officers' Assemblies in the Moscow Kremlin turns into a riotous rally of really angry people unwilling to listen to one another. "We do not rule such

a possibility. Yes, unfortunately the conference could turn into just another political show," we were told at the information analysis department of the Defense Ministry's Committee for Work with Personnel. It could. Of course it could. Suffice it to recall the "stunts" of the not unknown Uralian-Volga general Makashov. Or listen to Stanislav Terekhov, chairman of the Union of Officers, speaking the other day at a Moscow rally anxiously convened by the Working Russia movement. Incidentally, at that rally, his colleague Major Aleksey Ivashchenko was absolutely frank: He called the so-called democrats (still remember them?) nothing less than "scum" and a "mercenary clique." Ivashchenko's resume was similar: "The army must take power into its own hands across the country's whole territory."

Meanwhile, the results of the talks between Russian and Ukrainian delegations on military political questions which preceded the All-Army Officers' Assembly hardly inspired optimism. Indeed, what optimism can there be if the delegation heads' interpretations of the talks' results are not in accord with one another.

All we needed were... experts. The Ukraine's example proved infectious. According to news agency reports military officials in Turkmenistan are seriously stating their claims to the Caspian Flotilla. The Moldova State Department's military doctrine mentions the impermissibility of the country's participation in any bloc, political, military-political, or military. Does this mean that there will be no Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] troops on Moldovan territory? A similar question could be put to the leaders of Azerbaijan and, sadly, a considerable number of Belarussian parliamentarians.

Processes have been set in motion... Consequently, Dmitriy Volkogonov's recent comment that the majority of CIS states would prefer a NATO-type bloc in military relations with one another is not seen as especially conciliatory. That is not all. Some people really want to play the nationalist card in all this. The other day it was said: Of the 20,000 airmen in our country, 13,000 are Russians...

No, it is not through Makashov and his confederates but hundreds of thousands of sensible professional servicemen that the Army and Navy are urging politicians enamoured with sovereignty (no, with neutrality!) a way out of a truly extraordinary situation. Dialogue, and dialogue alone. Without ambitions and "preventive strikes." Without the utterly immoral attempts to win over the men with guns. The transitional period is not another demagogic affectation in the spirit of recent bolshevist traditions, it is not a means of preserving the job of some general who has not managed to find himself a place in some Moscow mansion. Nor is it someone's desire to retain a while longer the right to control the destiny of the world. The transitional period is the methodology of the most civilized arrangement capable of changing the armed monster of the former empire. That, in principle, was the theme of the discussion at the All-Army officers' forum which opened in the Moscow

Kremlin today. And perhaps we should disregard the "procedural" trickery which plagued it at the very beginning and the latest scandal involving the chairman of the servicemen's union Shchit (there was a unanimous vote that he be excluded from the hall but he stayed in the hall anyway—even the threat to call the security platoon did not help). In fact, the ones to suffer were the 5,000 officer delegates and those on whose behalf they spoke from the platform of the Kremlin Palace of Congresses. And indeed, those of them who insisted that it is necessary to give this assembly an official status were right.

A few days ago Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir Chernavin, commander in chief of the Navy, was heard to say: "Neither I, nor Kasatonov, nor Ukrainian Defense Minister Morozov will decide the fate of the fleet—that is the job of the politicians and them alone." But will people be able to bring themselves to call a "decision" the manipulation that some politicians have been indulging in so much over the past month?

...The 5,000 officers and generals who assembled for the All-Army Conference of Representatives of Officers' Assemblies now speak on behalf of the hundreds of thousands of their colleagues and several million of our fellow-citizens for whom even today the oath of allegiance to the people remains a beacon of salvation. No matter what some may think, it is not all that easy to extinguish that beacon or indeed those other beacons which reliably direct the ships of the Black Sea Fleet back to their home base.

Yeltsin Reassures Officers' Assembly

92UM0396A Moscow TRUD in Russian 18 Jan 92 p 1

[V. Badurkin report: "The Officers Are For Yeltsin"]

[Text] The events of recent weeks have put the military theme at the center of public interests. The Army and Navy are being written about by the newspapers, and the presidents are talking about them at their meetings. Yesterday the officers themselves, finally, began to give full voice to their problems.

There were things for the almost 5,000 delegates assembled at the all-Army officers' meeting to discuss: the beggarly material position, the everyday disorganization, the unsolved nature of social questions.... But the talk at the meeting was about something else—the fate of the fatherland and the Army.

Would the Armed Forces remain unified or would they be pulled apart in national apartments, when would politicians cease to play the military card in the disputes between themselves, how would military reform proceed—the officers wanted to put these and a multitude of other questions to the heads of state of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] personally. It was for this that the meeting was held, it was for this that political leaders were invited to it. Unfortunately, only two of them—the presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan—came to the Kremlin's Palace of Congresses.

Yet the day before they had all gathered for a working meeting, at which they had discussed military problems, in the main.

This discussion, like previous ones also, did little, it seems, to clarify the situation. Of the mass of documents which were presented, just one was signed by all 11 heads of state—the Appeal to the Armed Forces of the CIS, which was read out at the meeting by N. Nazarbayev. It says, it is true, that the leaders of the republics are prepared in the very near future to adopt an agreement at the interstate level on the status of the Armed Forces and to secure by national legislation the plenitude of the political and socioeconomic rights and liberties of the servicemen in accordance with the rules of international law, to draw up and adopt social programs, and to step up their concern for people of the Army and the Navy. All the other vitally important documents in the attache cases of the politicians have disappeared to the capitals of the Commonwealth. Their adoption has been put off until 14 February.

This attitude of the heads of state seriously offended the officers, it would seem. The meeting once again insistently invited them to the Palace of Congresses for discussion "tete-a-tete." Simultaneously, in the heat of the moment, it asked all those who were attempting to involve the delegates in a political debate to leave the hall. V. Urazhtsev, a former officer and now chairman of "Shield," who was unwilling to comply with the wishes of his former comrades even on pain of a summons from soldiers of the commandant's office, could not desist from the traditional row.

Having given vent to their emotions in the first 90 minutes, the officers finally embarked on a discussion of the main question—the unity of the Armed Forces. The leitmotiv of all the speeches was that the fate of the Army and Navy cannot be decided in impromptu fashion without thought being given to the consequences, without military policy having been formulated, and without social problems having been resolved.

The officers impatiently awaited the speech of the president of the Russian Federation. Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin had hitherto refrained from detailed statements on military topics, confining himself merely to brief observations on this issue or the other.

The Russian president did not cheat expectations. He responded clearly and specifically to the many questions. Noting that the fact of the Army's move into the political arena as an independent force was a disturbing symptom of the sickness of society, Boris Yeltsin called on the officers for civic calm. He announced that the heads of state had agreed within a week's time to create working groups to consider the entire set of military problems. The question of the oath for the strategic forces and the general troops had been resolved. And, what was most important, the officers will not have to forgo their honor—no one will take the oath for a second time.

All questions of the reduction and redeployment of the forces will, Yeltsin gave the assurance, be adopted only at the interstate level. The delegates responded with stormy applause to his statement that all forces deployed outside of the members of the CIS (in the Baltic, Georgia, and East Europe) had been put under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.

Similarly received was the announcement of the structure of the military budget, 60 percent of which will this year be channeled into a solution of the social problems of the people with shoulder boards. The quarterly indexation of pay will be introduced, and serious measures have been mapped out for the solution, in the main, of the housing problem in the first six months of this year. A considerable amount of the resources from exports of weaponry and military equipment will be channeled into this.

The Russian president assured the delegates that he, together with Nazarbayev, would "stand wholly for unified, joint armed forces." Unfortunately, not all the heads of state of the CIS adhere to such a viewpoint. Even the decisions enumerated by Yeltsin were supported by only seven of them. The leaders of Ukraine, Moldova, and the republics of Belarus and Azerbaijan are insisting on the creation of their own national armies. To this end the governments of these republics are promising a tangible improvement in the material position and social amenities of the regular Army personnel and other benefits.

Rightly believing that only joint armed forces can dependably guard the Commonwealth, the officers called on all the heads of state, parliaments, governments, and peoples of the CIS to think seriously about the fate of the Army and, consequently, the fatherland.

Yeltsin, Shaposhnikov for United Military

92UM0395A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
18 Jan 92 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Time to Decide"]

[Text] On the morning of 17 January, the gold-domed gray Kremlin greeted 5,000 emissaries of the Armed Forces who arrived for a conference of representatives of officer assemblies. They were brought here by a deep anxiety over the fate of the Army, which was threatened by disintegration and of being pulled apart into national frameworks.

Before entering the Kremlin, the officers and generals had to pass through a corridor of picketers at the Kutafya Tower. Many who came here held flags of the USSR and Russia in their hands, and also slogans, banners, and placards. Inscriptions strike the eyes: "Army! Be loyal to your oath!" "Officer, save the USSR!"

Judging by the character of the slogans and appeals, people of various political views were assembling here. This general sense of excitement seemed to continue

from the first minutes of the work of the conference. It was opened by Marshal Ye. Shaposhnikov. The only thing on which those assembled were unanimous was the minute of silence during which they honored the memories of soldiers who died in interethnic conflicts. Afterwards, a sharp discussion began on the status of the conference and the agenda. Those assembled decided that this was not a conference, but an all-army officer assembly.

Major General of Aviation N. Stolyarov, chairman of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Committee of the Armed Forces on Work with Personnel, proposed discussion of the question of the status and outlook for the organizational development of the Armed Forces and the protection of servicemen in connection with the organization of the CIS. And once again, additions and refinements are introduced here.

Approval was given to the proposal to invite all presidents of CIS countries to the assembly and to establish a coordination council of the all-army officer assembly. To approve an appeal to the presidents, parliaments, people, and personnel of the Armed Forces.

The assembly requested that it be informed on what was decided at the meeting of the CIS heads of state. The floor was given to President N. Nazarbayev. After a brief speech, he read a statement of the CIS heads that sets forth thoughts on the social protection of servicemen, on the necessity to work on their status, on a social program, and on other questions.

One of the speakers from St. Petersburg expressed the idea that "the empire was not broken up by the presidents, but by the people." He was not permitted to finish. Later, during the intermission, we saw how the officers, after surrounding this speaker, advised him to be more careful in registering the views of the people... A sharp dispute arose in connection with a decision to evict officers from the hall who were objectionable to the assembly.

In general, the theme of the assembly developed nervously, stormily, and heatedly. And this probably has its own logic. The question that has placed the Army before an abyss, it can be said, is too broad and too significant. Too much has pained the people in epaulets. As a matter of fact, the whole Army and Navy organism and every one of its capillaries has been enveloped in a most profound crisis. But it was not what is personal that the people considered to be the main thing. Practically in every speech, the central thought was: The Armed Forces must be unified! It is in this that the officers and generals saw the most important condition for the future existence of the Army and the Fatherland and a reliable defense for its people.

After Marshal Ye. Shaposhnikov's speech, the assembly became calmer. The CIS commander in chief, in particular, rejected as "groundless" the assertions that seemingly the present assembly of officers carries within itself the danger of a military coup and the seizure of power,

and, in the present situation, the assertions are socially dangerous and provocative." "I will never permit the employment of our Armed Forces against our own people in the resolution of interethnic and political disputes," he emphasized.

"Having created the most powerful armed forces in the world," continued Yevgenniy Shaposhnikov, "our state has displayed an inability to be properly concerned about them and to provide them with all the necessities... The development of events has reached the point beyond which there are confrontation, chaos, and a national, and even a world tragedy. It is our patriotic, civic, and military duty not to permit this."

The steps of some Commonwealth states directed at the "transfer to local jurisdiction of groupings of armed forces deployed on the territory of these states," and the creation of national formations were called "hasty" by the speaker. He came out for a "civilized way of resolving these problems." "A transition period is needed—two or three years—during which all questions can be resolved without tears and suffering." "The implementation of the unquestionable right of each independent state to have its own army should not lead to the disruption of an integrated defense space."

The marshal sees the structure of the CIS Armed Forces consisting of two main components: strategic forces and large combined general-purpose forces whose principal task is the defense of the CIS in peacetime and the repulsion of aggression in wartime. In the transitional period, the marshal believes, it is necessary to have combined armed forces with a single command over them, not to adopt legislative acts concerning the defense of the CIS without the coordination of fundamental questions on an interstate level, to develop a unified concept of reforming the Armed Forces of the former Union, and to conclude an interstate agreement on the procedure for maintaining the armed forces.

The commander in chief reported that a meeting of the heads of state will be conducted in Minsk on 14 February on the resolution of questions in a package of documents that regulate the status of the Armed Forces in the transitional period.

Briefly summing up certain results of the speeches at the officer assembly, they were all permeated with acute anxiety over the fate of the country, over the security of the Fatherland, and over the unity of the Army and Navy. This was talked about by Admiral Igor Kasatonov, Colonel General Valeriy Patrikeyev, Colonels Aleksandr Raylyan and Viktor Alksnis, and other comrades. These thoughts were expressed clearly and figuratively by the Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad Kirill in his way: "Oh Lord, give our God-protected country, its authorities, and its military a peaceful life, health, salvation, and success in everything, and protect them for many and many years."

President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin devoted his speech to problems that are fundamental and extremely important to the Army.

In particular, he declared that Russia has supported and supports unified armed forces.

The president reported that at the meeting of the CIS heads of state, they acknowledged that the Navy is part of the strategic combined command. Questions on the Black Sea Fleet and ship units of the Caspian Flotilla will be resolved in separate agreements between Russia and Ukraine and Russia and Azerbaijan.

Touching on the problem of a single military oath, he reported that only seven of the 11 CIS member-states (besides Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Moldova, and, with reservations, Belarus) accepted the unified oath text both for the strategic and for the conventional armed forces. The leadership of Belarus, in the words of Boris Yeltsin, is for unified conventional forces, but without a unified oath.

Yeltsin, Commanders Address Officers Meeting 19 Jan

92UM0397A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Jan 92 pp 1, 2, 3

[Report from Kremlin Palace of Congresses by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents Colonel G. Miranovich, Lieutenant Colonel O. Vladykin, Lieutenant Colonel A. Dokuchayev, Lieutenant Colonel V. Zyubin, Lieutenant Colonel V. Rudenko and Major A. Yegorov: "All-Service Officers Meeting: Fervent Call for Politicians To Be Sensible"]

[Text] And so we continue to report from the Kremlin Palace of Congresses, where the All-Service Officers Meeting finished its work late in the evening on 17 January. The preceding account (KRSNAYA ZVEZDA, 18 January) already said that the atmosphere in its sessions hall very much resembled what was happening at the rostrums and microphones of the first Congresses of People's Deputies of the USSR and RSFSR.

True, the fact that the meeting initially resembled a poorly organized rally is not the officers' blame, but rather their misfortune. The process of the uncertainty of their situation on this sinful Earth dragged on so very long. Then there also were the pickets at the Kremlin's Kutafya Tower and the old women's lamentations: "Sonny, save me!" The person who serves in Moscow or St. Petersburg is more adapted to such things, but the majority who were passing through "purgatory" were not from Moscow or St. Petersburg... Perhaps this too can explain to some extent why some of them demanded first to change the agenda, then to reelect the presidium, and then to call all Commonwealth presidents to the Kremlin immediately.

Be that as it may, in the end the meeting entered a working channel. The turning point came after a speech

by Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev. On 18 January we already published a brief account of the speech and a statement by the heads of nine Commonwealth states on military matters which he read to the meeting. We will only note that this speech once again showed how important it is still to give people the information they need on time in the tragic situation in which our Army is today.

In this sense the speech (we already have given some excerpts from it) by CinC Armed Forces Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov also became a stabilizing factor (if it can be put that way) for the meeting.

"We assembled for our officers council and invited the heads of all independent states to it because the development of events has approached a line beyond which there is confrontation, chaos and national or even world tragedy," said the commander in chief. "It is impossible not to see that acute conflict situations unfortunately are arising in military collectives under conditions where a number of Commonwealth states are beginning to establish their own armies. Some servicemen will not accept the transition to another jurisdiction, taking national oaths and so on. Officers wish to take part in deciding those questions which affect their interests.

"Stability in the Armed Forces," emphasized Shaposhnikov, "is the most important condition for success both of political and socioeconomic reforms as well as of military reform. This is the important thing. We officers must think about and remember this above all today. Political and state leaders also have no right to forget about this.

"The sharp splash of tension," the Marshal of Aviation said further, "also caused steps by certain Commonwealth states aimed at transferring Armed Forces groupings stationed on the territory of these states to local jurisdiction. The transfer is hasty and is being carried out on a unilateral basis without a joint study of the mechanism for transferring formations, units, military structures, installations and property of the Armed Forces and for coordinating the list of everything that falls under such a transfer. Attempts are being made to use the everyday social difficulties of servicemen and their families for one's own purposes."

The commander in chief announced his readiness to assist independent Commonwealth states in establishing their own armed forces. This concerns problems connected in particular with organizing a system for procuring weapons, combat equipment, spare parts and supplies, and a system for repair, logistic support, cadres training and other very important tasks. This also concerns establishing a coordinated, effective mechanism for legal and social protection of servicemen and their families.

"In any case," noted the commander in chief, "the process of transferring a portion of the former Union's Armed Forces to the jurisdiction of a particular independent state is not a one-act or one-sided action. It involves

not only equipment, but also people's destinies and demands a sensible, responsible, planned approach—in short, a state approach."

Shaposhnikov related that hundreds on thousands of letters, telegrams and appeals addressed to the Armed Forces leadership have arrived in recent days and continue to arrive from workers, peasants, engineering-technical personnel, scientists, writers, physicians, officers, enlisted men, and labor and military collectives. All ask that the Armed Forces be preserved and demand that we not allow the Army and Navy to be split into separate and (not at all precluded) opposing units or the defense potential, the common property of all peoples of the former Union, and now the Commonwealth, to be pulled asunder to national homes. The insistent demand of life itself finds concentrated reflection in this common impulse. People will not accept a break in the age-old ties among parts of a recently unified country. It is not only unnatural, but also pernicious. Under the specific historical conditions which have formed, establishing the Commonwealth probably is the only opportunity to save these ties and give sovereignization processes a democratic, creative character.

"There is no doubt," said the commander in chief, "that this opportunity can be realized only within the context of a unified defense space."

A unified defense space is a reality created by joint labor, sweat and blood of peoples and paid for by millions of our countrymen's lives. This is a unified, centralized, precisely coordinated system of operational, material, technical and logistic support; command and control and communications; manpower acquisition; cadres training; military infrastructure and so on, based on a profoundly integrated economy, science and technology.

We have—not in theory, not in political declarations, but in practice—a unified aerospace and military-strategic space and unified planning of Armed Forces employment. All force groupings have been created based on consideration of the military-strategic advisability and missions of collective defense without considering republics' administrative boundaries, which had a purely symbolic significance. The Armed Forces are multi-ethnic in makeup, inter-ethnic in spirit, and function in a unified, rigidly centralized system of official and life coordinates based on principles of one-man command. Coordinated with plans for shifting the economy to a wartime footing, their mobilization deployment is designed for work in a regime that is unified for the entire national economic complex.

Shaposhnikov told about the proposed structure of Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of independent states intended for accomplishing missions in support of the entire Commonwealth. Two basic components are possible in it. The first consists of strategic forces, the agreement on which was signed in Minsk on 30 December of last year and on which there are no serious

disagreements. The second component consists of integrated general purpose forces. Their makeup and command and control procedure obviously must be determined with consideration of national legislation of Commonwealth states and of establishment of their own armies. The primary mission of these forces is seen as providing defense of the Commonwealth of independent states in peacetime and repelling possible aggression in wartime, no matter from whence its danger comes.

Effective functioning of Commonwealth Armed Forces can be ensured only in the presence of a high degree of centralization and unified command. Its principal function consists of organizing coordinated performance of missions of force mobilization and deployment, preparing and conducting combat operations, and maintaining the necessary level of proficiency and combat readiness of forces. In the final account the activity of such a command element will ensure optimization of expenditures of funds and resources for defense and rational use of economic, S&T and other capacities of each Commonwealth state taken separately.

The CinC Armed Forces named the legislative acts whose drafts will be submitted to heads of Commonwealth states for consideration on 14 February of this year. Among them is an agreement on powers of supreme bodies of the Commonwealth of independent states in defense matters, an agreement among states parties to the Commonwealth of independent states on legal principles of Armed Forces activity, an agreement of the Council of heads of states-parties to the Commonwealth of independent states on the Military Oath, and so on.

Speaking on behalf of officers of a Strategic Missile Forces regiment, Senior Lieutenant A. Podzorov condemned the haste of heads of some states in deciding complicated defense questions. The senior lieutenant said that disintegration of defense and the Armed Forces does not meet our peoples's interests, although such decisions are being made on behalf of the people. The drop in the level at which equipment and arms are kept in a fighting condition, which is occurring as a result of disruption of economic ties among republics of the former USSR, is causing serious concern in the regiment's officers.

"Legal nihilism is growing. Taking advantage of the existing situation, first-term servicemen called up from Moldova, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and other republics are deserting, openly refusing to perform official duties, and declaring a lack of desire to serve outside their own sovereign state. Processes of delimiting enlisted men and NCO's by the ethnic characteristic are going on, and because of this even now we have difficulty choosing personnel for performing alert duty, for guard and for the daily detail. For two months now we cannot provide replacements for enlisted men and NCO's performing alert duty since the regiment's subunits are at 60-percent strength, and half of these 60 percent are young replacements from Central Asian republics who know Russian

poorly or not at all. Are such enlisted men capable of mastering sophisticated missile technology?

"The regiment's officers," said Senior Lieutenant Podzorov, "are ready to endure all difficulties and deprivations if they could see clear prospects for the future and felt concern for themselves. But in just the last two years every fourth warrant officer (i.e., all missile launcher drivers) and every tenth officer has been discharged from the regiment because of lack of social protection and the scornful attitude of the country's leadership toward our needs and wants. We ask that on arriving at a duty station every officer and warrant officer be given a separate apartment or that all expenses connected with rental of living space be paid and, finally, that the promise to issue officers food rations and increase pay to amounts ensuring prestige of military service be kept.

"We representatives of Officers Meetings of all branches of the Armed Forces clearly understand that there is no old Union, there is a Commonwealth of 11 independent states," said the next speaker, CinC Black Sea Fleet Admiral I. Kasatonov. "This is reality. But the Minsk agreement signed by these states on 30 December is not being completely fulfilled.

"For us, 30 December is a point when a long hidden worry became firmly established not only in families of Black Sea Fleet personnel, but also in families of officers of other fleets: What will happen to the Navy?

"In the history of all states and all civilized mankind there has never before been such a precedent where an army's people and servicemen have been nationalized together with its property and weapons, their families are nationalized, their destinies are nationalized and the dearest thing, the future of their children, is nationalized. Who could presume that history would bring us such a thing? We surprise civilized mankind for the umpteenth time.

"Passions and a hullabaloo are being whipped up around the Black Sea Fleet, hindering us in performing our official duties. These duties were specified not because someone wanted to have a big or small Black Sea Fleet, but because in performing a common strategic mission and working together with three districts, it participated on the Southwestern Axis in a system of unified defense of a unified strategic space, which did not disappear together with the disappearance of the USSR."

The admiral directed attention to the partition of the Black Sea Fleet. It is based in five republics—Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Georgia announced the nationalization of all Army and Navy property on 30 November of last year. Black Sea Fleet personnel were called occupiers and refugee streams of officer families began flowing. In early December General Dudayev's battle groups reached our garrisons in Azerbaijan and the refugees began flowing from there. Now Ukraine has announced that whoever does not wish to swear the oath should leave for another country. More refugees. Isn't this too much for one fleet?

Kasatonov cited the following example. Two twin brothers, the Kochetkovs, serve in the Fleet, both are colonels, and both are naval infantry brigade commanders. One serves in the Black Sea Fleet, the other in the Baltic Fleet. Their mother is a Ukrainian and father a Russian. They are foreigners with respect to each other, but if Black Sea Fleet Kochetkov will not take a Ukrainian oath, he will be first an occupier and then a refugee and will have to leave with all his family for his brother's two-room apartment in Baltiysk.

"Respecting the sovereignty of the state of Ukraine and the will of its people, we realize that establishment of its Armed Forces is a question that has been decided," said the commander in chief. "We are ready to facilitate this, including to help establish a Ukrainian Navy, and are ready to work constructively, but the talks again have entered a dead-end.

"At the same time, an analysis, study and forecast of all processes going on in the Fleet shows that haste in implementing the decisions being made with respect to personnel will undermine the foundations of service and the people's moral-psychological state to the maximum extent; disrupt the unified system of ensuring explosion and fire safety on ships, watertight integrity of ships and vessels, security of weapons and ammunition including nuclear weapons and ammunition, and logistics of formations and units; and also complicate the ecologic situation to a considerable extent.

"Inasmuch as it is regarded as nationalized, the Black Sea Fleet together with the officers has been planned for a decisive reform by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense without consideration for any kind of scientific forms of planning for combat employment," stressed the admiral. "Therefore we are placing much hope on the wisdom of leaders of Commonwealth states. The Black Sea Fleet is an inseparable part of the entire Navy in the Strategic Forces system. The Armed Forces must be only unified under a unified command element. Those officers and servicemen who already have taken an oath should not take another. There should be an identical package of all social security laws and social protection of servicemen in all Commonwealth countries."

Lieutenant Colonel M. Bekbosynov, chief of a group of the Committee for Work with Personnel, also devoted his speech to questions of servicemen's legal protection.

"We are forced to admit bitterly that a planned process of dissociating the Army into large and small units is gathering force," said Transcaucasus Military District Commander Colonel General V. Patrikeyev. "But the Armed Forces were created over decades by all peoples; they have been and are multi-ethnic; they have accomplished and are accomplishing missions for defense of the homeland and therefore must be unified and subordinate to a unified command element.

"From the standpoint of external conditions it has taken shape historically that the Transcaucasus always was a

center where interests of different countries got entangled and this often led to wars. Suffice it to recall the bloody events with outside intervention during 1918-1921, i.e., that time which very much resembles ours. From the standpoint of internal conditions, the situation itself dictates the need to preserve unified Armed Forces and district forces as a very important stabilizing factor. The ill-conceived, hasty division of the Army under conditions of economic crisis, general ruin, impoverishment of the people, the debauch of lawlessness and crime, paralysis of executive authority, and the absence of a mechanism in independent states for command and control of forces will lead to the most negative consequences and can become a detonator for new conflicts.

"While people in a number of republics of the former Union speak with alarm about the danger of civil war," said the commander, "it already is blazing here in the Transcaucasus, blood is flowing, and the number of victims is growing, including among servicemen. It is painful to speak of this, but since the beginning of the armed clashes (December 1988) up to the present time 73 of our servicemen have died and 710 have been wounded or injured. The personnel serving in the Transcaucasus are paying in this way for the politicians' mistakes. We know of instances of brutal murders of officers before the eyes of their loved ones. Light, heat and water are being turned off for garrisons. Reprisals are threatened against servicemen's children and wives. It is difficult to purchase food products and basic necessities and to give medical assistance. All this showed up especially vividly and in a concentrated way in Tskhinvali and Stepanakert.

"A reasonable question arises: On whom should demands be placed for all these torments and deprivations? Who should be 'thanked' for such conditions of existence? I will say honestly and frankly that the officers' patience is not infinite.

"Therefore," declared the colonel general, "our call to political and state figures at all levels is as follows. We have sworn an oath to the people, and you swear an oath to reason and common sense; preserve the unity of the Armed Forces; create normal, tolerable—in short, human—conditions of service. And we will fulfill our duty.

"It is no secret that right after the former Union republics former autonomies and other state formations are declaring their rights to an army ever more loudly. People already are trying to force us to swear an oath not only to republics, but to almost every village where a unit is stationed. For example, recently the district staff received the following document—a decree of the Supreme Mejlis of Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic of 2 January of this year, which states that all military and economic structures, property, arms, and military and civilian equipment of Armed Forces units stationed on the territory of the Republic belong to the Nakhichevan ASSR and all Armed Forces units are obliged to obey the Supreme Mejlis and coordinate their activity

with it. If we follow such logic, then a question may arise in the near future about resubordinating troops and having them take the oath of allegiance to a kray, oblast, city or village. But this is absurd!

"How much longer can we tolerate such humiliations and retreat in fundamental questions? Where is the guarantee that anarchism, complete license and lack of restraint do not gather force under the yardstick of democracy, and will all this not lead to new inter-ethnic clashes? In this connection I would like to raise the question of transferring the district to the jurisdiction of Russia, which is taken positively by servicemen and would put an end to various talk about our 'nothing' status. But in this case it is necessary to immediately change the manpower acquisition system and work out agreements on the presence of district forces on the territory of the Transcaucasus Republic."

Colonel N. Butenko, a representative of officer aviators of the Transcaucasus Military District, continued to discuss the problem which was touched on. "Swiftly pulling the Army asunder to national quarters can lead to the confrontation of military groupings of different republics," he said. "The officers are most disturbed by the fact that in pushing blindly and without preparation for a division of troops, the politicians are thinking least of all about the fates of hundreds of thousands of servicemen against whom this process will pass like a fiery sword, crumbling and breaking their destinies and lives and the destinies of their families. Many are being shamelessly sacrificed for the ambitious desire to have one's own national royal host. It is impossible to cut something living. It is also difficult to imagine the different military doctrines of Slavic republics. Do Ukraine, Belarus and Russia really plan to see each other as a probable enemy? This is blasphemous!"

"I serve in Western Georgia," said Colonel Butenko. "The situation there is tense in officer collectives. The officers are especially indignant that no one wants to think about our fate. My colleagues often ask me: Whose are we? Whom are we defending here? Ninety-nine percent of the people do not want to serve in Georgia, for we are occupiers' there. It is a similar situation in the Baltic and Pridnestrovye, but it is much more difficult in the Transcaucasus. A civil war is going on there in which we do not wish to intervene. I pass on the demand of my comrades and believe the meeting will support it: with today's situation, withdraw troops from Georgia and all the Transcaucasus. The officer deems it necessary to temporarily suspend combat training activities and resolve questions of the security and evacuation of families and the withdrawal of troops."

The meeting listened with great attention to Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, a permanent member of the Sacred Synod and chairman of the Department of External Church Relations.

"The church is above politics," said the metropolitan, "but considers it to be its duty to exert influence on the

individual and society in such a way as to promote the moral and spiritual transformation of this society. The reason why a church representative is among us today lies specifically in concern over moral consequences of everything occurring in the Army and with the Army.

"First of all I would like to say for those who do not know this that the Orthodox Church prays for the Armed Forces in its every divine service. There is a special petition for authorities and the Army. The church does not pray especially for any other professional category. Why? Well, because the powers that be and the Army possess special strength for influencing human destinies. They possess power. The destinies of the people and state, the destinies of citizens and, finally, the most valuable and sacred gift, human life, depend on them to a greater extent than on anyone else. The price of a mistake or crime is especially high here, and the consequences of sin and moral disorder can be especially terrible and devastating. To our great sorrow, for seven decades our society amused itself and jeered at the memory of Orthodox priests and also fiercely trampled the graves of those 5,000 chaplains who together with their flock rotted in the trenches, went into battle, and burned and sank in Russian combatant ships. Even from incomplete data, in the years of World War I more than 1,200 combat orders were presented to chaplains. The church also was concerned for the morality and spiritual condition of the soldier because the soldier is obligated to be dedicated to his duty like no one else, because performance of military duty demands what is most terrible and most sacred—giving one's own life. This is a moral and spiritual exploit. It is not performed by a person who is internally weak and faulty. This is why so many soldiers were canonized. Among them is the saint and great martyr Georgiy Pobedonosets, the saint and lord and master Grand Duke Aleksandr Nevskiy and many, many more. Therefore the soldier, as no one else, needs preservation of high ideals and moral integrity. The undermining of these ideals deprives the soldier of moral motivation for his military labor and turns the Army into an assembly of people carrying enormous danger to the surrounding world. Without high moral ideals the Army not only loses its ability to protect the homeland, but becomes a force dangerous to its own people. It is no accident that the moral and ideological decay of the enemy army always was an especially important mission of opposing sides.

"Quite recently," said the Metropolitan, "I visited Baltic Fleet combat formations. I must say to you that for me this was a touching experience of most profound emotional feelings. What did I see on Baltic Fleet ships? I saw devotees there who are performing most difficult service under very difficult conditions, pardon me for saying so, in poverty, in isolation from families, without sufficient food, without normal living conditions. What moves these people? The only thing they had not lost was love for their people and their homeland. Let us think what will happen with these people and with the Army and

with our nation if armed people lose this great moral motivation to perform their military service sacrificially and selflessly.

"A strong tendency for radical realization of their sovereignty is found now in the policy of some states. Historically such sentiments can be understood; they largely are a reaction to the past with all its callousness toward ethnic, cultural and religious principles. But what is important for political leaders to understand today is that no principles are capable of dividing a community of people of many centuries, and the more radically a policy of division is followed, the fewer chances it has for success, since it is impossible to divide families, separate children from parents and run a border between husband and wife. We really have largely become a single people. And this is not a propagandist cliché from the recent past, but the result of many centuries of life together. Not considering a history of many centuries means to repeat the terrible, tragic mistake of previous authorities, who reiterated the historic commonality of the people and ignored national principles. Boundaries that are run through the human heart are doomed to destruction, as the Berlin Wall was doomed to destruction. Therefore under our conditions a policy of radical sovereignty cannot be carried out without enormous risk of inflicting moral damage on society and provoking the gravest social consequences. Under these conditions voluntary self-limitation of states in implementing their sovereignty would be the most humane, noble and vital thing under these conditions. Such self-limitation does not carry in itself anything insulting for states but, to the contrary, attests to their strength and the wisdom of their leaders. It is quite obvious that this wisdom must be displayed above all in the area of organizational development of our own Armed Forces. Why? Well, because the creation of full-fledged, modern armies—not military units called upon to ensure internal security, order and all the rest, but specifically full-fledged, modern armies—by independent states, armies located in the immediate vicinity of each other, harbors danger. The boundary between armies is the only boundary capable of turning into a combat front. And the division of a unified army troubles the church, again not out of geopolitical considerations and not for the reason of a disturbance of military balances, but for the reason that the division is a great threat to our common security, a threat stemming from us ourselves.

"Today an enormous, epochal responsibility rests on all of you, my dear ones, and also on the politicians: in the face of our great history, in the face of our long-suffering people, to do everything to see that the free national development of states which have formed by the will of fate has a harmonious concord and at the same time that these states never tear apart that historic commonality which is millennia old and which lies in the genes of their own citizens."

The Officers Meeting gave the Metropolitan a standing ovation as a sign of special favor and respect for the speaker.

As if accepting the challenge of Captain 1st Rank Yu. Soldatenkov, who spoke following the Metropolitan and who reproached the heads of Commonwealth states for not showing proper concern for servicemen, Russian President B. Yeltsin ascended to the meeting rostrum.

"The August putsch and then the will of the majority of Union republics made the existence of a unitary state impossible," said Boris Nikolayevich. "Formation of the Commonwealth of independent states provides a chance to preserve the closest economic, ethnic and spiritual ties among our peoples, who have a common destiny, history and hopes. A very complicated process of searching for a historic compromise on the question of the Armed Forces is under way and it definitely must conclude with a specific, precise result, and not with its disruption."

The President emphasized that close coordination of operations in the military sphere, especially for nuclear weapons, is a very important factor of political stability, both in each of our states as well as in the Commonwealth of independent states as a whole. These questions were decided immediately, and the fundamental unity in the position of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine was confirmed in Alma-Ata, Minsk and Moscow. Command and control of nuclear weapons is only in two hands, that of the President of Russia and the CinC Armed Forces. Commonwealth states are for unified, strategic Armed Forces with a unified command element and joint control.

"Military cooperation of states—and this is confirmed by world experience—does not infringe on independence but, to the contrary, strengthens it and reinforces states' capabilities for ensuring their own security. No matter how difficult it may be, there still is forward movement. This was confirmed once again by the meeting of the heads of state of the Commonwealth of independent states in Moscow. A number of very important documents were signed and fundamental agreement was reached to form a plenipotentiary group from representatives of the states in a week's time for considering the full set of questions involving the Armed Forces. Above all these are questions of social protection, civilian and political status of servicemen and their families on territories of Commonwealth states, and financing of the Armed Forces. Ministers of foreign affairs were charged with examining the question of ratifying the Treaty on a Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe as well as complying with other international treaties of the former USSR in the sphere of international security, disarmament and arms control. It is inadmissible for obligations assumed by the USSR to ensure international security to be buried. Russia will do everything to see that this does not happen.

"And so," said Yeltsin, "states of the Commonwealth of independent states are beginning a negotiating process on military matters. I believe that in making political decisions the parties must give maximum consideration to the position of the servicemen themselves."

"A protocol on naval symbolics was signed at the Moscow meeting. This is of special significance. For several weeks now the status of Navy ships and vessels has remained uncertain. Our Navy is outside the protection of international law. It was necessary to urgently settle this question. Delay could lead to unpredictable consequences. The heads of Commonwealth states confirmed that the Navy is part of our integrated Strategic Forces. The question of the portion of forces of the Black Sea Fleet and the portion of ships of the Caspian Flotilla will be decided by separate agreements between Russia and Ukraine and between Russia and Azerbaijan. From now on the historic Russian Flag of St. Andrew, a white background with two diagonal blue stripes, becomes the primary naval ensign.

"The question of the oath in Strategic Forces of the Commonwealth and General Purpose Forces has been decided. The CinC Commonwealth Armed Forces determines the procedure and time periods for administering the oath to servicemen. The decision was made that only conscripts/new recruits will be sworn in. Officers will not take a second oath. Unfortunately, only 7 of the 11 Commonwealth states adopted a common oath for the Strategic Forces and General Purpose Forces. Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan and Moldova did not join. But Belarus is for unified Armed Forces; for now it has not decided on the question of a common oath.

"The heads of Commonwealth States confirmed readiness to conclude an agreement in the very near term, more specifically on 14 February of this year, on the status of Armed Forces on the territory of states parties to the Commonwealth. Appropriate documents have been sent to all heads of state. Questions of a reduction and restationing of troops henceforth will be decided only on the legal basis of states of the Commonwealth of independent states.

"Opinions differed," remarked the President, "as to what are Strategic Forces. In our understanding they are not just those forces armed with nuclear weapons. We believe that they should include the Navy, Air Force, air defense, Strategic Nuclear Forces, tactical nuclear weapons, intelligence, surveillance and control.

"Commonwealth states declared their will to exclude any restrictions on rights and freedoms of servicemen and their families. The decision was made to work out a program for resolving housing questions in the shortest possible time. Financing for 1992 on Russia's part is growing for these purposes. A fundamental agreement was reached on a coordinated procedure for pension support of servicemen on the territory of Commonwealth states."

Boris Nikolayevich further announced that CinC Armed Forces Marshal of Aviation Shaposhnikov will be a member of our delegation at the UN Security Council session on 31 January.

Speaking of difficulties connected with the crisis situation in the economy, Yeltsin emphasized that under

these conditions servicemen must retain coolness, self-control and understanding. Everyone today is familiar with the dangerous attempts to play the Army trump card, draw the Army into ideological opposition and use it as a means of achieving political goals. To the honor of the Armed Forces, such attempts have not been crowned with success. At the decisive moment of August 1991 servicemen displayed their best patriotic and human qualities, did not allow themselves to be drawn into the pernicious bonfire of opposition and preserved the civilian peace. More than once the Army has been placed under the most extreme conditions and often was forced to make a difficult choice. And today the question of the future of the Commonwealth Armed Forces has arisen especially acutely: How will they be structured? Who will lead them? What will their functions be?

"It is clear," said the President, "that the principle of a simple, elementary division of a unified Army organism is unacceptable. Russia as well as Kazakhstan will stand for integrated armed forces. But you know that through the will of a number of parliaments the problem of national armies of Commonwealth states is being discussed and decided. The Russian leadership's position on this question is definite and clear—Russia has been and is firmly for integrated armed forces. That approach enables deciding questions of financing the Army and providing identical guarantees of social and legal protection for all servicemen.

"Russia has been showing long self-restraint. We have not become pioneers in creating a national army, but if the majority of republics begin forming their own armed forces, we will be forced to do the same. One more very acute question. Personnel of forces outside the limits of the Commonwealth of independent states in republics of the Baltic, in Georgia and also outside the territory of the former Union express the greatest uneasiness and alarm, and for good reason. I am announcing that Russia is taking these troops under its jurisdiction with a simultaneous offer to begin talks on their destiny. My Ukase specified a special commission for these talks. I believe no one will perceive imperial schemes in this decision. We are proceeding from the need for immediate political and social protection of servicemen and their families in these areas. I ask the heads of independent states and citizens to correctly assess this forced step.

"A very important question is vital support of the Armed Forces. The government of Russia has reached complete mutual understanding with the Armed Forces high command on the military budget, although talks also were not simple. It stands to reason that this budget does not take into account expenditures of independent states for forming their own national armies. The basis of the new budget is a fundamentally new approach—a socially oriented military budget has been adopted in Russia for the first time in all the history of our Army. I emphasize socially oriented. Sixty percent of all budget funds have a human direction. Those items for which there was no money and which were shifted to the shoulders of the Army itself now become a priority. Russia is assuming

expenditures for conversion, RDT&E and so on. If we preserve the people," said Boris Nikolayevich, "and help them hold out in a difficult time, then we will preserve everything: equipment and weapons, security and independence of the Commonwealth of independent states." He also announced that in connection with price liberalization pay has been increased by 90 percent and the indexing of servicemen's pay and allowances is being introduced in 1992. Periodically, at least once a quarter, the level of pay and allowances will be revised with consideration of the growth of prices.

"A considerable increase in volumes of housing construction is required," said Yeltsin further. "Here, too, nonstandard decisions are needed. We are making them together with the high command. Realization of an understanding with Germany on building military compounds on the territory of states to where units are being withdrawn from the former GDR has begun. I am announcing today that the housing debt, 120,000 apartments in the Russian Federation, must be extinguished in the first half of this year. Those administration heads of oblasts and krays who do not fulfill this decision and the President's Ukase will be removed from positions based on results of the half-year. In addition, by agreement with the mayor of Moscow, with Moscow Oblast, with the mayor of St. Petersburg and with Leningrad Oblast, 20,000 hectares of land is being allocated for approximately 70,000 families, ten one-hundredths of land each, for officers discharged to the reserve who could build their own housing and build cottages. This is approximately one-third of what is being allocated to all of Moscow and almost half of what is being allocated to St. Petersburg.

"Now various world states are expressing a desire to purchase certain kinds of our combat equipment. The U.S. President and I were speaking about the fact that we do not have to divide the arms trade market, but to trade in those kinds of weapons which is permitted under international treaties. We are ready to agree to this temporarily while there are certain difficulties with the budget for the Army and to direct net currency for building housing, basically for officers. Not only to finance construction organizations, but also pay officers one, two or three thousand dollars each for building their own homes on a family plot. An understanding has been reached with Marshal of Aviation Shaposhnikov about granting the right to engage in commercial activity in districts and in armies, without detriment to combat readiness of course. These decisions were not dictated by the situation, but proceed from the need to protect the person in shoulderboards. This must be done quickly. An All-Russian Center for retraining officers discharged to the reserve has been established.

"I receive numerous appeals, including from participants of the Officers Meeting, that decisions for social protection of servicemen are not being carried out locally," said the President, "and not just because there are so-called objective reasons. There is a conscious inhibiting, even sabotage, of many matters. My attitude

toward such facts is unequivocal—a leader must answer for nonfulfillment of Russian laws, ukases and instructions. I signed an Ukase according to which leaders of the local administration are fined R5,000 the first time, R25,000 the second time and receive two years imprisonment the third time for nonfulfillment of the President's ukases. I think this will sober many. There is an understanding of the Russian parliament to take special additional measures on this matter in the shortest possible time."

In conclusion Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin emphasized that Russia does not plan to fight anyone. "We solemnly declare that we believe in the priority of political means for ensuring the security of our state and Commonwealth. But the principal lesson of our history is as follows: the peace and confidence of our citizens can be assured only when the Armed Forces are in order."

Colonel V. Alksnis, who was given the floor following the President of Russia, was brief and categorical. "A coup d'état took place in the country. The Commonwealth of independent states is a fiction," he said, and proposed electing a coordination council of the All-Army Officers Meeting with broad powers and electing its chairman. Representatives of the Officers Meeting must be present at talks of the heads of Commonwealth States, in the opinion of Alksnis.

"We are extremely indignant and concerned over the inactivity of heads of Commonwealth states with respect to servicemen of formations and units of the former USSR Armed Forces," said the following speaker, Captain V. Kosyrev. "We have ended up hostages of a political situation which has formed in the Nakhichevan Republic. The Supreme Mejlis of Nakhichevan essentially placed our formation outside the law by whipping up the situation around the status of forces. War was declared on us.

"We are told with surprising frankness: hand over weapons and equipment and get out! The republic leadership disdains no methods and means to achieve this goal. Everything is used, from lies and threats to direct provocations and armed attacks. The republic mass media have widely joined this campaign of moral pressure. The atmosphere heated up even more after a speech by Geydar Aliyev over republic television on 9 December 1992. Aliyev openly declares: 'If the equipment, arms and supplies are not handed over, I will myself will perish, I will spill the blood of the people, I will open the border with Turkey and Iraq and will announce this to the entire world.'

"Inspired by the decisions and fiery speeches made by their leaders and stupefied by the anti-army hysteria, armed bandits and local residents are humiliating the human dignity of officers and their families, enlisted men and NCO's. Human rights are crudely trampled with respect to many hundreds of officers and their families.

"Division officers," announced the captain, "are indignant over the ease with which illegal force elements are putting weapons to use and they ask the questions: What stops us, who have a right to legally bear arms, from using force to protect our families and our own dignity? We believe in the sensible reason of politicians, but our patience is not boundless. Six years of waiting for a political decision have not brought the Army results. The only thing we ask today is to urgently decide the question of evacuating families and personal property of officers and do this before the end of January 1992."

The speech of Colonel V. Sapsay [name mostly illegible] from 40th Army was disturbing.

"What awaits officers at the end of service? Will we be accepted in our historic Motherland, as has been customarily said since recent times, although we have one Motherland—this is one-sixth of the land of the entire Earth, which just recently was called the USSR.

"Officers demand that politicians and parliamentarians of independent states adopt agreements and normative acts guaranteeing safety, protection of rights and personal dignity of servicemen, their families and Armed Forces veterans regardless of national affiliation and citizenship, and preservation of Armed Forces unity.

"The partition of the Army and Navy now being observed can in no way be civilized. It is possible to divide arms, equipment, ships, missiles and nuclear weapons (in accordance with the proportional contribution made to their creation by each republic of the former Union), but it is impossible to separate mother from a son, father from children, brother from sister.

"What kind of armed forces combat readiness can we speak of in pulling the Army asunder to national quarters? Two-thirds of the officers of our Army's Missile Troops and Artillery declared a readiness to travel to Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Who will replace them? And has general disarmament begun in the world?"

V. Niyazmatov, representative of the President of Uzbekistan, then spoke.

"The President of the Republic of Uzbekistan is not present here in view of the natural disaster of floods in Karakalpakstan," he announced. Later Niyazmatov noted that "Uzbekistan of 20 million residents is for integrated Armed Forces—that is the president's position. The Uzbekistan law on jurisdiction over forces does not affect the honor and dignity of the Armed Forces. The Supreme Soviet is taking steps for social protection of servicemen and their families. The republic is conscientiously fulfilling agreements reached with the Armed Forces leadership and is showing its positive attitude toward the Army in action. Every tenth soldier is being called up from Uzbekistan." The speaker requested that those assembled be more attentive to the needs and cares of soldiers from the republics. "Let us

ensure that service in the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of independent states remains a school of friendship and comradeship. The Uzbekistan Supreme Soviet is at your service."

The next speaker, Major General V. Vostrotin, a representative of the Airborne Troops, noted that decisions of the 1st All-Service Officers Meeting were not fulfilled. He expressed doubt that this meeting as well could advance the questions being decided. The speaker suggested reassembling the All-Service Officers Meeting on 14 February, when the heads of the Commonwealth of independent states will assemble, thereby placing the presidents face-to-face with representatives of the officer corps.

Colonel V. Solodiy, a representative of the Daugavpils Higher Military Aviation Engineering School, noted in his speech that the pulling asunder of the Armed Forces also largely became possible because of the inactivity and sluggishness of the main commissariat and General Staff in deciding questions of reforming the Army and Navy. They proved to be unprepared by 30 December 1991, which then permitted the beginning of an uncontrolled pulling asunder of the Armed Forces already in January. "Therefore I deem it necessary," said the colonel, "to establish constantly operating entities from the All-Service Officers Meeting, to reinforce the role of officers meetings at all levels, and to revise the Statute on the Officers Meeting in this regard in the shortest possible time."

Speaking on behalf of the council of the Moscow Garrison Officers Meeting and the Officers Meeting of the Military Academy of Armored Troops, Colonel A. Betke suggested reflecting in the appeal by participants of the All-Service Officers Meeting the officers' unanimous will to stop the "parade of oaths," invest members of the coordination council with the right to participate in talks on military matters, and establish a one-and-one-half to two-month period for resolving immediate problems of the Armed Forces.

The participants elected a coordination council of the All-Service Officers Meeting. Then an appeal was adopted to peoples, parliaments, heads of governments of the Commonwealth of independent states, and Armed Forces personnel (published in this issue).

CinC Armed Forces Marshal of Aviation Shaposhnikov and Major General of Aviation N. Stolyarov, representative of the Committee on Work with Personnel, held a press conference immediately at the conclusion of the Officers Meeting.

They thanked Russian Federation President Yeltsin, Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev and also Uzbekistan Supreme Soviet Presidium Member Niyazmatov, the representative of President I. Karimov, for active involvement in the work of the meeting and summed up some of its results.

The fact of establishing a coordination council of the All-Service Officers Meeting probably can be considered the most noticeable of them. In the words of Marshal of Aviation Shaposhnikov, this new public structure will help the High Command resolve burning problems of military organizational development and will become his support.

"We succeeded in keeping the meeting within a framework not permitting the leadership to be accused of organizing a political demarche for the purpose of exerting pressure on presidents of sovereign states." That was General Stolyarov's summary.

There is also one other result. The military leaders believe that the Officers Meeting will be noticed by the heads of states who did not take part in its work, and as a result military questions will be resolved in a more weighed manner at the February meeting in Minsk.

Judging from the words of the CinC Armed Forces, the position of delegates who defended unified armed forces were unexpected for him. He formed the opinion that many did not understand what country they were living in and knew nothing about creation of the Commonwealth of independent states. The Soviet Union is no more, and so it lacks prospects to stand to the death for something "unified and indivisible." "Now it is possible to speak only about integrated Armed Forces with a unified command," said Yevgeniy Ivanovich, "and perhaps only in the future, after conclusion of bilateral and other agreements, about a defensive alliance."

A reproach was addressed to organizers of the All-Service Officers Meeting that they did not allow a single representative of a public organization engaged in social protection of servicemen to speak.

To this Marshal of Aviation Shaposhnikov said that he was against representatives of any organizations participating in the meeting, since this is an Officers Meeting and only officers elected by their comrades have the right to work in it.

Of course, the journalists could not help but ask the head of the military department questions concerning results of the meeting of heads of states which ended recently. Has there been any progress in talks on the fate of the Black Sea Fleet? Has the position of Ukraine changed with respect to the three military districts?

It became clear from the answer that Ukraine's position remains unchanged with respect to the districts. They are close in views on Strategic Forces. "With respect to the Black Sea Fleet, I believe we have not yet exhausted all possibilities for continuing a constructive dialogue," said the commander in chief. "In particular, about its division. It may be partially handed over to Ukraine, but the bulk will remain in the Commonwealth of independent states."

NATO Example for CIS Viewed—Part III

92UM0349A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Major M. Pogorelyy, under the rubric: "From the Experience of Foreign Military Structural Development": "3. Will We Follow NATO's Example?"]

[Text] (Conclusion. The first two parts are in the January 9 and 10 issues.)

NATO Allied Armed Forces do not exist in practice. Troops of 14 bloc countries, which are under national command in peacetime, are assigned to the NATO Allied Armed Forces in the event of war. But there is no single, united military armada right now.

Of course, some elements of the Allied Armed Forces continuously function. And despite their small numbers, they are very important and weighty elements. This is the question of commanders-in-chief headquarters and staffs that are continuously fully manned and supported at the required level of combat readiness, and communications, command and control and surveillance and warning systems and organs. Of the ground and naval forces that have actually already been transferred to the subordination of NATO in peacetime, we can note the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force, the permanent units of the NATO navies in the Atlantic, the permanent units of mine-sweeping forces in the English Channel, the AWACS-Nimrod early warning radar air division, and also a number of division-sized and smaller units that are part of the single PVO [Air Defense] system.

A unified command authority of the bloc's armed forces has not provided for in NATO's structures during their deployment—this function lies in the collective organ of military leadership—the Military Committee. The committee commands the three main commands—European, Atlantic, and the Straits Zone—through its international headquarters.

Here we feel the need to make a small digression. As a result of a discussion of the various variations of the future Soviet Armed Forces by the leaders of the Commonwealth states and their alteration and revamping, the appropriate diagrams have also appeared in the press where the interested parties attempted to find a "niche" for all of the formations—national and united, strategic and conventional. When the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, I do not think that anyone drew such diagrams. They concluded the required agreements on coordination of the Western European Alliance forces and American forces, at that time occupation troops, that existed at that time. Later, the bloc's military structure developed and was formed while proceeding from the conditions that were dictated by life.

The Allied European Command was the first to be established—on April 2, 1951, that is, two years after the

treaty was signed in Washington. A year later, the allied Atlantic command and the command in the straits zone were formed.

If you glance at the diagrams of these 40 year-old organs, you can discover many "superfluous" subunits that do not exist today. At the same time, many new ones have appeared. This is associated with the withdrawal of some countries from the bloc and the entry of others, and the change in the composition of the allocated troops and the broadening or narrowing of the functions of command and control organs.

It is most convenient to examine this process using the example of NATO's Allied European Command and its structure in the past, present, and foreseeable future. Forty years ago, the four commanders-in-chief—ground and naval forces in Northern, Central, and Southern Europe and the Mediterranean Sea were subordinate to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the NATO Allied Armed Forces in Europe. By way of illustration, the Mediterranean Sea Command included the commands in the zone of Gibraltar, in the Western Mediterranean (Algeria, at that time a colony of France), and in the Central (Naples) and Southeastern (Malta) Mediterranean Sea. Later, with Greece and Turkey's entry into NATO, commands were added in the Northeastern (Ankara) and Eastern (Athens) Mediterranean Sea.

Today, as we all know, there is no headquarters for a Mediterranean commander-in-chief—it was merged with the command in Southern Europe. At the same time, besides this and the two other headquarters for commanders-in-chief—in Northern and Central Europe, there is the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force and also the British Air Force in the NATO Allied Armed Forces in Europe. Moreover, the NATO AWACS air division is operationally subordinate to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the NATO Allied Armed Forces.

And a decision was made at the December 1991 session of the NATO Military Planning Committee in Brussels so that in the near future only three commanders-in-chief remain within the Allied European Command—in Northwestern, Central, and Southern Europe. And quite a few changes will once again occur within them. Take, for example, the command in Central Europe: right now, there are five main elements in it—the Northern Group of Armies, the Central Group of Armies, the Air Force command and, accordingly, the two Allied Tactical Air Forces. And in the near future, all of these structures are being transformed into two commands—Ground Forces and Air Force in the Central European TVD [Theater of Military Operations].

We can cite a multitude of similar examples. The essence is that all of them will illustrate the idea that maintenance and development of the combat capability and combat readiness of the military alliance, the bloc—is a process, and not a diagram that has congealed once and for all or that is divorced from reality.

We have already said that the NATO Allied Armed Forces actually do not exist in practice. And nevertheless the divisions, ships, and air squadrons that have been allocated to the allied structures have long since been designated. Little differentiates the 8th Mechanized Division that is tasked for operations in the NATO Allied Armed Forces from, say, "ordinary" American troops—and this is primarily the great emphasis on the propaganda of their readiness to carry out their "international duty" during the course of political training. This is also valid with regard to Canadian, Belgian, Turkish troops, etc.

However, they do still have specific features of combat training: operations in a coalition structure, when the neighbor to the right may be Germans and to the left—British, are rehearsed in all major exercises. But this is still at the division level. And at the unit and subunit level, they practice the exchange of experience with reciprocal trips to each other's units (not for a visit but at training centers and ranges), competitions between tank and BMP [Armored Transport Vehicle] crews, artillery crews, pilots, etc., to fulfill combat training standards. Commanders periodically drive out to familiarize themselves with assigned operational areas and subunit and unit personnel study these areas during appropriate troop, flying, and fleet exercises.

Here it is also interesting to note the fact that the foreign troops that are deployed on the territories of the NATO allied states get along quite peacefully with the "native" armies. The foreign military presence does not cause mass protests of the country's population in which they are stationed (even in Iceland which does not have its own armed forces). The fact is that the status of the foreign troops, the conditions of their stay, and their rights and obligations have been stipulated and legally reinforced by the appropriate interstate agreements. And the "peaceful population," as a rule, only gains from having foreign military bases operating near their populated areas since the bases create additional jobs and are a solid source of income for local budgets.

The composition and strength of the ground and naval forces allocated to the NATO Allied Armed Forces are not permanent. If these parameters had an adequately stable trend toward expansion during the period of the "golden age" of the Cold War, recently they are gradually, but steadily, being reduced as a result of changes in the situation and the actual end of military confrontation in Europe. This is occurring by withdrawing British and U.S. troop units and also by a 25 percent reduction of the armies, for example, of the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany], Netherlands, and other member countries. So, American troop strength in Europe must be reduced in half—approximately from 300,000 to 150,000 men—and air force units must be reduced by more than a factor of three in the shortest period of time.

As of today, 3,660,000 servicemen, over 7,000 aircraft of Air Force, Air Defense, and Navy tactical air forces, nearly 30,700 tanks, nearly 47,000 BMP's [armored

personnel vehicles] and BTR's [armored transport vehicles], over 57,000 artillery systems, up to 500 surface ships of the primary classes and 200 submarines can be included in the composition of the NATO Allied Armed Forces (NATO experts also include France's potential in these data. France is not part of the bloc's military organization in peacetime).

Briefly summing up, I would once again like to stress that NATO as a bloc and as the Western countries' system of coordination on defense issues is constantly in development, in movement, while accepting life's challenges and reacting to them, but in so doing not causing harm to the security of the NATO member countries or by sacrificing the bloc states armed forces to internal and international political processes.

Military Collapse West's Nightmare

92UM0322A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by A. Matveyev: "Dispute over the Armed Forces—a Nightmare for the West"]

[Text] The fate of the armed forces of the former Union for a long time has not been just a question of internal politics. The world is following with considerable tension the dispute that was started by the newly born independent states over one of the most powerful armies on the planet.

Officials are trying to exercise maximum caution in their assessments. Thus, a special spokesman of the U.S. State Department expressed the hope of the administration that Russia and Ukraine will find a mutually acceptable resolution to the problem of the Black Sea Fleet. At the same time, U.S. President G. Bush, who is in Japan on a visit, does not conceal his concern for guaranteeing control over nuclear weapons on the territory of the countries of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States].

But V. Vimmer, parliamentary state secretary in the FRG Ministry of Defense, declared that there is a certain risk associated with the creation of individual armies of the CIS states. He sees the role of the West in limiting the magnitude of the future military potential of the republics.

The commentaries of the world press are more alarming. One of the few relatively clear points in the Minsk agreements is the paragraph on strategic armed forces, writes LE MONDE. The paper emphasizes that they include the navy. However, Ukraine, which considers itself a naval state, is not paying particular attention to the agreement. It intends, acting without preliminary permission, to establish its own control over armed forces and the fleet. The policy of "take first and then discuss," LE MONDE indicates, places servicemen in an extremely complicated situation.

A much more extravagant assessment about the armed forces in the USSR was given in an interview with Henry

Kissinger by the Japanese NHK television company. Based on the existing realities, he believes the establishment of military regimes possible in the manner of the Pinochet regime in some of the former republics, including Russia.

The reporting of the American television company CBS is also a symptomatic expression of alarm in the West relative to the fate of the Soviet armed forces. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, a very powerful arsenal in the world became an object of buying, and, judging by available information, the reporting indicates that the rulers of Iran are the first in line. Iran is trying to get hold of not only modern aircraft, tanks, and PVO [Air Defense] systems, but nuclear technology also. The development of events, the reporting indicates, is a nightmare for Washington. And it becomes even more real in that, as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, a "black market" in tactical nuclear weapons can appear.

The cited opinions can be reacted to in different ways, but they are indicative of how alarmed the world is.

Vitebsk Garrison Supports Unified Force

92UM0376C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Jan 92 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Telegrams to the Number"]

[Text] The officers' assembly of the directorate of the submarine force of the Pacific Fleet advocates a unified Navy.

The chairman of the officers' assembly council is Murgazayev.

The officers' and warrant officers' assembly of the unit at the Vitebsk Garrison is absolutely opposed to the breakup of the armed forces and their piecemeal dispersal to national billets. We are for preserving the collective defense and for unity of the armed forces within the framework of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. We have no desire to oppose other peoples of the former USSR with arms.

Letters Reflect Military Distress

92UM0384A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Jan 92 p 2

[Letters to the Editor, under the rubric: "A Survey of Letters": "Let the Military Oath Bring Us Together and Unite Us"]

[Text] On the eve of the All-Army Conference of Officers' Assembly Representatives, numerous letters and telegrams continue to arrive at the editorial offices in which ideas are being expressed on the fundamental issues of current life and service of servicemen.

In the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the authors, we need to stop, at all costs, the dismemberment of the army that has been initiated by some leaders of sovereign republics and not change the organization of the Armed Forces in the next 2-3 years. During this period, the troops think that the politicians must completely determine their positions on questions of strategy, finally adopt Laws on Defense and the Status of Servicemen, and other legal acts that the army has been waiting for several years.

"To not hear the voice of the military man," we read in a letter from the officers of the Kapustin Yar Range, "was inherent in the leaders of the USSR. The Union Supreme Soviet also did not get around to 'secondary' draft defense legislation. The issue of the fate of the division-sized and smaller units that are being withdrawn from Eastern Europe was also secondary for those politicians. However, with great regret, we are becoming convinced that the handwriting of the union parliament is also being imitated in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. Otherwise, having agreed on the establishment of the Allied Armed Forces, the leaders of the Commonwealth states would not have forgotten to give us, officers, and also conscripts—as it turns out, citizens of different countries—juridical bases for service on the territories of other states. Whether they wanted this or not, the politicians have shifted responsibility from themselves to our shoulders for the chaos and for the fact that tens and hundreds of conscripts have refused to take the oath."

These days our readers write quite a lot on the oath, on duty, and on officers' honor. And if at first glance their words appear to be excessively impassioned, this is only at first glance. Because the oath—is not simply just a legal act but a moral act. It is impossible to cross that day out from life, just like it is impossible to dismiss the words spoken at that time from one's memory.

Therefore, this entire "re-oath taking" campaign is not to the liking of the overwhelming majority of officers and warrant officers.

"All of us have been united and are united by a feeling of responsibility to the people and by the readiness to always defend the people," writes Major-General V. Tonkikh. "We took an oath to do this and we do not want to betray our oath. We do not want to refuse to defend our loved ones who have found themselves in other states through the whim of fate. A man, who has once betrayed his military oath and his military duty, will easily betray it twice."

We read similar words in the open letter of the officers of the Far East headquarters directorate, and in dozens of other letters, that Lieutenant Colonel D. Bogatyrev delivered to the editorial offices. Here are excerpts from

several of them that express the point of view of Officers' Assemblies of armies, and division-sized and smaller units.

"We oppose a division of the army that destroys the single system of security and we do not want to once again swear to some single people today that will confront another people with weapons in hand tomorrow."

From the letter-appeal, adopted by a division Officers' Assembly (Chairman G. Korneyev), to the President of Russia and to the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Armed Forces.

"The attempt to force their own military oath will result in confrontation in officers collectives along ethnic lines and will involve the division in direct combat operations against the Armenian population in Nagorny Karabach."

Colonel S. Bozhko, on behalf of the Guards Officers' Assembly.

"We must not be pawns in political games and therefore we appeal to all servicemen who have taken the oath once to not take another oath."

A. Solovyev, on behalf of a unit Officers' Assembly.

"The absence in our hands of a package of laws and decrees that have been adopted by the Ukrainian parliament and the accelerated process of having officers take a military oath for some not understood reasons causes the officer corps special concern. We demand a legal solution to the problem of releasing us from the previously taken military oath and we consider it necessary to review the period of its adoption."

Carpathian Military District Tank Division Officers Delegate Presidium.

"We have taken an oath of loyalty to the people which did not cease its existence along with the Soviet Union. We think that taking any other oath is premature until that time when the status of servicemen has been defined and until the problems of the social protection of servicemen and members of their families have been resolved. All attempts to resolve the fate of the Armed Forces without considering the opinion of the officer corps is considered to be immoral."

Colonel Kulikov, Guards Officers' Assembly Chairman Transcaucasus Military District.

Appeal by Carpathian District Officers

92UM0384B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 17 Jan 92 p 2

[Excerpt from an Appeal of a Carpathian Military District Officers and Warrant Officers General Meeting:

"From the Appeal of Carpathian Military District Officers and Warrant Officers General Meeting"]

[Text] The appeal states that, in accordance with the demands of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the military district headquarters, we have to take an oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine in the period from January 15-20, 1992. While preserving our loyalty to the oath we previously took, we have served in Afghanistan, participated in the cleanup of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant and other natural disasters, and have constantly rendered assistance to the national economy and we are worried about the accelerated division of the Armed Forces.

In our unit, 58 percent of those serving are Russian, 37 percent are Ukrainians, and five percent are representatives of other nationalities. Some of them want to serve in the armed forces of other Commonwealth states. Others want to serve in the Ukrainian Army. While trying to avoid aggravating the situation in military collectives, we demand an individual solution of the fate of each serviceman.

Moscow Officers Support Unified Force

92UM0384C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 17 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Moscow Military District Headquarters Officers' Assembly Council Chairman Major-General P. Rovenskiy: "The Conference Participants Speak"]

[Text] Moscow Military District Headquarters Officers' Assembly Council Chairman Major-General P. Rovenskiy:

The hope that common sense will prevail in the actions of political leaders, parliaments, and governments has still not completely died out in me.

The unity of the Armed Forces is vitally important for each one of us. The Armed Forces were created and manned by all nations and peoples of the former USSR, its foundation is multiethnic, and to divide the Armed Forces right now among the republics or states means to actually cut off a vital component. I hope that all of us, the conference participants, will express our fundamental position on this issue and that we will attempt to use our work to influence the decisions being made by political figures.

Unfortunately, I have to certify: despite the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, we still do not have a genuine commonwealth. And this is being manifested in the issue on the army. It was created as a single structure and we definitely need a transition period for its reembodyment into a new capacity. Politicians must clearly recognize this.

In principle, we the military understand that each independent state has the right to have its own armed forces. These armed forces can consist of border and internal

troops and the national guard. Time is needed to establish them. But under no circumstances can we divide those troops that carry out strategic missions in the interests of the entire Commonwealth and that have a single, common structure like, say, the PVO [Air Defense] Troops. Their division is practically impossible without their total destruction. This also applies to the air force and the navy.

Or, take this aspect. The Western, Northern, and Northwestern Groups of Forces exist at the present time. Sooner or later, they will have to be withdrawn. But if no single Ground Forces command exists, who will decide their fate?

This applies to our nuclear forces to an even greater degree where the existence of a single command is the only rational solution.

Patrikeyev on Army's Stance in Georgia

PM2101161192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Jan 92 p 2

[Interview with Colonel General V. Patrikeyev, commander of the Transcaucasus Military District, by Captain First Rank A. Pilipchuk and Captain Third Rank V. Yermolin; date and place not given: "The Army Remembers How It Was 'Set Up'"]

[Text]

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Comrade General, there are many stories in the press about which members of the opposition and of Gamsakhurdia's government appealed for help, and to whom in the district command. Could you now tell us who tried to make contact with the military during the days of the siege of Government House and when?

[Patrikeyev] During all these events I happened to be on leave—the commander in chief of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Armed Forces gave me permission to have a rest. In my three years as district commander I had seen not a ray of hope, as it were. There has constantly been a tense situation. At this time I was replaced by Lieutenant General Grekov, my first deputy. Both the opposition and Gamsakhurdia appealed to him for assistance. But the troops did not get involved in this conflict. That was my intention too. That is, to preserve neutrality. Any other approach would have produced the same result as in April 1989—the Army would have been to blame for everything. After all, it was not on their own initiative that the military intervened in the course of events then either—the Georgian Government appealed to them. What was the result? No, today we did not repeat this mistake.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Did you personally adopt the decision on neutrality or was it issued by Moscow?

[Patrikeyev] I kept in touch with Marshal of Aviation Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS forces. But neither my deputy nor I held any talks with any of the CIS leaders.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] After the president left Government House and went to Armenia, did members of the republic Military Council and the interim government not approach you for assistance in restoring order to the city—it is no secret to anyone that Georgia, and Tbilisi in particular, has been virtually overwhelmed by a wave of gangsterism. And maybe it was proposed that you participate in military tasks aimed at strengthening the new authorities?

[Patrikeyev] No, no one made any such proposals to us. We do not intend to carry out any joint military operations to resolve tasks of Georgia's domestic policy either. I repeat again: The Army does not and will not interfere in the republic's internal affairs. As for gangsterism, then there really is such a problem, and we the military, and indeed our families, perceive it no less keenly than the local population, and perhaps even more so. Recently, following Zviad Gamsakhurdia's departure, attacks on servicemen and military units have no longer been of a mass nature, but men in uniform are targets for all kinds of bandits.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Tbilisi's military commandant told us that today it is Gamsakhurdia's supporters who are firing at the military with the aim of provoking the Army and drawing it into armed conflict.

[Patrikeyev] We are not denying the possibility of this. But if we could talk about some kind of joint actions between the Army and the local authorities, only one option is possible here: Coordinated patrol by Army and, for example, militia patrols. But this means patrols with the sole aim of fighting bandits and the criminal elements which are terrorizing people almost unhindered today. However, this option can only be discussed when the political situation in Georgia is more or less normalized. When political forces clash in the struggle for power, the Army's intervention turns into a catastrophe for the country and for the people. It is enough to recall Yugoslavia... [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Well, relations between Mr. Gamsakhurdia and the district troops are well known. Paradoxically enough, the president appealed for assistance to... the "occupation" troops. It was he who put this term into circulation. And what do you think of the future relations between the district and the new Georgian Government?

[Patrikeyev] The Military Council statement recently broadcast on republic television that the district troops on Georgian territory are being taken under government protection gives hope for believing that these relations will really be new in quality. Lieutenant General Sharashenidze, acting defense minister of the republic, has publicly stated that they reserve the right to appeal to the district troops for help in case of any external threat. There have, however, been no such appeals to date. I

recently had a discussion with Tengiz Sigua, acting prime minister of Georgia. He briefed me on the new government's program of action. You can probably talk about a sharp change in attitude toward the Armed Forces. We have before us the fact that the parliamentary decision describing the Soviet Army as an army of occupation has been rescinded.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Comrade General, officially the district troops took no part in last December's events. Are you able to say with certainty that not a single district serviceman violated the order on Army neutrality?

[Patrikeyev] No, I cannot say that. Nor do I rule out the possibility that servicemen participated in the storming or defense of Parliament House—but in a private capacity. Unfortunately, the Army's long embroilment in local conflicts, the attacks on servicemen and their families, thefts, and firing upon military units have created the kind of atmosphere in the Army where it is difficult for the most emotional officers and NCO's to maintain personal neutrality, as it were. But I repeat, I possess no facts of any participation by district servicemen in the events surrounding Government House. And if there were such incidents, they can only be condemned.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The press has published information that a number of Officers Assemblies issued statements during December that in any event, even if Moscow were to so order, not a single serviceman would leave his barracks or take part in the storming or defense of Government House. What do you say to this? Are you as commander sure that the troops would obey your order in this case?

[Patrikeyev] No, I have no such certainty. I would remind you once again that the Army has experienced a campaign of persecution and psychological terror, and in many cases armed terror too, this specifically relating to the events of April 1989. They remember how they were "set up" at the time... And no one is sure today that the Army will not be "set up" in similar fashion once again.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] We have visited the troops and spoken with officers, warrant officers, sergeants, and privates. The general mood is far from cheerful. Many talk about the undefined nature of their position here.

[Patrikeyev] My opinion is that the district troops here, in the Transcaucasus, should switch to Russian jurisdiction. The status of the district should be examined at governmental level. Certainly, if Georgia does have its own national troops, we will, as part of the CIS defensive doctrine (and the elaboration of such a doctrine is probably a matter of the very near future), find points of contact with them—in the security interests of Russia and Georgia. Only the principle of recruitment has to be changed: National formations being manned by local draftees, while the district troops will be correspondingly recruited from Russians.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Do you think that the question of withdrawing district troops from sovereign Georgian territory will be raised in the near future?

[Patrikeyev] No, I do not think so. I think that the republic government realizes that the troops here are performing tasks in the republic's interests too. And as far as a possible initiative from the Russian side is concerned, such a step would be mistaken, in my view.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] But how are the lives of servicemen and their families to be protected if the situation deteriorates? It cannot be ruled out, after all, that the region might become a civil war battlefield?

[Patrikeyev] We have sufficient forces to evacuate servicemen's families in good time and defend our military camps and units. But let us hope that it will not come to that.

Servicemen's Letters Complain About Living Conditions

92UM0300A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 3 Jan 92 p 1

[Letter to the editor under the title: "Let Us Be Friends with the Armies? What the People in Uniform Are Writing Us"]

[Text] This letter is from a group of servicemen of one of the line outposts of the Megrinskiy border detachment, which is located at the junction of three states—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Iran. Owing to the situation that has developed, service in this region is becoming unbearable.

Officially we have ended up being drawn into the Armenian-Azeri conflict as a third party, but we have simply become a "scapegoat" and the one to blame for all of the troubles. There is no mutual understanding between us and the population and no complete trust in each other. The Azeris do not believe us, because we are Christians. The Armenians complain about the fact that we sold ourselves to the Muslims. But as a result, neither one side nor the other helps us with material support, even though economically we are fully dependent on the local population. Not even half of the food supplies are being delivered. Medical service is worse than all of the established norms. It is not generally known now who will come to replace those who are demobilized.

After the discharge of the autumn callup, the strength level of the outpost will be at about 40 percent, and this means that each one who remains behind will have to serve for two persons at a minimum. Only who needs us here? What are we guarding? The border of what state?

[signed] O. Listopad, A. Mazur, and others

Today, all of my fragile faith in the future was shattered, like a glass falling to the floor. I received a phoned telegram that all of those who were drafted from the Transcaucasus, the Baltics, Moldova, etc., are to be

discharged immediately and assigned to serve in the national guard. In the next few days, we are supposed to go for replenishments to the training unit, but very likely the trips will not take place. After all, after this telegram, there are also practically no people there either. Well, this year we will pull through somehow with 25 persons in a company. But by summer, many will be discharged, and only four persons will be left. Imagine, a company with four people with 11 pieces of equipment!

But the position on the national guard was explained to us as follows: They say, it will defend the internal borders of the republic-states, and the Union army the external borders. But if everyone will now serve only "at home," then who will stand guard in the interests of the whole commonwealth?

[signed] Lieutenant R. Saduyev Moscow Oblast

After long debates in the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic, the first reading of the draft law on defensive troops took place. Before the implementation of the law on citizenship, the male population between the ages of 18-28 years is being called into active service in the Estonian Army. The term of service will last 18 months, and the state language in the army will be Estonian.

The decision that was made did not evoke great enthusiasm among the draftees, many of whom had just returned from the ranks of the Soviet Army, and who now received new notices. Something else is not clear. On what grounds are the citizens of a "neighboring state" (this is what the former USSR is called here) being drafted into the army; that is, people who do not claim local citizenship and the rights associated with it?

[signed] I. Alifanov Paldiski

I took an oath of loyalty to the Union. I am a Russian officer. But why does no one ask me whether I want to serve in a sovereign Uzbekistan...

[signed] Captain S. Belyayev Samarkand

We, officers of the district training center, make this request—immediately resolve the question of the protection of the rights of servicemen of the Soviet Army and members of their families, the future use of units, determination of their status, or withdrawal beyond the borders of the Chechen Republic.

The situation that is developing around military units in the republic is continuing to get more complicated with each day. In November alone, four motor vehicles, of which only three were later found and returned, were hijacked from units of the district training center under the threat of the use of weapons. At the present time, one-third of all servicemen of the district training center are being assigned for service in military compounds to guard facilities, which does not permit qualitative training of junior specialists. All gunnery and driving are being conducted only in coordination with the local

leadership and under the control of their representatives, but in the last month and a half they have been prohibited entirely.

By an ukase of the president of the Chechen Republic of 26 November 1991, all transfers of military equipment and arms are forbidden. Representatives of the national guard are attached to units, and they conduct checks on motor vehicles and documents, and also property, being brought into or taken out of military units. With this ukase, all arms, equipment, and property belong to the Chechen Republic and cannot be removed from its territory...

We request that you arrive at a decision on the future purpose of the district training center, or the feasibility of locating military units on the territory of the republic.

The request was adopted at an officers' assembly of the military unit.

[signed] Groznyy

So, who are we—defenders of the Motherland, or occupiers, as our position was defined by the leadership of Georgia? And until when and in behalf of what will servicemen of the Soviet Army die on the territory of the republics of the Transcaucasus, and how long will we be hostages here to "high" policy, while sensing a total indifference to our fates on the part of the supreme organs of authority of the country and the USSR Ministry of Defense? **From an appeal adopted by an officers' assembly of the directorate of the Air Army of the Transcaucasus Military District. Considered and supported by the officers' assembly of a large formation [obyedineniye].**

All of the present leaders of the former Soviet republics think that their own army is an essential element of statehood. But as a result, the matter is leading to the fact that instead of a reduction in the Soviet armed forces, about which so much has been said, we will have an increase in numbers of national armies in the republics. Simple arithmetic provides the sum of the overall number of such armies, which substantially exceeds the current composition of the armed forces. The burden of military expenditures is growing immeasurably and will be placed on the same tired backs of the people. On you, dear citizens of the former Union. And at the same time, believe me, the existing Soviet armed forces are capable of defending the people of our whole commonwealth. All that is necessary is an immediate adoption of a law on the army and the creation of acceptable living conditions for servicemen.

About myself:

I am a serviceman, a lieutenant colonel. I am married and have two children. I receive 688 rubles. I ask myself how I am to live further. The main questions for officers of the older generation now are housing and a pension. Who will pay the pension, for example, to me, a Russian, if I am already serving the fourth year in the Republic of

Azerbaijan? Who, where, and for what period of time will someone give me an apartment? But there are thousands like me, tens of thousands.

[signed] P. Korytin Baku WS

Dividing Strategic, Non-Strategic Forces

92UM0392A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 14 Jan 92 pp 1, 2

[Article by Pavel Felgengauer: "Moscow and Kiev, It Seems, Have Reached an Agreement: The Future Fate of the Army Will Not Be Decided in the Government But in Officers Assemblies"]

[Text] The emergency plan developed by the Russian leadership for the purpose of a quick resolution of the military-political crisis in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] is being fulfilled for the time being. Established in accordance with this plan, the "state delegation of the Russian Federation" conducted rather successful negotiations in Kiev: The Ukrainian leadership made certain fundamental concessions, agreeing to divide the Army and the Black Sea Fleet deployed in Ukraine into "strategic" and "non-strategic" (Ukrainian) parts. Before this, Ukraine laid claim to the entire Black Sea Fleet and to all general purpose ground forces. Only units of the Strategic Missile Troops (RSVN) and strategic aviation were acknowledged to be strictly strategic (that is, subordinate to a unified command).

It should be noted that until very recently the Russian leadership did not have its own clearly formulated position on defense issues. Even now, in the middle of January 1992, there is no final clarity as to where the Ministry of Defense of the former USSR ends and Russia begins.

But the leadership of the Ministry of Defense of the former USSR was also ready earlier to "turn over" to Ukraine a significant part of the large ground units deployed there. It was proposed to divide the group more or less "fairly": that is, approximately in half. It was also proposed (as was recently admitted by Commander in Chief of the Navy Chernavin) to assign to Ukraine two brigades of armored boats and a helicopter regiment from naval aviation. Moreover, this was only the initial position of the Ministry of Defense—during the negotiations (as became known from reliable sources in the military department), further concessions were possible.

However, "mobile" forces (the Air Force, Navy, and Airborne Troops, and certain other elite large units), according to all calculations, were supposed to be allotted to strategic forces subordinate to a unified command. Thus, Ukraine would receive a sizable army in numerical strength (and, together with this, considerable military expenditures from a lean republic budget). However, such forces would not be in a condition to independently (without the support of the CIS unified forces) resolve any number of important strategic combat tasks.

But a deal like this does not entirely please Kiev. At the all-Ukrainian conference on questions of military force development on 9 January, General Konstantin Morozov, minister of defense of Ukraine, set forth plans for the transformation of the group of forces in Ukraine into a powerful independent Ukrainian army. The resubordination of the Black Sea Fleet has particular significance, as far as can be judged. However, having one's own navy is not at all a big power whim.

If a substantial part of the Black Sea Fleet (and also naval aviation) become Ukrainian, all merchant shipping on the Black Sea will turn out to be completely under the control of a foreign state for the first time for Russia since the Russo-Turkish wars. But, after all, it is through the southern ports that most of the vitally important grain imports arrive. Any interrepublic economic or political conflict, like those that occur now almost every week, could lead to a naval blockade, which Russia will not be able to oppose. The only hope of defense from such a threat is a Russian Black Sea Fleet that is not weaker than the Ukrainian fleet. Thus, the sole reasonable and cheapest solution to the problem both for Russia and Ukraine is to leave the main forces of the Black Sea Fleet under a unified command.

The spontaneous opposition of the officers to the "second" Ukrainian oath prevented Ukraine from taking over units and large units without prior arrangements. In the meantime, the Russian leadership succeeded in working out a semblance of its own position on defense questions. It demanded serious concessions from Ukraine. Simultaneously, it became known that Russia is ready, in the event of failure of the negotiations, to temporarily take under its control all the armed forces of the former USSR, including those deployed outside the territory of the Russian Federation. This, it must be assumed, also helped to achieve the well-known progress during the negotiations in Kiev. Now, the problem of the Ukrainian army will be resolved by military experts, who are faced with a monstrously difficult task: to decide the fate of each individual unit—which to assign to "strategic" and which to assign to "Ukrainian" forces. The parties, in essence, returned to the former "pre-Alma Ata" situation. Not entirely, however. The dramatic events of the first week of January involved field grade officers (the foundation of the Army) in the interrepublic struggle. And to the extent that officers assemblies are dragged into politics, the Army loses the previous unconditional controllability.

In the middle of December the Army would have accepted any "compromise" solution to the division of the forces in Ukraine. Only several officers would have submitted requests for transfers. But now it cannot be guaranteed that units "ascribed" to Kiev will comply with a decision reached behind their back. Moreover, some units can, in turn, refuse to subordinate themselves to a Combined Strategic Forces Command.

An all-Army officers conference was held in Moscow on 17 February. It is quite possible that a majority of the

delegates will express themselves for unity of the Armed Forces of the former USSR. In addition, it cannot be excluded that at this assembly, or soon after it, some permanently acting coordinating organ of the officers movement will be established. The presidents of the CIS will have to cope with a new political force.

Baykal Troops Choose Assembly Delegates

92UM0376E Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Jan 92 p 2

[Report by Colonel V. Kovalev, KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Our Last Hope"]

[Text] The election of delegates to the All-Army Conference of Representatives of Officers' Assemblies has been completed in the Transbaykal Military District. The district will be represented by 50 people. They are being sent to Moscow with a package of proposals generally reflecting the opinions of all the officers in the collectives.

District officers have spoken out firmly in favor of preserving a united armed forces within the framework of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] and centralized control, and for proportionate participation in their financing by each of the states. They demand that precisely defined standards be worked out on all defense matters, including the procedure for serving, the status of the servicemen and their legal and social protection. The Transbaykal personnel believe that there should be a common military oath in the armed forces for the transitional period.

The package also contains more than 20 specific proposals for ways to reform the armed forces and measures to provide social and legal protection for servicemen.

Officers Call for Preservation of Military

Fate of Army Disturbs Officers

92UM0367A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Jan 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "The Officers' Assemblies: No to the Disintegration of the Armed Forces"]

[Text] Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Yermolovich, enrolled in the third course of study in the command department at the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze, will be coming to the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in two days, along with thousands of emissaries of the army and navy. He, like the majority of participants in the All-Army Conference of Representatives of Officers' Assemblies, is an officer at the regimental level. He is 37 years old. He commanded a detached reconnaissance battalion in the Far East before coming to the academy. He is married with two children. Viktor, like many other participants in the conference, does not yet have his own housing on the territory of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. But it is not their own lack of

amenities that troubles this and other representatives of the officers' assemblies with similar biographies.

What will the army be? Will it be able to defend its integrity under the conditions of the expanding "militarization" of the sovereign states, thereby saving the CIS itself? Will an end finally be put to the lawlessness directed against the people in shoulder boards? These are the questions whose answers they await from the politicians.

Judging from the appeals coming continuously to the editors, some of which we are publishing, this troubles a great many today.

Military 'Hostage' in Political Game

92UM0367B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 Jan 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "From the Appeal of the Officers' Assembly of the Moscow Garrison"]

[Text] Moved by a feeling of loyalty to the peoples of the Commonwealth and by military duty, as it says in the appeal, we assert that the political games with the armed forces are taking on a more and more dangerous nature for the civilian world, the security of the Commonwealth and the fate of the servicemen who have become hostages to those games. The growing rift between political realities and the legislative base, along with the incompetence of the new power structures in resolving military issues, is creating an arbitrary climate and encouraging adventurism among some politicians, who traffic in ideas of the supremacy of their own national rights while relying on armed force. The tragedy of an army that has experienced the collapse of the political system is threatening to disintegrate into a nationwide one.

While recognizing the right of sovereign states to create their own armed forces, we call for:

- a curtailment of the legal force of unilateral standard documents in relation to the armed forces and, first of all, the hasty taking of oaths, since an oath taken under pressure is immoral;
- joint agreement on establishing a transitional period for the transformation of the armed forces; the preparation of a program to create unified strategic forces and integrated armed forces for general purposes in the interests of the collective security of the Commonwealth, as well as their own armed forces for those independent states that have expressed a desire to do so, with the participation of military specialists, political and legal scholars and economists on the constitutional basis of national legislation and international law; and
- preservation of the integral nature and unified system of command and control for the armed forces until the

completion of the transitional period; the development of laws providing for the socio-political protection and status of servicemen during times of service and after their discharge into the reserves.

We appeal to the peoples of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Making no claim of any privileges and sharing to the full the deprivations of the transitional period, the officers are ready to overcome any difficulties together with the people. But we cannot consent to a hasty break-up of the army and the navy, contradicting the interests of the people and to common sense. In the interests of the security of our peoples and for the sake of peace and friendship in our land, demand of your parliamentarians, presidents and governments, in the name of our future children and grandchildren, that our proposals be supported.

We appeal to all officers and all servicemen in the armed forces. Fellow servicemen, schoolfellows and comrades-in-arms! We took an oath of loyalty to all the peoples of our country. No one has released us from that oath. We will be prudent; our hands hold weapons entrusted to us by all the peoples of the Commonwealth. We call upon you for restraint, so as to give our politicians a peaceful climate to adopt laws on the armed forces.

We call upon the participants in the All-Army Conference of Representatives of the Officers' Assemblies on 17 Jan 92 to support our position.

Our information. *The Officers' Assembly of the Moscow Garrison that was formed on 10 Jan 92 unites the officers' assemblies of the military units, institutions, military educational establishments and veterans, and "Afghan," Cossack and other social organizations of officers and servicemen.*

Northwest Officers: 'We Are One Army'

92UM0367C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 Jan 92 p 1

[Excerpt "From the Appeal of the Officers' Assembly of Units in the Ventspils Garrison of the Northwestern Group of Forces to the Officers of the Kiev, Odessa and Carpathian Military Districts and the Black Sea Fleet"]

[Text] We serve in one army, took one oath and have made one common cause. It was our comrades who spilled their blood in Afghanistan, who lost their lives and health at Chernobyl. And now they are trying to make us oppose one another. Remember the officer's code of honor—the oath of loyalty to the Motherland is given one time. Yes, the USSR that we swore to is now gone. But the people to whom we swore loyalty remain.

The time has come when we need unity in our ranks, as never before, so as not to permit the chaos into which shortsighted politicians are trying to drag us. Do not forget our brothers-in-arms who should soon be returning to the Motherland from Germany and the Baltic countries, either.

We call upon you, regardless of your nationality, to demand unified armed forces and not to take an oath until the ultimate resolution of the issue at the next meeting of the heads of the independent states.

Missile Troops on Military Division

92UM0367D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 Jan 92 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Hear Our Voice"]

[Text] *From the appeal of the missile troops:*

The army has always been the pride of the peoples populating our Fatherland. Today they are trying to divide it into "theirs" and "ours," which conceals a great danger. The members of the Commonwealth, having agreed on the existence of combined armed forces, have unfortunately forgotten to give us officers and all servicemen any legal guarantees for normal service. This has shifted onto the shoulders of officers the responsibility for dozens and hundreds of inductees who are refusing to take this or that oath.

At the same time our comrades, without legislative assurance of the prospect of service in a state that is frequently their motherland or of housing or a pension, are made to face a dubious dilemma. What should they do—violate an oath they already took at one time, or refuse to swear allegiance to the republic on whose territory they are currently serving? Is that moral?

It is essential, in such difficult times, that the political figures listen to the voices of the people in shoulder boards.

Officers' Assembly of the Kapustin Yar Test Range—Strategic missile troops.

Readiness Must Be Preserved

92UM0367E Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 Jan 92 p 1

[Excerpt from an open letter from the officers of a strategic missile troops unit as passed on to the editors by Major A. Korbut]

[Text] We feel it necessary to remind you, it says in the letter, that under the conditions of the complex interethnic relations on the territory of the former Union and the instability of the international climate, that it is essential to preserve a combat-ready army that consists not only of the strategic forces, but also the other branches and arms of the service, able to ensure security within the framework of a unified defensive expanse.

Kazakhstan Troops on Oath

92UM0367F Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Jan 92 p 1

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel A. Ladin: "Telegram to the Paper"]

[Text] The officers of an army directorate stationed in Kazakhstan have come forward with a demand to halt the arbitrariness in relation to the army and navy. Before pursuing any reforms, they feel, it is essential to back them up with standard documents and consult with those who are immediately protecting the interests of the state, in whose hands are the weapons... The officers' collective declared that the oath that was taken earlier by the servicemen of the former USSR does not contradict the principles and aims facing the armed forces or the interests of each of the states of the Commonwealth.

Belarus Officers on Oath, Officers' Meeting

92UM0367G Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 Jan 92 p 1

[Interview with Belarus officers by Colonel P. Chernenko: "Within the Bounds of Common Sense"]

[Text] *Our correspondent visited some of the military collectives of the Belorussian Military District on the eve of the All-Army Conference, interested in the opinion of soldiers on the current situation and the coming forum in Moscow.*

Guards Colonel V. Patskov, commander of a motorized rifle division: The soldiers of our unit are not so much surprised by the decision of President L. Kravchuk—to take under his authority the troops stationed on the territory of the republic—as they are by the haste in the taking of the Ukrainian oath by all personnel.

The Supreme Soviet of Belarus, in my opinion, adopted very much the correct resolution: the new oath of loyalty to the Belorussian people will be taken only by those soldiers who have not taken an oath before and were called up at the end of the last year. They are all from Belarus, so there will be no problems. And one cannot, it is my firm conviction, take an oath twice. The circum-spection of the Belorussian parliament inspires the hope that there will not be such confrontation in Belarus as arose in the Ukraine.

Guards Major V. Kan, deputy commander of a training truck battalion for armaments: The All-Army Conference, in my opinion, should categorically say "no" to the break-up of the armed forces and their dismemberment into national armies. As soon as those of us cadre military who have fulfilled our duty to the Motherland and the people honorably and conscientiously face the choice of whom to serve, after all, we will be separated by nationalist barriers.

Senior Lieutenant N. Kuzmin, commander of a communications platoon: It is sad to recognize that the army has once again become a bone of contention, that the politicians are once again trying to solve their problems at the expense of the military. Experienced commanders, excellent specialists and young officers are leaving the army due to such an attitude toward it. If this continues in the future, there will be no one to serve in the army.

Western Troops Officers on Oaths

92UM0367H Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent V. Khabarov: "We Are Creating the Problems Ourselves"]

[Text] The telephones do not stop ringing at the correspondent's office of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for the Western Group of Forces [WGF]. The commanders and representatives of the Officers' Assemblies of the units, along with the soldiers and officers, are expressing serious concern that attempts are currently being made to break up the armed forces into several armed formations. The Officers' Assembly of the Guards Berlin Order of Bogdan Khmelnitskiy Motorized-Rifle Unit commanded by Guards Colonel Yu. Makarov, well known in the WGF, has come out decisively in favor of the preservation of a unified armed forces for the Commonwealth for a transitional period right up to 1996. A demand to adopt legislation defining the status of officers and guaranteeing observance of the civil rights of servicemen has been heard.

And here is another topic of dissension in the military collectives. "The impending oath of loyalty to Russia has literally blown up the previously calm atmosphere in the subunit," said Senior Lieutenant S. Ivanov, commander of a motorized rifle company. "Judge for yourself. We have representatives of five sovereign republics serving with us. And while the Russians have no problems with taking the oath, what about the Ukrainians, Belorussians and Uzbeks? It is even harder for the officers to make a choice—due to their lack of social protections..."

The representatives of the Officers' Assemblies from the Western Group of Forces, in short, have something to say at the All-Union Conference.

Regiment Officers' Meeting Views Reported

92UM0374A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Lt Col A. Dokuchayev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "Commentary About...": "Endurance for You, Comrade Officers"]

[Text] It was difficult to offer any advice to captains Yuriy Ilinchik and Tofik Agayev, who visited the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA office yesterday. They had already gone to the Main Commissariat of the Ground Forces, the commander in chief and his deputy for personnel. They did not receive an encouraging response there. And just what advice can one give people who find themselves in a situation which only recently could not have occurred even in a nightmare? These men were practically refugees in shoulder boards.

The officers' meeting in the regiment in which these officers serve was held before it became known that there was to be an all-army conference. The regiment is stationed in the Azerbaijan republic, near the city of

Priship. In the opinion of the officers themselves it is one of the best. The military have good relations with the local population, and the people share the joys and sorrows of the military. One late day in December, however, Azerbaijan's minister of defense appeared on television and proposed that all the officers join the armed forces which the republic is beginning to form. It was noted that no one was waiting for them in Russia, the Ukraine or Belarus. They had a choice like the one described in the old anecdote. The leader came to the Caucasus. People brought him a lamb for a picnic and said: "Take your choice, dear one." "But there is only one. Where is the choice?" he replied. Their answer: "You're the only one we have too, but we choose you...."

"My roots are in Belarus," Captain Ilinchik told us. "I would like to return there toward the end of my service. But what do I get? No one will transfer me to the Belorussian Military District. So I remain here in Azerbaijan's army. How are my compatriots going to greet me when I am discharged? And then it is simply absurd to count on an apartment or a pension. Most of the regiment officers are in the same situation. We came here under orders. We all thought that after a time, toward the end of our service, we would return to the area we like. But what are we going to do now? We went to the commander. Major General Popov simply threw up his hands and said that there was nothing he could do. So we came to Moscow for justice."

While the officers are "seeking justice" in Moscow, we learned, not a ruble from the central structures and not a kopeck out of Azerbaijan's budget is going into the account of the army deployed in Azerbaijan. And we are not talking about the future. The men might not be issued their pay tomorrow. How are they to feed their families?

The units in Georgia are in an even worse situation. Officers of the Armed Forces of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] cannot understand what they are doing in a state which is not a part of the Commonwealth. And there is no need even to talk about service or living conditions. The barter system has been used for a long time now to maintain the vital functioning of the units there. They trade whatever they can.

The situation of the army in the Ukraine seems to be improving. Once you take the oath there, you are in clover. Not everything is so simple even there, though. And what are the thousands of officers to do who were inducted from the Ukraine and are presently serving in the Far East, the Transcaucasus, Siberia, the groups of forces...? Many of them wanted to return there, but how can they? It is a difficult choice even for those who have apartments in the republic. In order not to lose them, these people have to be discharged from the armed forces of the former USSR.

These represent only a small portion of the problems which will descend upon the officers if the armed forces break up. Dozens of telegrams and appeals presently

arriving at the editorial office, the main commissariats of the armed forces and other offices represent a cry from the heart. They are our common agony. And we are not even talking about the fact that the people in the shoulder boards have been reduced to a position of begging. Politicians who were recently advocating a professional army apparently intend to do everything possible to turn it into something worse than an amateur force. There is practically no combat training in the units. But then how could this be arranged, when there is a shortage of personnel, when the main concern is to feed the people and keep them warm, when, as some specialists believe, our technical military support is dropping to the level of armies of the developing nations? And then, against this backdrop new armies are being formed....

The demands of the officers who have visited the editorial office of late have been diverse and tough. And their questions have been difficult ones. And just what are we to answer, to advise you, comrades?

The first thing would probably be to endure. An officer myself, I admire those who serve in "hot" spots, in a situation in which banditry is sweeping entire regions. We all need endurance to give the politicians an opportunity to find some reasonable way out of the chaos into which they have thrust us either deliberately or as a result of complete incompetence in defense matters. In the meantime the editorial office is receiving dozens of documents and suggestions which, it seems to me, might help us find a way out of the crisis. Aware that the politicians and law-makers have not shown proper concern for them for a long time now, the officers are getting down to working out legal documents. And their everyday demands and suggestions also deserve attention.

Here are some excerpts from an appeal by officers of a motorized rifle regiment, which the officers we have met, captains Ilinchik and Agayev, brought to the editorial office.

"Set up an inter-state commission to resolve the issue of withdrawing and redeploying units and subunits from the Transcaucasus Military District. Send empowered representatives from the CIS and the governments of the Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova by 25 January 1992."

"Give the officers the opportunity to serve under a unified command by reforming the armed forces."

"Work out the procedure for transferring weapons, equipment and other materiel to representatives of the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan."

"Leave the personal weapons, the equipment and supplies needed for the regiment to exist."

"Adopt the legal constitutional basis and status for servicemen located in the independent states which have not signed the agreement on conventional armed forces under a unified command."

I shall cite a few points in order to demonstrate that the officers of this regiment—an ordinary, rank and file regiment, I underscore this fact—think in state terms and, I believe, are wiser than some of our politicians. The officers demand that their legal status be defined, viewing this as the prime job right now. And the supreme soviets have indeed passed dozens of laws, many of them good ones, which will, at least in the future, provide for a normal life for our compatriots. At the same time the lives of the military continue to be governed by departmental acts and have absolutely no protection against arbitrary rule. The functioning of the army and the rights and duties of servicemen, a special kind of citizens armed with modern weapons, should be regulated only by the law.

The officer corps is a part of the people. They have a right to demand wisdom and deliberated action on the part of the politicians. The voice of the officers must be heard.

Formation of Officer Assemblies Viewed, Grozny Officers Demand Redress

92UM0329A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Jan 92 p 2

[Collection of materials under the rubric: "On the Agenda of the All-Army Conference": "The Voice of the Officers Must Be Heard"]

[Excerpts] An all-army conference of representatives of officer assemblies will be held in Moscow on 17 January (not on 14 January as was reported earlier). Many are placing great hopes on this measure. Letters and appeals are coming to this office which raise questions, in their opinion, that require examination at the conference without fail. Materials are also arriving in which the authors share their thoughts on what, in their opinion, should be the overall role of officer assemblies in today's army. We invite your attention to a selection of this kind of material.

Will Hopes Be Realized

The idea of the revival of officer assemblies was labored over by our officer corps, but its implementation unfortunately followed a scenario developed in the main political directorate. The new social organization in the army and the navy was given the role only of a safety valve. Neither the political department nor the party committees wanted to permit a weakening of their influence among the troops. Indeed, the commanders felt more confident in the usual system of rank and authority. Therefore, the officer assemblies in their first year of existence did not become an appreciable phenomenon in the life of the army and the navy.

After the August events and the departyization of the armed forces that followed them, the significance of the officer assemblies should have increased. However, this did not happen. The officers do not sense any kind of real influence of their assemblies on the state of affairs in

units, and the commanders do not know how to rely on the new social organization. But often they generally see the officer assemblies as interference in one-man command.

But I think the latter will disappear by itself with time. It simply is necessary to get accustomed to everything that is new. But how to achieve the effectiveness and influence of officer assemblies, and how to increase their role in the life of military collectives, has to be examined now. Moreover, at the present stage of formation of officer assemblies, the most important thing of all, in my opinion, is to try to define that which should be avoided in the organization of their activity. For then, without unnecessary complications, we will be able to understand what the real capabilities and intentions of democratic structures are in a military personnel environment.

First, excessive organizational bustle and endless reorganizations are capable of destroying any effort. Second, there is the danger of a gradual slipping downward of officer assemblies to the positions of abolished party-political organs. The opinion has already been expressed about the need for a full-time chairman of the soviet of an officer assembly (Lieutenant Colonel D. Tutuk, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of 17 December 1991), but there, before you know it, they propose a deputy for him, and afterwards even want to set up a department... I am ready to argue that 90 percent of the time of this full-time chairman (or department) will be spent on the formation of plans and reports on their fulfillment. It will turn into a bureaucratic organ like the party committee.

There is also a third danger: The officer assemblies will become a democratic screen under the commander. A consultative organ is an organ with which one can consult or not consult. Or after consulting, not listen to it. Whereas officer assemblies can and should play a very active role in deciding a wide range of questions of the daily activity of the military collectives. Why, you will say, do efficiency report boards and officers' courts of honor exist in units to this day? Why are they needed, if there is a soviet of the officer assembly? Is the inclusion of the chairman of the soviet on the staff of an efficiency report board really a limit on trust in the officers' assembly?

The officer assembly should have real powers, weight, and authority. Only then will it become a real democratic institution, and not a cover for the absence of any kind of real changes in the army in the position of the officer corps.

I would like to believe that the problems I have touched upon will become the subject of the most detailed discussion at the all-army conference of representatives of officer assemblies.

[Signed] Colonel A. Sinikov, candidate of military science

It Seems It Can Be Done This Way Also...

There are collectives where new social formations play a notable role on many questions. The officer assembly of this unit in the Northern Group of Forces is talked about as one of the best. Our freelance correspondent met with Lieutenant Colonel V. Susloparov, deputy chairman of the soviet of the assembly.

The conversation is conducted by Lieutenant Colonel R. Abdullin

[Abdullin] Vyacheslav Yevgenyevich, how did you organize the work?

[Susloparov] We started by trying to understand the tradition of the Russian officers and the experience of the officer assemblies—we familiarized ourselves with the history and memorialist literature. This gave a different coloration to today's requirements for the moral and ethical makeup of an officer and to today's traditions. Imagine, if we were locked in conferences, hearing about the "cleaning of uniforms" of officers. Everyone is so sick of this. Our people saw a benefit to themselves in the officer assembly—it began to protect their rights, dignity, honor...

We adopted rules for the officer assembly—a kind of code of honor of officers of our regiment. We come in dress uniform to functions and assemblies, with decorations and medals. On working days, the casual uniform is permitted. Duty, honor, keeping one's word, and equal and even treatment of one another is the law.

What is the officer assembly in its ideal form? This is the officer regimental family. Where does it assemble? A former large officers' mess hall has been adapted for this. Decent furniture and a piano were brought in, and the walls were done up properly, so that the situation would create the right mood and a favorable atmosphere. This unique club opens at 1700 hours daily. A bowling alley, chess, and mahjong are available to the officers. We have a color television and a video tape recorder. There are many musical recordings, especially songs about officers and their traditions.

[Abdullin] But all of this costs a lot of money after all...

[Susloparov] There are several dozen officers in our regiment. By common agreement, they declared a money collection twice, and they understood that without the means it was not possible to do anything.

And there is money in the treasury now. The duty officer of the officers assembly handles it. Anyone who wants to can up to a certain day of each month take, say, 100-200,000 Polish zlotys. The guarantee is a signature in the account journal.

Some of the receipts for the treasury are provided by the slot machine.

[Abdullin] You talked about working days. But how are holidays spent?

[Susloparov] Approximately once a month we hold a special event day on a social basis. We time it with an unusual military date, and we recall eminent Russian and Soviet commanders and their combat experience.

Incidentally, all of the organizational activities fall on the shoulders of the soviet of the officer assembly. Life is life. It becomes necessary to look into conflict situations that are not associated with visits to the officers club. A major insulted a lieutenant colonel. An assembly was held. The one to blame publicly apologized to a colleague, and he gave his word as an officer to behave with dignity in the future. And he keeps his word...

We work in close contact with the leaders of the regiment. They consider our opinion. They do not make decisions without us on questions of advancement in position, promotion in rank, awards, and training assignments.

I think the role of the officer assemblies also has to be increased in the resolution of questions not only in individual collectives, but in all of the armed forces as a whole. In this connection, we are placing great hopes on the forthcoming all-army conference.

[passage omitted]

From a Package of Documents Delivered to the KRSNAYA ZVEZDA Editorial Office by Captain A. Dubov from the Grozny Garrison

There were appeals in the package of the officer assembly to the officers of the armed forces and to D. Dudayev, president of the Chechen Republic.

The first, in particular, says: "At a time when the whole civilized world is uniting, we ended up divided into national quarters. To suit individual politicians who fear unified armed forces, they are trying to put us on different sides of the barricade.

"We demand an end to the redeployment, reduction, and disbandment of units and formations without the resolution of questions of all-round social and domestic security of servicemen."

Just in December of last year, says the appeal of the assembly to the president of the Chechen Republic, 16 illegal actions were committed with respect to servicemen, and, of these, nine with the threat of use of weapons, which could have led to unpredictable consequences. The murder of Major Vladimir Chichkan (duty officer in one of the military units of the garrison; his wife and two little children are left without a breadwinner—Ed.) has exhausted the patience of the servicemen. The assembly demanded the arrest of the criminals and their conviction according to all the laws of the Chechen Republic.

Otherwise, the officers warn, we will take responsibility for the protection of military compounds, ourselves, and members of our families into our own hands.

Lvov Officer on Oath, Pension Problem

92UM0325C Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 9 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Colonel V. Bogdanovskiy under the rubric "Local Reports": "Lvov"]

[Text] Almost every day they talk on the radio about the example of Colonel V. Martirosyan who was the first, together with his communications regiment, to take the oath of loyalty to Ukraine. But the general swearing in ceremony in the Carpathian Military District has been postponed until 18 and 19 January. I visited one regiment to find out the opinion of its officers. Their mood is rather gloomy.

"We are just declaring slogans about the need for a rule-of-law state but in reality we have total lawlessness," I was told by Major I. Belentsev, commander of a motorized infantry battalion. "I am a Russian and I was born in Leningrad Oblast. If I pledge allegiance to Ukraine, tomorrow they can tell me: Conduct your classes in the state language and if you cannot speak it, yield your place to someone else. There are 21 people in the battalion who refuse to take the republic oath for the same reasons."

Here is what senior lieutenant V. Tagayev told me:

"I do not think that language is the entire problem, one can learn it. A multitude of other problems are coming up. My wife and I are from Mordovia. Our parents and relatives live there. It is quite possible that after my service is over I will go back to Mordovia. Who is going to pay my retirement benefits then? Not a single practical issue has been resolved yet. Last night my wife and I could not sleep till midnight as we kept wondering what to do."

Defense Ministry Military Oath Instructions Questioned

PM1701130792 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 17 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Major A. Bashchenko: "To Whom To Swear Allegiance and How?"]

[Text] A decrypted message which began with the appeal "Comrade officers!" was distributed a few days ago through the Defense Ministry communications system. It asserted that "in the period 17 through 25 January 1992 the entire personnel serving in the troops stationed on the territory of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] in the strategic forces and groups of forces will swear the military oath approved by the Russian president."

There followed the text of the oath which, to put it mildly, induces melancholy thoughts. First of all, how are we to understand why the Russian president approves an oath for all Armed Forces of the CIS states?

Somehow I do not recall the Belovezhskaya, Alma-Ata, or other agreements containing such an instruction or at least consent to it.

The text begins with the the assertion that the person who takes the oath enters into military service and swears "allegiance to the Russian Federation and its people." What does "enter into military service" mean? Surely he is not outside the army, surely he was fulfilling and continues to fulfill one of the most honorable types of state service of the country to which he previously swore allegiance?

In addition the servicemen must now swear "to observe the Constitution and laws of the Russian Federation" and to fulfill the demands of the statutes, the orders of the commanders, and so forth. But forgive me, what is the "Constitution of the Russian Federation" and who adopted it and when?

This strange telegram was received by virtually all commanders of formations and units and the entire army officers corps must be familiarized with it. And as for us, who are serving in the troops on the territory of the CIS states or in other countries, how can we heed the instruction that "the military oath in its new draft is taken in connection with the change in state structure and releases servicemen from the previously taken military oath." It would be worth reminding the authors of this offending text that we swore an oath of allegiance to the Motherland which, in contrast to some, we did not intend and do not plan to trade in." Release from the oath is nothing other than betrayal of the Motherland. They want by this means to involve us in the anticonstitutional process of the collapse of the Fatherland.

Unit Refuses To Take Russian Oath

92UM0358A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 11 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by R. Romanenko: "Loyal to the Old Oath"]

[Text] One of the military units located in Vologda (No. 30710) has refused to take the Russian oath. This decision was approved unanimously at an officer assembly.

The officers expressed concern over the breakup of the armed forces, and they resolved to consider the taking of a new military oath premature and to refuse to "take it again in the current political situation." The officers are awaiting the resolution of all the problems from the extraordinary all-army officer assembly.

Russian Oath Stirs Controversy

92UM0358B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 11 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by A. Kraynin: "It Appears a Russian Has No One to Whom To Swear an Oath"]

[Text] On the news of Marshal Shaposhnikov's ciphered telegram with the text of the oath of allegiance to Russia, things became lively in the parliaments of the sovereign republics. After dropping discussions of daily problems, they hotly protested, seeing in the very fact of the transmission of the military oath to the troops (to all troops, and not only to those garrisoned in the Russian Federation) an expansion of the largest sovereign republic. Although, on the other hand, Russia is still paying for the army, and it also increased the monetary pay and allowances for officers by 90 percent starting on 1 January.

The military budget question is still hanging in the air, but the armed forces of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] have to be fed today, but the leaders, it appears, are interested only in the question of the oath.

I want to reassure them: The text was immediately followed, literally on the next day, by another telegram to the troops in which it is proposed that taking an oath (any, both that which Marshal Shaposhnikov sent and those created in the republics) be postponed until 17 January. The all-army officer assembly will be held on 17 and not on 14 January, as we reported earlier, (because of the New Year parties being held in the Kremlin). After it, obviously, at least some clarity will result. Although, in my opinion, the policy should have been clarified a long time ago.

Fate of Caucasus Troops Viewed

92UM0313A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Captain 1st Rank A. Pilipchuk, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The Caucasian Prisoner?: The Army in the Caucasus May Become Hostage to the Complicated Political Situation"]

[Text] Gyandzha-Baku-Moscow—In my opinion, 1991, now over, was a year of major political paradoxes. One of them was the following. Even relatively recently we were hearing claims from politicians, political experts, and public figures in many of the languages of the former USSR that the danger of war in the world had receded, and the Armed Forces, the Committee for State Security, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs were declared to be outdated state institutions that could be used by rightist forces to usurp power and suppress democracy. Today, however, as the former republics of the Union create and consolidate their own statehood, they are substantiating just as insistently the need to have their own regular troops and internal security, and are laying the legal and material foundations for developing a national military and for creating systems of national security.

The nature of politics has always been thus: When necessary it facetiously dissociates itself from its own theoretical constructs of the day before. But the real life of society is not like that: Tectonic shifts in policy palpably affect the fates of millions in practice. Today the Armed Forces are experiencing the serious consequences of the biggest "divorce proceedings" in human history, proceedings that are affecting not only the state but also its army. Our own creation was at one time for one people and one country; whose national families and apartments will it enter tomorrow, and what will its status be? These cogitations accompanied me constantly during a trip I made in December to formations and units of the Caucasus Military District and the Caspian Flotilla deployed on the territory of the Azerbaijan Republic.

The trip started on 19 December when the military transport aircraft put down at the military airfield at Gyandzha (Kirovabad). Three days earlier the political calendar had been filled with several ukases from President A. Mutabilov, including ukases on his assuming the duties of commander in chief of "all Armed Forces located on the territory of the Azerbaijan Republic except for troops making up the strategic deterrent force," on the formation of an Azerbaijan Republic Committee for Guarding the State Border, and on measures to safeguard the rights of servicemen in military formations and units transferred to the subordination of the president of the Azerbaijan Republic and give them social protection. The package of ukases was the logical continuation of the law "On the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijan Republic" that had entered into force earlier. The terminology in this document is quite expressive: "To nationalize weapons and other material-technical values," "to deem impermissible any action associated

with the removal from the territory... of weapons, military equipment, and all kinds of material-technical property," "to conduct an inventory," "to transfer to the command," "to produce according to agreement"...

I do not know. Perhaps public awareness will always be at least one step behind the politicians' mad dash to the finish, but one can understand the confusion among military people who have failed to keep up with events that many of them have perceived as dismemberment of the living body of the Armed Forces, the unpredictable lowering of their combat readiness, the possibility of anarchy in management of the troops, and finally, a threat to the interests of servicemen and their families.

In Gyandzha I went directly from the airfield to an officers' meeting in one of the units of a formation. The agenda was this: "The attitude of the collective of officers toward the ukase of the president of the Azerbaijan Republic." However, more eloquently than any words, a dozen or more officers of the unit had already expressed their attitude toward the processes taking place in the army in Azerbaijan by handing in their resignations from the Armed Forces. And the opinion of many of those who had come to the cold barracks that evening, those who had not yet allowed their apathy toward their service overwhelm them, was expressed by Guards Lieutenant Colonel A. Nechukin. He talked about the need to give him the opportunity to remove his family and personal belongings from Azerbaijan, and to arm officers with automatic weapons for their own defense and for the protection of the military quarters and family quarters (the family quarters are now guarded by patrols "armed" with night sticks—author's note). He was supported by Guards Major A. Sorokin and several others who spoke. The acting commander of a guards unit, Lieutenant Colonel S. Belikov, on the other hand, emphasized this: "I do not see," he said, "the need to raise so sharply the question of weapons." The chief of staff of a guards formation, Colonel S. Vozhko, informed the officers that the command was holding talks with the city authorities on giving the formation railroad container cars to dispatch the personal property of those officers who so desired.

These are the unambiguous opinions, assessments, and approaches. I think that a short story about the situation in which the units of the formation find themselves today would help people to understand better. I left the officers' meeting with Colonel S. Vozhko and we went directly to the headquarters of the formation. After several attempts Stanislav Vasilyevich communicated via a walkie-talkie with the commander of a guards formation, Major General A. Budeykin, who at that time was en route to the city of Agdam, in the region of which several hours previously, with the participation of the Azerbaijani soldiers themselves (they make up about 90 percent of the formation) an independent engineer battalion had been disarmed. A machine gun, more than 100 automatic weapons, several pistols, thousands of rounds of ammunition, several combat vehicles of various kinds, trucks, and other equipment had been seized.

The battalion had been under fire for some time. On the same day, Armenian fighters had seized hostages, an Azerbaijani soldier and an officer, and accompanying personnel. The list could be continued.

One other episode. Along with Stanislav Vasilyevich I was in the headquarters building when somewhere nearby we heard a burst of automatic fire. "They are shooting in the area where the No. 2 guard patrol is located," the duty officer for the formation reported. After some time it was possible to establish that the shooting was taking place a few dozen meters away from billets of the formation. Who was shooting whom? It was difficult to say; too many weapons are in too many hands, they are even falling into the hands of criminals (in the interests of objectivity it should be said that sometimes even the soldiers themselves "direct" hunters to the warehouses and guardhouses for weapons).

The morning of 20 December was just as tense. The chief of an intelligence formation reported that at Khankendi (Stepanakert) one of the units of the formation was under fire. According to some information, the intelligence chief reported, the unit commander had "been condemned to death" by one of the opposition groupings in Nagorno-Karabakh. "We are between the hammer and the anvil," the intelligence chief said, turning directly to me. And to that, we might add the following. In the units located on the territory of Azerbaijan, the percentage of Azerbaijani servicemen is growing, while in units located on the territory of Armenia, the number of Armenians is growing. I was asked repeatedly in the units whether particular forces were trying to use the jurisdiction of the republics over army units for the purpose of drawing them into interethnic conflict.

I tried to find an answer to this question in the headquarters of the commander in chief of troops on the Southern Salient, located in Baku. At the headquarters they informed me about the details of a meeting between the republic President A. Mutabilov and the command officers of the troops deployed on the territory of Azerbaijan. The president informed the military people that in connection with the collapse of the USSR a legal ambiguity had arisen: Whose troops were on Azerbaijan soil, and on whose behalf are they there? In order to ease the tension created by certain forces about the troops ("If they do not help us then get rid of them") he—the president—had instituted the following measure: He assumed the duties of commander in chief. But he did not intend to interfere in the life of the troops until their status had been finally determined. He is a supporter of the troops not being involved with either side in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. In turn, the military people assured the president that the servicemen will respect the republic's sovereignty. At the same time the military people have been trying to make the president aware of the profound outrage of personnel about the attacks on military quarters, and the seizures of weapons and combat equipment, and hostages. This path is unlawful no matter what slogans may be used as a cover. The president supported this and recommended that

closer links be maintained with organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and that the attacks by the bandits be repulsed.

Did this meeting remove the tension caused by the president's ukases on "nationalization"? To some degree the sides have clarified their own mutual relations at this stage, and this has been useful. But no significant change has taken place in the sentiments of the servicemen. On the previous day I had been received by the Azerbaijan Republic minister of defense, Major General Tadzhammadin Ibragimovich Mekhtiyev, who remarked that in his opinion the essence of the president's ukases had not been brought to the attention of officers and warrant officers, and that this situation should be corrected. I do not think that this is all there is to it. They are, of course, aware of the results of the meeting between the command and A. Mutabilov in the units. But the situation with respect to many of the units did not improve because of it, since the events of which I spoke above took place after the meeting between the head of state and the military. And of course, until there is a political, interstate resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, the situation among the servicemen will remain unstable, and they may find themselves playing the role of hostages in a political situation that is becoming increasingly complicated.

These lines were written after my return from my trip, when in the meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States heads of state had taken place in Minsk, where decisions important for the fate of the Armed Forces were reviewed. Naturally, it was with a heightened interest that I sought information on Azerbaijan's position. And I was not too surprised to find that along with Ukraine and Moldova, the Azerbaijan Republic had announced that it would independently handle the conventional forces on its own territory. And this is what I thought. According to the experts, considerable assets and time would be needed for Azerbaijan to create its own army. I have information from well-informed sources that the appeal is having its problems in the national formations. Cases are known, for example, in which parents of draftees have expressed their readiness for their sons to serve even outside the republic, but not along the border with Armenia. So, what "line of business" is planned for the transitional period for troops of the former USSR Armed Forces deployed on the territory of the republic, where in fact combat actions are taking place and people are being killed, including servicemen? What will be the fate, for example, of the Caspian Flotilla, which, if we proceed on the basis of the Minsk agreements, is to be assigned as part of the Navy's strategic forces? At the Azerbaijan Republic Ministry of Defense, which I visited along with the commander of the Caspian Flotilla, Vice Admiral Boris Mikhaylovich Zinin, we were given to understand that in determining the forces that could be categorized as strategic forces, within the republic they will be guided primarily by their own approaches. To judge from how many disputes this issue caused in Minsk, we can expect no simple solutions in Baku.

After my trip I returned on a transport aircraft. But whereas I had flown out as the lone passenger, on the return journey I had to share the cramped benches in the cargo compartment with families of servicemen that were leaving Azerbaijan and Georgia (the aircraft made a landing there en route). I had already been convinced that despite the neutrality of the servicemen in Tbilisi, the bullets had also started to fly at them. I became a witness to the departure of more than 50 officers and warrant officers from that same military unit at Khandendi, whose commanding officer had "been condemned to death." So when will the "great resettlement of the peoples" end in our long-suffering land? The question still hangs in the air.

Belarus Currently Without Military Oath

92UM0325B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 9 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Colonel P. Chernenko under the rubric "Local Reports": "Minsk"]

[Text] Young soldiers have joined the units and detachments of the Belorussian Military District but have not been sworn-in yet. The ceremony was postponed till 12 January. The reason lies in the absence of a text for the republic military oath.

As our correspondent was told by the Belarus Ministry for Defense Affairs, the Supreme Soviet of the republic was going to discuss the draft of the new oath in the nearest future. The draft specifies that soldiers will pledge their allegiance to the people of Belarus.

Belarus to Address Military Issues

92UM0339D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Jan 92 p 3

[Unattributed article under the rubric: "From Minsk": "Military Issues at the Belorussian Parliament Session"]

[Text] The Belorussian Parliament special session resumed its work after the Christmas holidays with a stormy discussion. Many deputies insisted on the immediate inclusion of a series of military issues on the agenda. Various points of view on the army problems of the republic ministry for defense affairs and the Belorussian Military District command were manifested in the debate on this score.

After prolonged debates, the parliamentarians nevertheless decided to discuss the issues of social protection of servicemen, army property, and the transfer of army units and subunits deployed on Belarus territory to the republic's jurisdiction, but after having carefully studied this issue in the Supreme Soviet's permanent commissions beforehand.

Attack on Barracks in Chechin Republic

92UM0339C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Major A. Ivanov: "At the Cost of his Life"]

[Text] During the night of January 4-5, more than ten unknown armed individuals burst into a barracks of the separate communications and radio technical flight support battalion that is located on Khankal Airfield. Unit Duty Officer Major Vladimir Nikolayevich Chichkan was shot with an assault rifle at pointblank range while opposing the bandits. At the cost of his own life, he thwarted the criminals's intentions to disarm the subunit.

The case of the bandit murder of the officer outraged not only servicemen but also the residents of Chechin. Aviation Chief—Deputy Commander-in-Chief of PVO [Air Defense] Troops for Aviation Lieutenant-General of Aviation V. Andreyev, who flew to Grozny immediately after the incident, told our correspondent that Chechin President D. Dudayev condemned this bandit act and assured him that all steps will be taken to search for and punish the murderers.

A joint decision was made for the Chechin National Guard to protect the garrison's servicemen, army facilities, and housing area and also to insure the inviolability of military units.

On January 8, garrison troops and Grozny residents bid farewell to Major Chichkan. Republic government and national guard representatives participated in the funeral procession. The Council of Republic Elders decided to render material assistance to the family of the deceased. Speakers at the procession were united in their desire that the murderers should not avoid retribution and that this type of incident should not be repeated.

Alma-Ata Guards Recruits Take Oath

92UM0325D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 9 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Colonel A. Ladin, under the rubric "Local Reports": "Alma-Ata"]

[Text] Alma Ata—The new recruits of the Panfilov Guards division took their loyalty oath, the words of which had been approved by the former USSR president, M. Gorbachev, in one of his last ukases.

Nazarbayev Meets with Defense Industry Leaders

92UM0379B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Jan 92 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Catastrophic Situation in Defense Enterprises in Kazakhstan"]

[Text] Enterprises of the defense branch located on the territory of Kazakhstan have ended up at an impasse.

They have not received state orders for their basic products. Previously at certain plants these orders comprised up to 18 percent of their overall production volume. These problems were sharply voiced at a meeting held the other night between President Nursultan Nazarbayev and the leaders of the defense enterprises.

Riga Anti-Army Protest Planned

92UM0342B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Colonel M. Ziyeminsh: "Riga: An Anti-Army Protest Is Being Planned. It Is Being Planned with Imagination"]

[Text] On January 13, the board of the Latvian Movement for National Independence has decided to conduct an anti-army protest—protest picketing "against the presence of the army of the former USSR on the territory of Latvia"—near the Northwestern Group of Forces Headquarters building. In so doing, protest organizers have decided, judging by everything, to flash with imagination: they have decided to surround the headquarters building with a rope with black and red flags, like they use when hunting wolves.

Incidentally, I did not think up this comparison. It was taken from the republic press. The only thing I do not understand is why are headquarters staffers being assigned the role of wolves in this protest? Naturally, it is impossible to call this comparison correct. The Northwestern Group of Forces Military Council has assessed the conduct of this protest as an attempt to draw the army into the next political provocation. At the same time, it also indicated that all questions of the presence and withdrawal of troops from the Baltic Region must be resolved using civilized methods through interstate negotiations between the interested parties.

Moldova Law on Servicemen Rights

92UM0395B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Jan 92 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Law Published on Protection of Servicemen"]

[Text] A draft law of the Republic of Moldova has been published on the social and legal protection of servicemen, members of their families, and citizens undergoing military training. In accordance with these documents, regular officers and reserve officers of the Soviet Army who became citizens of Moldova and who are on the rolls of the Armed Forces of the republic retain their length of service and pertinent pension support and enjoy the rights and privileges provided by law.

Shakhray on Kiev Meeting

92UM0363B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 14 Dec 91 p 1

[Interview with Sergey Shakhray, deputy chairman of the government of the Russian Federation, by TASS correspondent under the rubric "Firsthand": "Sergey Shakhray: We Agreed Not to Undertake Any Unilateral Actions"]

[Text] The results of the negotiations just concluded in Kiev between state delegations from Russia and the Ukraine on military-political issues testify to the fact that the beginning of a search for compromise dictated by common sense has been laid down. "This, our first meeting, confirmed how important it is today to seek a way to agreement, and not to act unilaterally," said the head of the Russian delegation and deputy head of the government of the Russian Federation, Sergey Shakhray, to a TASS correspondent.

He noted, with a positive regard for the results of the negotiations, that all issues of a military-political nature will be considered within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States in the future as well, first and foremost proceeding from the spirit and letter of the agreements on strategic forces and on the armed forces and border troops. They were able to reach a formula within the framework of which issues of a military-political nature can be resolved in a civilized manner in the future, in the interests of all the Commonwealth.

The head of the Russian delegation, revealing the essence of this formula, noted that "the parties agreed that all armed forces currently stationed on the territory of the Ukraine consist of two categories. These are groups of strategic forces of the Commonwealth, namely including the Black Sea Fleet, only a portion of which can be said to be part of the make-up of the Ukrainian armed forces. The discussion thus concerns exclusively the tasks of guarding the Ukrainian shore."

The other portion of the armed forces located in the Ukraine is composed strictly of the armed forces of that state and those that are subject to reductions under the Vienna and Paris agreements. In the communiqué that was adopted, Sergey Shakhray noted, "we confirm that this portion of the armed forces, which is subject to cutbacks, will be determined by consent of the parties within the framework of the quota agreements that are envisaged." The parties confirmed their readiness to take concrete steps in the future in regard to ratifying the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the USSR and the United States and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe in the near future. "It is important to emphasize," as the head of the Russian delegation noted, "that the obligation not to take any unilateral actions and to resolve disputes via negotiations was recorded in Kiev."

"The head of the Russian delegation called an "undoubted success" of the negotiations in Kiev the fact that "agreement was achieved to resolve issues of social protections for servicemen and their civil and political status by concerted action."

Text of Russian Military Loyalty Oath

92UM0326A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Jan 92 p 1

["Ukase of the President of the Russian Federation on the Text of the Military Oath to the Russian Federation"]

[Text] To approve the following text of the Military Oath to the Russian Federation:

"I, (surname, given name, patronymic) will enter the military service and vow to be faithful to the Russian Federation and its people.

"I swear to observe the Constitution and the laws of the Russian Federation, to fulfill the requirements of the military regulations, the orders of commanders and supervisors, and duties legally assigned to me.

"I swear while in the military service to be honest, conscientious, and worthy of undergoing the difficulties associated with it. Courageously, without sparing my life, I will defend the people and state interests of the Russian Federation.

"I swear not to use arms against my own people or the organs of authority legally elected by them.

"I commit myself to perform military service in any place on the territory of the Russian Federation or outside it where I am sent by the Government of the Russian Federation and to observe the laws of the state on whose territory I am performing my military service.

"If I violate the military oath I have taken I am prepared to pay the penalty established by the laws of the Russian Federation."

President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin.

Moscow, Kremlin, 5 January 1992.

Prospects For Turkmenistan Armed Forces

92UM0373A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 9 Jan 92 pp 1, 3

[Article by Igor Zhukov: "Turkmenistan Is Ready To Create a Ministry of Defense But Not the Corresponding Army"]

[Text] After inviting the commanders of military units and formations deployed on the territory of Turkmenistan to call on him, the president proposed that they talk about the most acute problems of concern not only to servicemen but also the local authorities. Describing the situation in general, he noted the positive role of the

Army in maintaining stability in Turkmenistan, and he said that it "deserved the highest assessments." Nevertheless, the collapse of the Union and the emergence of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] are giving rise to questions that may cause some misunderstanding and distrust among them. As an example of this, Niyazov cited the telegram from Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov that listed six republics wishing to create independent troops: "Turkmenistan was erroneously named among them. In Minsk I supported the creation of unified armed forces for the Commonwealth but did not vote in favor of this because I believe that first of all it is necessary to look into Army problems in the regions in detail, and only after that combine our efforts to ensure security." One question on which there is also no clarity for Turkmenistan is the composition and maintenance of the troops deployed on its territory. The republic is incapable of solving this on its own. A possible solution is seen in reducing the units and subunits of the Armed Forces and in dividing appropriations for the Army between Turkmenia and, for example, Russia. According to Niyazov, it has already been proposed to its leadership that a bilateral treaty be concluded on the composition and funding of the Army, but no decision on this score has yet been reached. Meanwhile, Turkmenia has been forced to share resources with the Army—fuels and lubricants, food, and so forth, but its position remains unaltered, namely, that in two months the citizens of the republic will be going hungry along with the troops.

The priority problem for Turkmenistan is the creation of its own military district. As Niyazov emphasized, this is essential not to take command of the Army but to facilitate contact with it under the conditions of real independence for the republic. "For us the question is not who to swear in and whom to serve. In Turkmenistan we do not regard people in military uniforms as foreigners. Attitudes toward them are respectful, but we should not deceive each other in our actions and plans."

Going half way to meet the demands of the president, the Army generals expressed their opinion. The commander of the Turkestan Military District, Georgiy Kondratyev, said that while the Army reform promised by Yazov has remained on paper, it is impossible to disregard the valuable work done by the Turkestan Military District. Kondratyev was critical about the draft ukase of the Uzbek leader, Islam Karimov, transferring the Army to the jurisdiction of Uzbekistan. He emphasized that he agrees to direct subordination of units deployed in Turkmenistan to the president of the republic. He noted, however, that if Turkmenia follows the Uzbek example and tries to form its own armed forces, this will inflict irreparable harm on its security. According to the commander of the Turkestan Military District, the solution is for Turkmenistan to develop its own military doctrine and sign an agreement on collective security with the five Central Asian republics. It was the opinion of those attending the meeting that despite the good attitude toward the Army in Turkmenia, concern and alarm are

growing among the officers serving there. The lack of any precise status for servicemen, or of social guarantees for the members of their families, or of prospects for career advancement and normal pension provisions is destabilizing the Army. Its multinational orientation, too, is no cause for joy. One adverse example of this was sounded in the words of the Uzbek minister of defense, who stated his readiness to replace 80 percent of the existing officer corps with national cadres. According to the commander of the Ashkhabad garrison, Viktor Kormiltsev, the military policy of the Turkmenia leadership is still unclear to his subordinates. This is prompting officers to appeal directly to the president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, requesting that bilateral agreements be signed as quickly as possible with Turkmenistan to regulate the status of personnel in military units and formations. Saparmurad Niyazov called these appeals unnecessary: "Russia may perceive them as a signal that the rights of servicemen are being infringed upon, but that does not correspond to the reality. In Turkmenistan it will be regarded as interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state." According to the president of Turkmenistan, the republic leadership can resolve all disputed matters independently: "We are prepared to set up our own Ministry of Defense to coordinate military policy and work giving due consideration to recommendations offered for our own defense doctrine, but we will be in no hurry to create armed forces for Turkmenia. Of course, in the long term the republic's sovereignty will necessarily raise the issue of forming our own military units and subunits, but this will not be for five or six years. In the immediate future Turkmenistan will limit itself to the creation of a symbolic national guard and the conclusion of a defense alliance with Russia."

At the end of the meeting Saparmurad Niyazov expressed doubts about the advisability of holding the general officers assembly in the Kremlin on 14 January. It was his opinion that the assembly would be capable of adopting constructive decisions only after it had received all information from the regions where military subunits are deployed. Otherwise, it may only inflame the situation.

Turkmenistan is linking its hopes for a resolution of the set of problems concerning the Army with the visit to the republic by Marshal Shaposhnikov. "The sooner it takes place, the more quickly we will find a common language," Niyazov noted.

Turkmen Military-Commerce Center Reported

92UM0379D Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Jan 92 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Military Commercial Center Created in Tashkent"]

[Text] In the Turkestan Military District a commercial center has been created with its own stock exchange, bank, and a number of small and joint enterprises,

mainly with parties interested in using the Army's technical equipment: motor vehicles, prime movers... Civilian specialists with experience in business and commercial activity will be recruited for the center's work.

Ukraine Cuts Off Command and Control System

92UM0387C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 9 Jan 92 p 1

[Report under the rubric "Briefly": "Ukraine Has Cut Off Command and Control of Forces System"]

[Text] A NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent has been informed in the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the former USSR that Ukrainian authorities have cut off the automatic system of combat command and control of forces of three military districts situated on the territory of the republic.

Thus, the General Staff has been deprived of the capability of effective operational command and control, including that of "Ukrainian" tactical nuclear weapons as well.

The Black Sea Fleet has a separate command and control system (not through Kiev) that is still functioning.

Report on Ukrainian Conference on Force Generation

92UM0353A Moscow TRUD in Russian 10 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by S. Prokopchuk, Kiev: "Do Not Manipulate Peoples' Fates"]

[Text] The All-Ukrainian Conference on Military Structural Development Issues took place yesterday in Kiev. Black Sea Fleet Commander I. Kasatonov and the commanders of the military districts, and division-sized and smaller units deployed on the territory of Ukraine participated in it. Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk and Prime Minister V. Fokin participated in the conference's work.

Ukrainian Minister of Defense K. Morozov delivered a report and Cabinet of Minister Head V. Fokin spoke on measures for the social protection of servicemen and members of their families. Very polarized assessments were heard in the discussions on these first steps that are being undertaken in the republic on military reform issues and the creation of their own armed forces. Many spoke about the obvious haste in resolving these issues and the politicians' manipulation of the fates of tens of thousands of soldiers and officers. None of the three military district commanders who spoke at the conference supported the proposed January 20 deadline for military units (other than strategic) to take the oath, whose text has been approved by the parliament. The opinion was expressed that this deadline must be extended until the end of the year or in general should not be defined because with time the problem will fade away in and of itself as a result of the natural processes of

release into the reserve, reassignments, and conscription of Ukrainian State citizens into the Ukrainian armed forces.

The speakers stated that, prior to taking the oath, documents must be approved that would guarantee complete social protection of officers and their families so that each officer and warrant officer, who does not wish to take the Ukrainian oath, knows that he will receive a pension and will be provided with housing in those states to which he will be transferred.

At the same time, in the opinion of Generals V. Gubenko and V. Kukharets and other conference participants, personnel of units deployed in Ukraine have essentially become hostages of political intrigues, especially by those who would create a united army on the territory of the 11 CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] states. The negative reaction to the steps taken by Ukraine was assessed in those speeches as the result of the groundless incitement of tensions and disinformation of society at large as a result of the republic exercising its legal right to establish its own armed forces.

Conference participants appealed to the personnel of all military formations deployed on Ukrainian territory to manifest restraint, maintain law and order and observe military discipline in this difficult time.

L. Kravchuk summed up the results of the conference.

Ukraine's Law on Defense

92UM0381A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
3 Jan 92 pp 1,3

[The Law of Ukraine on Defense of Ukraine, signed by Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk, Kiev, December 6, 1991: "Law of Ukraine on Defense of Ukraine"]

[Text]

Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Resolution on the Procedures for Enacting the Law of Ukraine "On Defense of Ukraine"

The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To enact the Law of Ukraine "On Defense of Ukraine" from the moment of its adoption.

2. To task the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers: to elaborate and approve the Provisions on Mobilization Preparation of Ukraine's national economy;

—to develop a draft Ukraine Law on the Legal Regime of Wartime Status and to submit it for review of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet;

—to resolve the issue regarding the organization of the Ukrainian Scientific Center for National Security and Defense Problems.

Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman I. Plyushch

Kiev

December 6, 1991.

Ukrainian Law on Defense of Ukraine

Ukraine seeks peaceful coexistence with all states and maintains its defense capability at the level of defensive sufficiency for defense from aggression.

This law prescribes the principles for organizing the defense of Ukraine and the powers of state organs to insure it and the obligations of enterprises, institutions, organizations, and officials to strengthen the country's defense capability.

1. General Provisions

Article 1. Principles of the Defense of Ukraine

The defense of Ukraine—is a series of political, economic, ecological, military, social, and legal measures to insure the independence, territorial integrity, and protection of the interests of the state and the peaceful lives of the people.

The goal of defense of Ukraine is the creation of all required conditions for the prevention of military attack and the armed rebuff of possible aggression against Ukraine at any time and under any circumstances.

The defense of Ukraine is based on the readiness of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the economy, population, and territory for defense and is structured in accordance with the military doctrine of the state.

Ukrainian military doctrine is defined by the principle of defensive sufficiency in the force generation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and is based on the fact that Ukraine:

—does not recognize war as a means of resolving international problems;

—strives for neutrality and observance of nonnuclear principles: to not accept, manufacture, or acquire nuclear weapons;

—does not have territorial claims against any one state and does not see in any one state the image of an enemy; and,

—will never be the first to initiate combat operations against any country if Ukraine itself does not become the object of aggression.

Article 2. Organization of the Defense of Ukraine

Organization of the defense of Ukraine includes:

—formation of the state's military policy and military doctrine and the development of military science;

—implementation of appropriate measures in the international arena to prevent aggression;

—guarding the state borders;

- preparation, development, and formation of the structures and maintenance of the required strength of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, maintenance of its combat capability and combat and mobilization readiness for the defense of Ukraine;
- development and conduct of military technical policy and supplying the Ukrainian Armed Forces with a full range of weapons, military equipment, food, equipment, and other material resources;
- mobilization preparation of the national economy, state organs, and the command and control system for operations under conditions of wartime status; and,
- preparation of the country's population and territory for defense.

Defense of Ukraine is structured taking into consideration the existing strategic deterrent forces that are deployed on its territory and their reform based on interstate treaties.

Command and control organs and division-sized and smaller units of the Strategic Deterrent Forces that are deployed on the territory of Ukraine transmit the information, stipulated by Ukraine's interstate treaties, to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

Article 3. Legislation on Defense of Ukraine

Legislation on defense of Ukraine consists of this Law, Ukrainian Presidential decrees, Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers resolutions, and other legislative acts regarding support of the state's defense capability and Ukrainian Armed Forces structural development.

2. The Legal Bases of the Activities of State Organs of Power and Administration to Ensure the Defense of Ukraine

Article 4. The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet

Formation and conduct of the state's military policy, legislative resolution of issues in the sphere of defense and military structural development are carried out exclusively by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet creates the Ukrainian Defense Council.

The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet approves:

- the military doctrine and the military force generation concept;
- the amount of budget appropriations for defense, the general structure and collective composition of the Ukrainian Armed Forces;
- the primary directions of Ukraine's cooperation with other states in the military sphere;
- the Ukrainian Minister of Defense;
- the military oath and military regulations; and,

- the state arms and military equipment development program.

The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet:

- hears the Ukrainian President's report on the state of the defense of Ukraine, and the reports of the Ukrainian Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, and other officials on defense issues;
- introduces wartime status in Ukraine, declares a state of war when necessary to fulfill international treaties on common defense from aggression, and also at the representation of the President of Ukraine in the event of military attack against Ukraine, adopts the decision on repealing wartime status, on ending a state of war and on the conclusion of peace; and,
- determines military ranks.

Article 5. The President of Ukraine

The President of Ukraine as Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and as Chairman of the Ukrainian Defense Council takes the required steps to insure Ukraine's defense capability and the constant combat readiness of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The President of Ukraine as Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces:

- submits for approval of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet drafts of military doctrine, military force generation concepts, state weapons and military equipment development programs, and also proposals on the overall structure of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the amount of budget appropriations for defense, and financing of the indicated program;
- submits a candidate for the post of Ukrainian Minister of Defense for Ukrainian Supreme Soviet approval;
- coordinates the activities of state organs in the sphere of defense;
- conducts negotiations and signs international and interstate treaties on military issues;
- approves the development plan, mobilization plan, and strategic plans for utilization of the Ukrainian Armed Forces;
- declares a general or partial mobilization, a state of war in the event of military attack against Ukraine and immediately submits this issue for Ukrainian Supreme Soviet review, declares wartime status in some areas, and enacts standard wartime acts and repeals them;
- makes the decision and issue the order to the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the conduct of combat operations;
- designates and dismisses the Ukrainian Armed Forces high command and awards the highest military ranks;

- makes the decision on conscription of Ukrainian citizens for compulsory military service and the release of compulsory service servicemen into the reserve, and also on mobilization of persons subject to a military service obligation during wartime and demobilization; and,

- prescribes the powers, organization, and procedures for the activities of military administrative organs.

Article 6. The Ukrainian Defense Council

The Ukrainian Defense Council is the highest state organ of collective leadership for Ukrainian defense and security issues. The Ukrainian Defense Council is being created to insure the organization of the defense of the sovereignty, constitutional system, and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and to develop strategy and policy in the sphere of defense and state security.

The jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Defense Council is defined by the Provision on the Council that has been approved by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

Article 7. The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers

The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers:

- manages the activities of all organs and organizations subordinate to it that support defense and equipping the Armed Forces with weaponry, military equipment, and other material resources;

- determines the amount of material-technical resources, food, clothing and other equipment for the needs of defense and the Armed Forces and the number of Ukrainian citizens who are subject to the draft for active compulsory military service, the procedures for them to perform military service and the conduct of accounting of persons subject to a military service obligation and draftees and the procedures for performing alternative service;

- approves plans for stockpiling material resources for the mobilized reserve;

- manages mobilization preparations and mobilized deployment of the national economy and its shift to a work regime under wartime status conditions and issues appropriate standard acts on these issues;

- creates and eliminates Ukrainian Armed Forces military educational institutions and scientific research organizations, military departments of higher educational institutions, and determines the procedures for the establishment and activities of military missions at industrial and other enterprises and in organizations;

- makes decisions on issues of social and legal guarantees for servicemen and individuals released into the reserve or retired, their families, and also families of servicemen who have died (deceased), are missing in action or who are captured while fulfilling their military duties.

Article 8. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense is an organ of state administration of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and has complete responsibility for their development and preparation to carry out defense missions.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense:

- assesses the military-political situation and determines the level of the military-political threat;

- prepares the substantiation of Ukrainian Supreme Soviet decisions on defense issues;

- participates in the development of the draft military doctrine and the formation of the Ukrainian military budget;

- develops and submits for review of the Ukrainian President drafts of state programs for the force generation and development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the development of weaponry and military equipment, and proposals for appropriations for defense needs;

- is accountable to the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers for the utilization of resources allocated for defense;

- carries out management of combat, operational-tactical, and moral-psychological training of troops;

- manages military science and organizes and conducts military-scientific research;

- issues the state order for the development, manufacture, and repair of military vehicles and other military equipment and carries out monitoring of their development, testing, production, and the quality of manufacture;

- organizes and provides military-patriotic education of Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel;

- determines the number of personnel of the services and branches of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and supports the training and assignment of military cadres within the limits of its powers;

- participates in the organization of mobilization preparation of the Ukrainian national economy and monitors the preparation of enterprises, institutions, and organizations for the fulfillment of mobilization tasks determined for them;

- monitors the execution of existing legislation on issues of preparing citizens for military service;

- plans and organizes training and retraining of persons subject to a military service obligation, conscription of citizens for active compulsory military service and release into the reserve of servicemen who have served the prescribed periods, the call up of persons subject to a military service obligation for assemblies, and also mobilization in wartime and demobilization; and,

- carries out cooperation with the armed forces of other states;
- in cases determined by the laws of Ukraine, issues standard acts on military issues and monitors their execution; and,
- organizes the fulfillment of existing Ukrainian legislation on preservation of the environment during the activities of military formations and organizations.

Article 9. Other Ministries and Central Organs of State Administration

Other ministries and central organs of state administration, in whose manufacturing facilities military orders are placed, are responsible for the quality of the development and manufacture of weaponry and military equipment and the delivery of products required for the needs of defense and the Ukrainian Armed Forces and for the implementation of measures to provide defense during wartime.

Article 10. The Crimean ASSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers and Local Organs of State Rule and Administration

The Crimean ASSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers and local organs of state rule and administration insure fulfillment of the requirements of the Constitution of Ukraine and Ukrainian laws that are in force on issues of defense by all officials, citizens, enterprises, organizations and institutions; resolve tasks for support of the needs of defense and mobilization preparedness, organize on a contract basis the manufacture and delivery of the products, electrical power, and heat ordered to the troops by subdepartmental enterprises, allocate plots of land for the needs of defense, and carry out monitoring of their use; and, provide offices and living space, utilities and other services to Armed Forces military units, institutions, and educational institutions.

The Crimean ASSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers and oblast, city, and rayon Soviets of people's deputies and their executive committees organize conscription of citizens for active military service in accordance with the law, facilitate the conduct of assemblies of persons subject to a military service obligation of the reserve, initial military training of pre-conscription age young people and military-patriotic education of the population; and implement the fulfillment of laws on social and legal protection of servicemen and members of their families.

The Crimean ASSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers, local Soviets of people's deputies and their executive committees also carry out other functions in the sphere of defense that are prescribed by Ukrainian law.

Article 11. Obligations of Enterprises, Institutions, and Organizations to Provide for Defense Needs

Enterprises, institutions, and organizations fulfill state orders and contracts for the manufacture and delivery of weapons and other products for defense needs, carry out scientific research and development, develop and maintain in readiness the required mobilization capacity and reserves, fulfill military-transportation obligations and other tasks in accordance with mobilization plans, and bear the required expenditures for defense needs that are prescribed by law.

Article 12. Citizens' Obligations

Protection of the Homeland is the constitutional obligation of a citizen of Ukraine.

3. The Ukrainian Armed Forces

Article 13. The Ukrainian Armed Forces

The Ukrainian Armed Forces are the military state structure tasked for the armed defense of the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and indivisibility of Ukraine from attack from without. In the event of war, the Armed Forces fulfill their tasks in close coordination with the Ukrainian Border Troops, the Ukrainian National Guard, the Ukrainian National Security Service and other military formations.

Organizationally, the Ukrainian Armed Forces consist of large armed formations, division-sized and smaller units and subunits, institutions, and military educational institutions.

The principles of the formation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, their strength and composition, and procedures for manning, deployment, and mobilization are determined by the Law on the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other laws of Ukraine.

4. A State of War. Wartime. Martial Law. Mobilization

Article 14. A State of War. Wartime

A state of war is declared in the event of military attack (aggression) against Ukraine or in the event of the need to fulfill international treaties on common defense from aggression and is repealed after conclusion of a peace agreement with the opposing belligerent party.

Wartime begins with the declaration of a state of war or with the initiation of combat operations. The initiation of wartime is the day and time of the declaration of a state of war or military attack (aggression) against Ukraine. The day and time declared as the cessation of combat operations is the end of wartime.

In the event of a military attack (aggression) against Ukraine, the military command and the organs of state power and administration, without waiting for a declaration of war, are obliged to take all steps to rebuff the attack (aggression).

Article 15. Wartime Footing

A wartime footing is introduced in some areas or on the entire territory of Ukraine in the event of the declaration of a state of war or the threat of military attack (aggression).

With the introduction of a wartime footing, the powers of the military command are expanded and the functions of the organs of state administration in the sphere of defense can be transferred to the military command by a Ukrainian Supreme Soviet decision.

During a wartime footing in the interests of defense, restrictions can be introduced on the activities of enterprises, institutions, organizations and on human rights and the powers of the corresponding law enforcement organs are expanded.

A wartime footing is repealed when the threat of military attack (aggression) disappears and with the repeal of the state of war.

The wartime footing mode is defined by a Law of the Ukraine.

Article 16. Mobilization.

A total or partial mobilization is announced with the declaration of a state of war or wartime to implement measures for the mobilized deployment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the shift of sectors of the national economy from a peacetime to a wartime footing.

5. Territorial Defense

Article 17. Territorial Defense

Territorial defense is organized and carried out to cover, defend, and protect the state border, maritime shoreline, island zones, important facilities and communications hubs from the attack of aggressors, to combat his assault forces and sabotage teams, and to maintain the wartime footing regime.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces carry out territorial defense in peacetime in cooperation with Ukrainian National Guard units. The tasks, organization, and procedures for coordination are determined through joint plans while proceeding from the circumstances and conditions for implementing territorial defense.

6. Responsibility for the Violation of the Law on the Defense of Ukraine

Article 18. Responsibility of Officials and Citizens

Leaders and other officials of state organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations and citizens who are guilty of violating the Law on Defense of Ukraine are brought to account in accordance with the procedures prescribed by law.

[Signed] Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk,
[Dated] Kiev
December 6, 1991.

Troops Take Ukrainian Oath, Some Resist

92UM0312B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Jan 92 p 3

[Report by Colonels A. Polyakov and V. Kaushanskiy, followed by a letter to the editor by Lieutenant Colonels V. Kostin and V. Kisarov: "Kiev Is Accelerating Swearing In"]

[Text] On 3 January, officers of the Defense Ministry staff, officers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces main staff, and graduating cadets of the Kiev Higher Military Communications Engineering School took their Ukrainian loyalty oath. On Sunday the words of the oath were pronounced, under the yellow and blue banner, by the national guard and hundreds of other servicemen of the Kiev Military District.

12 January is expected to become the swearing-in day for border guards. The dates of the solemn ceremony have been determined for the administrations of military districts, strategic formations, combined units, higher educational establishments, military units, organizations and enterprises—for all places where soldiers, warrant officers, and officers serve. This stage-by-stage process is to be completed by 20 January.

[Signed] Colonel A. Polyakov, Colonel V. Kaushanskiy

So, swearing-in has started in Ukraine. Many of the servicemen have made their choice: They want to serve in the Ukrainian military. It is their right. But the situation is far from being simple, as can be seen from the numerous telephone calls and letters to our newspaper. We are printing here one of these rather typical concerns.

The conditions emerging in the Ukrainian military garrisons, with respect to the Ukrainian loyalty oath, are forcing us to send you this telegram. State administrators and officials of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense are doing their best to try and prove that all officers, warrant officers, and soldiers are unanimously prepared to take the oath. We are not against the oath either, but such a rush in administering it makes us wonder. We are being told that the previous oath is invalid but then the Interior Service Regulations that contain it should be declared invalid also. But this is not being done. We continue our life in accordance with the previous regulations and there are no Ukrainian regulations. We are being forced to join an army which does not exist, which does not have any regulations or any military doctrine, or any documents extending social protection to its servicemen.

Why is Ukraine in such a hurry to have everybody sworn in? For the simple reason that the republic delegation wants to arrive at the forthcoming meeting of CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] heads of states with a "trump card," an army that has already taken the oath.

An initiative group of officers has been formed in our school who are speaking against this urgent oath taking. We have the support of hundreds of officers from other military schools and units. We are not convinced that the officers who refuse to take the oath will be able to serve in other republics. This issue has not been considered at all.

[Signed] Lieutenant Colonel V. Kostin, Lieutenant Colonel V. Kisarov,

Kiev Higher Military Aviation Engineering School

Ukraine Units Take Oath

92UM0372B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 Jan 92 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Zaporozhye Recruits Take Oath to the Ukraine"]

[Text] The day of taking the oath of loyalty to the people of the Ukraine became the first holiday for the young soldiers from the fall induction who are completing service in units and subunits stationed in Zaporozhye.

Yesterday's inductees from Odessa, Nikolayev Oblast and the Crimea were the first to take the oath to give loyal and true service to their homeland. Officers and senior servicemen will complete this ritual on January 19. They have been given the right to think it all over once again and make their choice according to their conscience.

Ukraine Deputy on Military Policy

92UM0382A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
3 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by M. Porovskyy, people's deputy of Ukraine: "Ukraine and its Defense Policy"]

[Text] What will the Ukrainian army be like: Point of view of a people's deputy

With the adoption by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet of a packet of laws on defense, the Armed Forces, a republican guard, and border forces we have begun the process of formation of administrative organs of a Ukrainian army and military subunits which will respond to all modern demands.

Of course, it will hardly be possible to create a Ukrainian army of 500,000 men (according to preliminary plans) in a short time because of a lack of money; and in any case such a large army is inadvisable, in my opinion, from the point of view of the defense concept of Ukraine.

The defense concept of Ukraine includes a system of views of the tasks of the army and a complex of political, economic, military, social, and legal measures to ensure independence, territorial integrity, and protection of the interests of the state and the peaceful life of its people.

The security of Ukraine is based on the principles of ensuring the readiness of the Armed Forces and its economy, population, and territory for defense and is constructed in accordance with military doctrine of the state.

The military doctrine of Ukraine is constructed according to the principle of defensive sufficiency and should be founded on:

- nonacceptance of war as a means of solving international problems;
- gradual realization of our intent to become a nonnuclear state;
- absence of territorial claims against any state and not viewing any people as an enemy;
- not carrying out the first military actions against any country;
- renunciation of military superiority and a readiness to construct relations with all states on the basis of respect for each other's security interests;
- nonuse of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to resolve the internal affairs of other states.

Ukraine should take part in all measures to reinforce international security, achieve an end to the arms race on earth and in space, actively contribute to the realization of international agreements and accords which minimize the threat of nuclear war, and prohibit types of weapons and means of conducting war that are inhumane or ruinous to humanity and the environment.

On the regional level, Ukraine should take part in the development and performance of measures that increase stability and security on the European continent by way of the conclusion of nonaggression pacts and treaties on avoidance of dangerous military activities, coordinated reductions of Armed Forces, and changes in the military potential of states to give them a defensive character.

When estimating a military threat, one should begin with the fact that today the development of worldwide nuclear and conventional wars and large-scale conflicts in Europe are unlikely; but so long as there exist strong groups of armed, military-political unions and an aggravated situation in various regions, there will remain a certain military threat to our state.

Keeping in mind that political and diplomatic efforts and economic and other measures do not always achieve the goal of averting war, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, when drafting its Doctrine, should base itself on the possibility of utilizing its Armed Forces:

- for defense of the state;
- in accordance with the rulings of an international community (the United Nations) as a member—in other regions of the world in the event of the creation of centers of threat to international security when this does not contradict the national interests of Ukraine.

Use of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is possible only by ruling of the highest legislative organ of the state, and in the event of a surprise attack—by ruling of the president of Ukraine.

Evaluating the strategic nature and the consequences of a possible war against Ukraine, it is proper to proceed from the following positions:

—war with the use of nuclear arms is unlikely, but so long as stores of them exist—and a portion of the strategic nuclear forces of the former USSR are stationed in Ukraine—then for a certain period of time Ukraine should view the nuclear forces not as a possible means of armed conflict but as a means of ensuring stability.

However, for nuclear arms to play the role of a "deterrent factor," our state has an objective need for a national system for controlling missile and rocket facilities and a center which will provide the president and the command authorities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with strategic information. It is important to distinguish two aspects to this problem.

A state which has nuclear arms on its territory but which does not have its own early warning system against missile attack cannot use those arms as a "deterrent factor," because the question of launching missiles depends upon who holds the stations for acquisition of targets. Under such conditions one cannot rule out the possibility of the use by another state of the Commonwealth of nuclear arms from the territory of Ukraine for a preventive strike. Naturally this situation would give rise to alarm on the part of the world's countries despite all our statements about our peaceful intentions.

In addition, the more open and effective a Ukrainian early-warning radar system is, the more confidence the political initiatives of Ukraine will have in the international arena.

The second aspect of this problem consists of the fact that the supreme power of Ukraine should lay claim to its own triple-blocked "nuclear button." For practical purposes this can only take place under the condition that military duty on missile bases is performed by servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Realization of these aspects is necessary first and foremost so that in the event of a critical situation the president of Ukraine and the command authorities of Ukraine may make the crucial decision (by responding "yes" or "no") and so that this decision will be executed.

For this the president of Ukraine must have his own objective information concerning the degree of real threat to the people of Ukraine.

In the opposite event one cannot rule out the possibility that Ukraine may be pulled into a nuclear conflict against its will.

The Armed Forces should be built on the principle of a single multiethnic, full-time, regular army that is manned on the basis of the linking of universal military obligation and voluntary enlistment for military service in accordance with a contract or commitment; of exterritoriality, consolidated authority, and centralized leadership; of social justice and equality of all servicemen before the law.

Of substantial significance for the manning of subunits of the Armed Forces is the fact that more than 300,000 officers, warrant officers, and ensigns of Ukrainian origin are serving beyond the borders of Ukraine, the overwhelming majority of whom are expressing a desire to return to Ukraine and continue their service there.

To resolve the question of the organized return of servicemen to their Fatherland, it is necessary first and foremost to conclude the appropriate agreements with countries of the former Union and to create a governmental commission for repatriation which will include representatives of the Cabinet of Ministers and the Ministries of the Armed Forces, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Finance, and Labor.

With the goal of maintaining the military readiness of the Armed Forces of states of the former Union, the transfer to Ukraine of Ukrainian servicemen should be performed on a competitive basis in accordance with the appearance of vacant posts and according to the gradual transfer to the reserves (retirement) of servicemen who have served an established period of time.

The qualitative makeup and other characteristics of collective strategic forces for deterrence should correspond to the demands of maintaining strategic equilibrium. Ukraine will participate in collective leadership of these forces and will have the right of a "veto" over their use on its territory. In addition, the contingent of joint strategic forces for deterrence should be systematically reduced.

When creating a Ukrainian Armed Forces it not at all necessary to copy the present structure of the Soviet Army or armies of foreign states.

Given the presence among the armaments of modern armies of weapons of mass destruction and high accuracy, it is quite clear that in the event of military conflicts large military forces will not be used with regard to their vulnerability.

Based on this, it is clear that a regimental structure with a flexible organization would be optimal for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

A regiment has sufficient military might for solving operational and tactical tasks and includes all types of armaments from armored vehicles to missiles and aviation.

Given modern types of weaponry of the enemy and methods of conducting warfare, such structures as motorized rifle divisions, tank armies, and other military combined units have lost their significance for practical purposes.

In peacetime the professional ranks of the regiment should, from time to time, recruit draftees into their ranks, train them, and transfer them to the reserves.

Furthermore, in the creation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine special attention should be paid, in my opinion, to the development of accurate weapons and a proper PVO [air defense] system and to aviation and cruise missiles. This is where both scientific research and the appropriate money should be targeted.

Polarization Among Troops in Ukraine Reported

92UM0376B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Jan 92 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Incidentally"]

[Text] According to reports received by the editors, the polarization in connection with the swearing of loyalty to the Ukraine which is occurring in some military units stationed in the republic is intensifying. Ninety of 170 officers and warrant officers in the surface-to-air missile brigade in which Lieutenant Colonel S. Rudoy is chief of staff have refused to take the oath, and 50% of the first-term personnel do not desire to take the oath to the republic.

If 50% of the servicemen in the surface-to-air missile brigade do not take the oath, combat readiness will be reduced to naught.

The officers and warrant officers, a total of 841 men, were polled in one division of the Kiev Military District. Forty-seven percent of them agreed to take the oath, around 30% agreed to take the oath after all republic laws on servicemen had been passed, and 120 men refused to take the new oath in any case.

Ukraine Controversy Over Scrapping Ships

92UM0385A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 17 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA military correspondent Sergey Doronin: "Major Scrapping"]

[Text] The tactics being employed by Ukrainian Defense Minister K. Morozov are increasingly mindful of a kamikaze mission. Soaring skyward in rank and position, he has unleashed his latest attack against warships of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Navy under construction at the wharves of Nikolayev, Kherson, and Kerch. The "ship dismantling" program he has promulgated envisages a large-scale scrapping of those ships whose state of completion is less than 50 percent.

One of these ships is the heavy aircraft carrier Ulyanovsk—third in line after Varyag (at 60 percent completion) and Admiral of the Soviet Union Fleet Kuznetsov (relocated to its place of registration—to the Northern Fleet).

Morozov's statements are critically evaluated at the Main Shipbuilding Directorate:

"Ship construction for the current year has been coordinated and contracts will be concluded. The only thing interfering is tardiness in the confirmation of budget allocations... Our proposals on the Ulyanovsk are directed to the Russian government. We hope that it will reach, jointly with the Ukrainian government, a mutually acceptable decision."

But perhaps it is really not worth it to go faster than the speed of sound, to set up demonstration flights before the eyes of a stupefied public? After all, such actions are more suggestive of a suppression of the recalcitrant Main Naval Headquarters protesting "privatization" by Ukraine of the Black Sea Fleet.

Ukraine Garrison's Water Problem Viewed

92UM0369B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
12 Dec 91 p 3

[Article by Major A. Trubitsyn, NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent: "Water Comes To the Garrison"]

[Text] Those who have been to this garrison, if only on one occasion, were sure to encounter the water problem. Before, water was drawn for one and a half to two hours three times a day, and the public catering establishment and housekeepers filled heavy-duty tanks beforehand. After all, it is not in vain that it is said that, without water you're neither here nor there. Recently, however, with the introduction of new housing and barracks, and with the increase in the number of personnel at the garrison, the water supply, which was poor to begin with, has become critical. The day I arrived on a business trip, there was no water for a full 24 hours. Using water during dinner hours had even long before been restricted.

It was no coincidence during a meeting of those living at the garrison that the first question addressed to the sector commander in chief conducting an inspection of the units was: When will the buildings finally have water?

The okrug commander—was the response—promises that there will be water in the very near future.

The response produced laughter in the hall. More water had in fact been promised to the people for many years. Since 1989 a water supply line 10.8 kilometers long had been under construction, but the end of the project was not yet in sight.

Those new to the garrison, having encountered the situation with the water supply puzzled: How could it be that a river flows nearby, but there is no water?

"Unfortunately, it is not suitable for drinking"—I was told by the deputy inspection chief of the district KEU [billeting directorate], Lt. Colonel N. Voznyak—If it was, the problem would have been resolved long ago. The capacity of the artesian wells is limited. There was only one solution: to tap into the town water supply which draws water from the Dnieper.

Nikolay Aleksandrovich described the kinds of problems that builders encountered during the course of their work: from a shortage of steel pipes with a diameter of 350 millimeters to a special adhesive capable of withstanding tens of atmospheres of pressure. Recently, said Lieutenant Colonel Voznyak, the KEU, construction management, the district's special project management, and the Dnieper-petrovskii UNR [Ukrainian Peoples Republic] have been pouring a great deal of their efforts into the water supply line.

Nikolay Aleksandrovich warmly recalled the specialists, thanks to whom water from the Dnieper was now coming into the garrison. In particular, he spoke of the head engineer of the UNR, Major S. Danilovich, who under difficult and irregular circumstances found a solution to the problem.

Then we met in the visitor's quarters on what one must presume was a memorable evening for those residing at the garrison. Nikolay Aleksandrovich arrived along with "more water." And in fact, it did run from the faucets considerably longer than usual, almost four hours. From time to time, Lieutenant Colonel Voznyak left the room and called to check how filling of the tanks was going. Things were in order there, the water supply line was maintaining a working pressure of 6 atmospheres.

"Of course, it is still a long way from being in complete running order"—he admitted—"Meanwhile there will not be water 24 hours a day. The problem is that the town water treatment plant will have difficulty dealing with the added load. Once their second phase has been implemented, I think the water problem at the garrison will be solved once and for all."

We would like to think so.

Negative Attitudes, Problems Facing Ukrainian Army

92UM0270A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Dec 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel V. Bogdanovskiy: "The Blessing Is Not Helping Either"]

[Text] Ukraine now has Armed Forces. There is a Commander-in-Chief in the person of the President. There are certain plans for the life of the army in a period of transition, before the ultimate formation of the

Armed Forces of a sovereign state. Political leaders are calling on the populace to care for and support the army.

The parliament of Ukraine also devoted a great deal of time to the topic of the army. In particular, it adopted the text of an oath and regulations concerning it, and adopted a law which gives draftees the right to serve closer to home. In a word, as the same political leaders put it, the people have lived to see what they have been waiting for, for so long.

It could have been expected that this would affect morale in units and subunits (at present, an overwhelming majority of those serving in them have been drafted from Ukraine), that the status of military discipline and organization would improve, that nonregulation relations would fade into oblivion, that the word "runner" would be heard no longer, and that the drafting of recruits to the army would proceed as it ought to in a sovereign state.

Unfortunately, we cannot hear enthusiastic words about changes for the better. Hazing is still a factor in some units if not in others, the only difference being that more and more often it is a fellow citizen, also born in Ukraine, rather than a representative of Transcaucasia or Central Asia, who swings fists at his fellow serviceman. The number of deserters in the units has not diminished. Soldiers frequently abandon their units simply because they do not want to serve, rather than because someone affronts their human dignity. There are more difficulties with drafting recruits.

At the Lvov Oblast draft station, they said: "Some people screamed: Give the guys an opportunity to serve in Ukraine, and you will see what their attitude toward performing their assigned duties will be." So, we let them. What happens? At present, 1,100 draftees in the oblast have, as the saying goes, gone over the hill. Out of this number, 105 are evading their second, or even third draft."

The political leaders are apparently calling on the populace to care for and support the army. This includes solving the social problems of officers, warrant officers, and their families as soon as possible. What actually happens? The Lvov Oblast Executive Committee allocated 20 or 21 apartments to the military, and has no intention of allocating more. "There are none, they say. Build apartments with your own resources." However, deliveries of necessary materials fall through every now and then. At present, a different trend is apparent. Recently, the fathers of recruits "put a brake" on a bus carrying draftees, preventing their transportation to a construction battalion. They could be successfully sent to their service location only under the cover of darkness. So, who is going to build housing for servicemen? Who will solve the social problems of officers and warrant officers? Hundreds of them are now homeless.

My interlocutors gave reasons for a negative attitude towards serving not only in construction units but in the army as such. A lot of mud has been slung at the army in

recent years. Incidentally, this was done on the initiative of political leaders rather than that of common working people or even members of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers.

What is the result? The Commissar of Radyanskiy Rayon, in the city of Lvov, has been driving around the city together with militia functionaries for many nights now, hunting down those who have a duty to be drafted for service in the army.

However, this is not the lot of the Commissar of Radyanskiy Rayon alone. What are they supposed to do? A fine of 10 rubles for failing to report to the rayon military commissariat on a summons is no deterrent for those evading military service. They are prepared to pay even more as long as they do not have to serve.

What about the authorities? They are not in agreement either. For example, the Lvov draft commission, disregarding even the decision of the Ukraine Council of Ministers, resolved not to send its recruits to the Black Sea Fleet, saying that after being trained with the fleet, citizens of Ukraine are assigned to continue service beyond its borders. From now on, the Lvov area will assign its draftees to form the republic guard which was perhaps talked about in the oblast more than anywhere else.

The selection of the first group proceeded with particular care here. They decided to arrange the departure of the group so that not only the new recruits would remember this day.

Witnesses told us: "They had everything. There was an appeal by mothers to the guardsmen, a blessing by a priest of the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church, and the upbeat sounds of a march. Only one thing was missing—due order and responsibility in the ranks of future guardsmen."

I was told that those who had drunk much too much were among those who will join the ranks of elite troops, the future pride and glory of Ukraine. Some abandoned the ranks and did not go to the unit.

Ukraine Officer Training Alternative Viewed

92UM0364A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
13 Dec 92 p 2

[Article by Candidates of Military Sciences, Colonels V. Kobelev and L. Kravchuk, and Lieutenant Colonel N. Selyuk, under the rubric: "Military Education Reform": "There is an Alternative Variation"]

[Text] While establishing the Ukrainian Armed Forces, it is necessary, with a great deal of warning beforehand to the troops, to reform the military educational institutions that are the foundation of officer training.

Colonel Yu. Prokofyev's articles, "Kak gotovit ofitser-skiye kadry" [How to Train Officer Cadres] (October 31, 1991) and "Alternativnoy kontseptsii net. A zhal" [There

Is No Alternative Concept. And That is Too Bad] (November 14, 1991) that have been published in NARODNAYA ARMIYA, have been devoted to the concept of military education and science in Ukraine.

The work of the Second Congress of the Union of Ukrainian Officers permitted us to see the entire complex of problems that the Ukrainian Minister of Defense faces.

The SV [Ground Forces] PVO [Air Defense] Academy imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevskiy has great scientific potential and a highly-trained professorial-teaching staff that can make a definite contribution to military educational reform. The academy has a general tactics and operational art department that is the leading department in the VUZ [higher educational institution]. The officers who work in the department have passed through various levels of command and staff positions in the troops and have the rich experience of officer training. The department's teachers group painstakingly studies all publications of the periodical press that concern military educational reform. We have performed an analysis of Colonel Yu. Prokofyev's articles.

On the whole, the approach to reform proposed by the author is interesting, however, in our opinion, he does not completely consider today's actual situation.

We agree with Yu. Prokofyev that military educational reform is inevitable and that there are more military VUZ's on the territory of Ukraine than are needed to man the sovereign state's Armed Forces. We support the idea of creating a single academy for the Armed Forces of Ukraine and we consider correct the proposal to have united territorial training centers for training junior specialists and for retraining reserve officers.


The elimination of multiple gradations in the management of the military education system also merits attention.

However, we do not agree with the author that our military education system produces only 15-20 percent of the specialists who meet contemporary requirements. As the analysis of responses from the troops demonstrates, over 80 percent of Ground Forces Air Defense Academy graduates carry out their duties with high quality. We can also relate this to other USSR Ministry of Defense academies (the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze and others). We also think that there is no need for humanization and the development of education for training specialists-teachers, psychologists, or sociologists in the establishment of a Military Institute.

It is impossible to over exaggerate the organization and the quality of training of specialists of other states, for example, the NATO countries and Japan. It is premature to introduce bachelor's and master's degrees into our education system, as Yu. Prokofyev suggests. Integration of the achievements of military science of the USSR Armed Forces and of the leading states while considering the specific national features of sovereign Ukraine is needed in these issues.

Approximate General Structure of Military Education in the Ukrainian Armed Forces

ПРИМЕРНАЯ ОБЩАЯ СТРУКТУРА
ВОЕННОГО ОБРАЗОВАНИЯ В ВС УКРАИНЫ



Key:

1. Initial Military Training (at a school or SVU [Middle Military School]).
2. Training Centers (3-6 months).
3. Service in the Troops (6-12 months).
4. Professional Selection into a VU [Military School].
5. Ukrainian Armed Forces Higher Military Schools.
6. Schools of the Services of the Armed Forces.
7. Ground Forces.
8. Air Force.
9. Navy.
10. Departments of the Branches of Troops.
11. Command.
12. Command-Engineer of the Branches of Troops.
13. Engineer.
14. Training Period—3 Years.
15. Service in the Troops (6-8 years).
16. Professional Selection into the Military Academy.
17. Ukrainian Armed Forces Military Academy/Chief of the Academy and Deputy Minister of Defense for VUZ's.
18. Departments of the Services of the Armed Forces.
19. VAK [Higher Academic Courses].
20. Scientific-Research Centers and Doctoral Thesis Preparation.
21. In addition, there will be the following to train scientific-teaching cadres:
22. NIG [Scientific Research Group] and Graduate Work.
23. Period of Study—2-3 years.
24. Ukrainian Armed Forces Ministry of Defense.

Our proposals are reduced to the following. All existing VUZ's and training centers on Ukrainian territory must be the foundation of Ukrainian Armed Forces officer training. The majority of them correspond to contemporary requirements. After the partial reduction of some schools, their facilities can also be utilized for training republic guard specialists.

In our opinion, we need to train soldiers and sergeants in the appropriate specialties at training centers for 3-6 months. After that, they continue their service in the troops and, 6-12 months after professional selection on a competitive basis, they can be accepted into warrant officer schools and military schools where they administer examinations primarily on military disciplines.

It is desirable to establish three higher VUZ's for the services of the armed forces based on existing military schools on Ukrainian territory. In our opinion, it is advisable for each of them to have several departments for the branches of troops. A period of study of not more than three years is possible at the schools.

Military school graduates serve in the troops in positions from platoon commander to battalion commander and in equivalent positions. To increase skills prior to assignment to higher positions, officers need to complete 2-3 month courses in their specialty. The most promising officers with the positions of battalion commanders and their deputies can enter the Ukrainian Armed Forces Military Academy and it is advisable to have one. It is advisable to man departments with personnel from the services of the armed forces. Training of scientific-pedagogical cadres at the academy is possible at the scientific research center and in groups, and at doctoral preparation and graduate work centers. At the present time, the structures indicated have totally justified themselves at the Ground Forces PVO Academy.

It is advisable for all military schools to be subordinate to the chief of the academy, whose position in this case can be combined with the post of deputy Ukrainian Minister of Defense for VUZ's. This will permit us to more effectively carry out all tasks assigned to Ukrainian military VUZ's and to have a military cadre training structure in a single system.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces Military Academy must train specialists for placement in command and command-staff positions at the regimental-army level in 2-3 years. Training of higher command personnel must be carried out at the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy or at similar academies of other states.

It is advisable to have higher academic courses under the Ukrainian Armed Forces Military Academy for the subsequent increase of the skills of officers and generals prior to their assignment to higher posts. It is desirable to conduct Armed Forces reserve officer training primarily at military departments of civilian institutions. We can

utilize the training facilities of military schools and the academy for training and to conduct periodic reserve officers' assemblies.

Thus, it seems to us that reform of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will occur in three phases (periods). In the first phase, the Armed Forces will be established on the existing facilities of the three military districts. Subsequently, a so-called transition period is possible for the creation of a professional Ukrainian Army. It will be characterized by the introduction of a new approved Armed Forces organizational structure and improvement of military cadre training programs. Reorganization of the Ukrainian Armed Forces during the transition period will permit us to consider the future development of military science and all of Ukraine's specific national features (language, culture, etc.).

And finally, the third phase (period)—this is the completion of the establishment of the Ukrainian professional Armed Forces in accordance with the adopted military doctrine and the capabilities of the economy.

The indicated proposals do not lay claim to the absence of alternatives. At the same time, we think that representatives of all VUZ's located on the territory of Ukraine must participate in the establishment of the new army which must meet international standards.

Ukraine Officer Groups Exchange Criticism

Group Critical of Ukraine Officers' Union

92UM0371A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
14 Dec 91 p 2

[Article under the rubric "The Union of Officer-Citizens of the Ukraine—Two Views, Two Positions": "Open Letter to Officers Serving in the Ukraine"]

[Text] Comrade officers! The officers' assembly of the directorate of the detached army for air defense is appealing to you.

The events of recent months, chief among which were the founding congress of the Independent Association of Officers and the 2nd Congress of the Union of Officers of the Ukraine [SOU], have shown that a real danger threatens the unity of the officer corps of our units.

We note that the creation of the Union of Officers of the Ukraine did not arouse any particular interest among the officer cadres. This indifferent attitude started to change quickly, however, to the extent that this Union and its chairman, Colonel V. Martirosyan, began to come forward as the sole authorized representative of all officers serving on the territory of the Ukraine, and the press and television began willingly offering their pages and screens to them. The representatives of the Union are received at the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine, and not only received but are even asked to take part in the creation of the armed forces of the Ukraine.

It is a good thing, in our opinion, when officers are taken into account at all levels. Because the Union is being structured according to territorial traits rather than according to troop organizations, however, a situation is taking shape wherein the interests of the officers are being expressed by people who are not authorized to do so, which is causing a schism among the officers. When the Union began to make proposals concerning the principles for the organizational development of the armed forces of the Ukraine, the overwhelming majority of the members of the Officers' Assembly had a negative reaction to that situation. The same attitude took shape in more than just our collective alone. Confirmation of that in particular is the holding of a founding meeting of the Independent Association of Officers in the city of Vinnitsa on October 25.

The decisions of the 2nd Congress of the Union show that the appetites of its leadership are growing. Today the Union of Officers of the Ukraine is aspiring to create an "Institute of Authorized Representatives of the Supreme Soviet"—i.e. newly minted commissars—among the troops from among their own representatives. The demand of the congress to return Ukrainian officers to the Ukraine and repatriate the officers of other nationalities before the end of 1992 is moreover none other than unconcealed nationalism.

The mistrust toward the SOU on our part is also conditioned by the fact that one of the principles for the building of that social organization is the late lamented principle of democratic centralism. And that assumes, to a considerable extent, the creation of the next political party.

If we throw out the ideological differences of these two organizations, both of them are reminiscent of ordinary trade unions in their aims. Their novelty is the fact that they are trade unions of officers. If matters proceed further, then we evidently will not have long to wait for the appearance of trade unions among other categories of servicemen.

Are such military trade unions able to provide social protections for servicemen? Clearly not, because, first of all, they are being created outside of the military collectives. Second, the decisions of the 2nd Congress of the SOU contradict the principle of unity of command.

So what then is the way out? We turn to history. The Officers' Assemblies appeared in the Russian tsarist army starting in the second half of the 18th century, and had taken decisive shape by the end of the 19th. Their chief aims were cohesion among the officers' collectives, the cultivation of love for military service, the rendering of assistance to the emergence of young officers and the organization of leisure for officers and members of their families.

Analogous Officers' Assemblies were created in our time as well, just with the difference that their aims and tasks were expanded in favor of providing social protections for officers; consequently there could not be any other

organizations. The Union of Officers of the Ukraine that has been created could have been reformed into a delegate Officers' Assembly from the military collectives.

We declare that servicemen, as opposed to other citizens, are a special category to whom such democratic principles as freedom to participate in political organizations or the SOU, which has proclaimed itself a social organization but which is, in fact, a political organization in its aims, should not extend.

We feel that the pursuit of an Institute of Authorized Representatives from among the members of the Union of Officers of the Ukraine in the units is insulting.

The decision of the congress on the assignment of officers to positions from battalion commander or their equal and above with the consent of the Union of Officers of the Ukraine is even more insulting, as is the certification of all officers with its participation.

Comrade officers!

We appeal to you and we hope that each of us, in these anxious and critical times for the armed forces, will perform his officer's and constitutional duty with dignity and honor.

Assembly of Officers of the Directorate of the Detached Army for Air Defense.

Officer Union Member on Critics

92UM0371B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
14 Dec 91 p 2

[Article by Major of the Medical Service M. Liber, chairman of the Novograd-Volyn organization of the Union of Officers of the Ukraine, under the rubric "The Union of Officer-Citizens of the Ukraine—Two Views, Two Positions": "We Are Standing Upright"]

[Text] I am writing under the impressions of a feature in one of the military papers at the threshold of the so-called Congress of the Officers of the Ukraine in Vinnitsa (having in mind the founding assembly of the Independent Association of Officers—Ed.). The Assembly of Officers, the author (or perhaps group of authors) feels, should unite and make like thinkers out of the officer corps of the army. Wonderful, isn't it? Not one officer will say anything against such a postulation of the issue. And now the practical actions following this good intent have begun. The units have received a supplement to the "Statute on Assemblies of Officers" in which, aside from everything else, it is stated that the chairman of the assembly cannot be the commander of the unit. That is, they are beginning to move from one extreme to the other right away. Why can the commander not be elected the chairman? Let them elect him, and on a competitive basis. If the commander is a decent person and enjoys trust, he will always be elected.

But we will not talk about that. The task they face became comprehensible at the very first meetings. They were allocated the same functions the party organizations had not very long ago. The same agenda, the same issues, like twins, reminiscent of the same meetings and decrees of July and August of this year, only regular party ones. And such points in the draft resolutions as support for the Constitution of the USSR and the declaration of the State Council of November 4, everything in its place. The whole campaign is aimed at preserving the status quo in the army and bringing to life those resolutions that are advantageous for certain structures, in this case structures of the empire.

The reanimation of the officers' societies in the current socio-political climate has the aim of bringing to naught the efforts of democratic organizations and associations of the Union of Officer-Citizens of the Ukraine that are aimed at creating their own armed forces and the consolidation of the officer corps around the idea of the independence of the Ukraine. But you will agree that making the decision to support the State Council and the Constitution of the former USSR today is the same thing as swearing loyalty to one on the eve of marriage to another. The same people who are instigating us to adopt those documents will, in a few weeks, be beating themselves on the chest and declaring that it does not matter to them whom they serve.

The fall inspections are largely confirming this apprehension. Lieutenant-General Torshin declared in Novgorod-Volyn at the start of the inspections that Colonel Martirosyan had recently come out with provocative appeals. They will probably soon straighten him out, as well as those who are joining various unions, said the general. Only one organization—the Assembly of Officers—has the right to existence in the army. That means, according to the general's logic, that there is no place in the armed forces for the members of the Union of Officers of the Ukraine, and they must be freed of us. There's democracy military-style for you.

A tendency to quarrel has become noticeable recently between the Union of Officers and the minister of defense of the Ukraine. A far-sighted but nonetheless clear idea. They were writing about the minister only in a tone of ill will until quite recently, and now they have begun to feel sorry for him and shed crocodile tears due to the fact that the Union of Officers intends to supervise

and indicate to the minister what he is to do and how to do it. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine has entrusted Colonel-General Konstantin Petrovich Morozov with forming up the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces, which he is engaged in, and the Union of Officers is facilitating this. And he does not intend to thrust anything on anyone willfully. This is our common cause, and it will be brought to its logical conclusion.

The activity of members of the Union and its leadership are very negatively covered. They take individual fragments from the appearances of the chairman of the Union, Colonel Martirosyan, out of context and start passing them off as program goals of the Union. One may judge that this is not so both from the resolutions of the 2nd Congress and from their everyday activity. Although it must be noted, if we are to be candid to the utmost, that some of the statements by Vilen Arutyunovich are a heavy burden on the shoulders of the rank-and-file members of the Union.

The path we have chosen is not an easy one. They are discharging us and will continue to discharge us under specious pretexts, and moreover many without pensions, without housing and without means of existence. A great and insurmountable force, however, the force of faith in the correctness of our cause, is not leaving us and will not leave us. We are standing upright, and no one will be able to knock us onto our knees next time.

Uzbeks Assert Jurisdiction over Military

92UM0379A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Jan 92 p 1

[Unattributed report: "From Tashkent. Decision of the President of Uzbekistan: Troops Under Republic Jurisdiction"]

[Text] In keeping with the Decree of President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov, military forces and individual units and subdivisions stationed on its territory will be transferred to republic jurisdiction.

Moreover, the Tashkent Higher School and the military-technical school of the former USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs with all of its personnel, arms, and property will be transferred to the jurisdiction of Uzbekistan. They will be used as a basis for creating the domestic forces of the republic Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Illegal 5.45-mm Round Believed in Inventory

92UM0232A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 13 Nov 91 p 6

[Vadim Ledovyy report: "Death From the 5.45-millimeter Round. In the Soviet Union They Are Still Using Bullets That Were Banned Back in the 19th Century"]

[Text] Up to now there has been silence about the use by the Soviet army of a 5.45-millimeter round, which not only "tumbles" when it hits an obstacle but also splinters into small fragments, leading to inevitable death. If this kind of bullet enters a man's arm it will exit somewhere in the area of the neck, ripping the entire body apart like a sieve. There are no wounded from these bullets, only corpses.

Rounds of this type were banned late in the last century and early in this century by several international conventions as an inhumane means of mass destruction. True, these kinds of rounds were used inhumanly by the Germans in World War I. The illegal initiative of the German militarists was seized upon by the Soviet communists, who proposed to the military-industrial complex in the USSR and to the eager designers that they be put into mass production.

In an interview for the newspaper ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, General V. Skorokhodov said this:

"As an expert I confirm that this round does not fragment and does not become deformed when it enters the human body because it does not have design tricks. It cannot, therefore, be classified as being at variance with international law (the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907)."

Back in 28 December 1990 at a meeting of the presidential commission checking on objectivity in the investigation of the reasons for the death of servicemen in peacetime, a lawyer versed in international law, G. Melkov, asked the chief military prosecutor, A. Katusev, if the USSR Armed Forces had rounds with a lopsided center of gravity, which makes death inevitable. This is what he replied:

"I am not a military person but I also learned of this in the press. According to my own information, a special commission has been set up in the Ministry of Defense. It will reach a conclusion on whether or not these rounds do exist."

On 12 January 1991 at a meeting of that same commission, the meticulous Melkov again showed an interest, but this time addressed the deputy procurator general, Ya. Dzenitis: "Do the USSR Armed Forces have these rounds?"

The response: "I am a representative of the civil procuracy. I am not competent to answer this question. And none of the civil procurators, even the procurator general, will answer it."

This question arises: Do the generals and procurators at all levels in fact know the true answer to the question about the rounds that are banned by international law and used in the USSR Armed Forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs? Or is the impression being created that they do not know? And what do the procurators of lower rank think about it? In conversations many of them say that, yes, these rounds do exist but officially they cannot say that. But facts are stubborn things.

Criminal case No. 5 charges enlisted man A.N. Guzhva, from combat unit 41541, of the murder of enlisted man Dmitriy Chumichev, whose father, V.V. Chumichev, is a member of the above-mentioned commission and attended a meeting with M. Gorbachev.

The finding of the forensic and criminological expert examinations of 27 April 1989, signed by the chief of the 87th forensic medicine laboratory in the Carpathian Military District, Colonel of Medical Services Sardinov (the signature and the stamp are in the possession of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA—editor's note), provided answers in writing to these questions.

"Was the round manufactured with a lopsided center of gravity?" (This was how the meticulous father of Chumichev posed the question to the procurator and the experts.)

Answer: The 5.45-millimeter-caliber bullet that was fired was a standard combat round designed to be fired from an automatic weapon or the 1974-model Kalashnikov light machinegun. The design characteristics of this round are that the center of gravity is shifted somewhat to the rear. This leads to an increase in the angle of rotation at the back end of the round... The back end of the round submitted for examination was destroyed and the steel casing was ripped at that place and somewhat flattened, revealing the upper part of the steel core and the lead sleeve.

Is this not a design feature of the 5.45-millimeter round? Is this not how it differs in design from the straight-travel 7.62-millimeter round?

Let me cite from another criminal case, that brought against enlisted man K.A. Masagetov, from combat unit 61103, who shot Sergeant Yu.V. Kroman and enlisted man P.A. Andryushchenko.

From the conclusions of forensic medical expert G. Trushin with respect to enlisted man Andryushchenko:

"Wound No 1: the wound channel is not straight: the direction of the initial part of the wound channel is from front to rear, but the final section of the channel runs from back and below to above... Wound No 8:... deformed (without back-end section) 5.45-millimeter-caliber round found in the field of a fracture of the humerus... Wound No 20.... deformed (without back-end section) 5.45-millimeter-caliber round found in the boot."

The list of examples, could, of course, be continued.

Unprofessionalism, Army Instability Scored

92UM0304A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant Colonel N. Poroskov under the rubric "Reading the Mail": "Dishonor and Honor"]

[Text] Most often a person sets pen to paper when things are not going well for him. For that reason, apparently, letters of confession and letters of hurt predominate in the editorial mail. At one time, a lot was being said about outside attempts to divide the Army, and to drive a wedge between the general ranks and the senior and junior officers. Today, if we are to judge by the letters that are coming in, there are symptoms of illness in military collectives coming from within.

After a billet cut, Captain Sheshnikov was held in an unauthorized status almost a year. For the last seven months, Mikhail Yurevich has not received a single kopek, and he gets by with the casual earnings he makes as a loader at a quarry and a railroad station.

"After returning from the usual search for a job," he writes the editorial office, "I found my apartment open. Strangers were already living in it. Many things were missing, and with them my identity card. The commander prohibited the registering of my report requesting that the document be reissued."

We read other letters carefully. Lieutenant Colonel V. Titkov was waiting to be called up for graduate work, at a time when his documents were "gathering dust" in the regiment. Fearing discharge, Captain O. Buzhenko was compelled to agree to the position of platoon commander, although not long before this he was recommended for promotion to major. This after 15 years of service—and down to a starting position. Senior Lieutenant S. Orlov is not being promoted, he will not be transferred to another unit, and he cannot get a discharge. Money for building materials, which the command element took, was held back from warrant officers subordinate to Major A. Gadetskiy...

Whom should we, the military, blame in stories like this except ourselves? For the disorder that is more and more prevalent in officer collectives. For disappearing magnanimity, tolerance towards one's neighbor, and concern. For time-serving and squabbles with and without offenses. Previously, the high-handed chief knew: He could be reprimanded severely. There was, so to say, a warning based on a strict vertical structure of subordination, as there should be in an army. Today, the concepts are muddled. Insinuatingly, and under a plausible pretext, the idea is inculcated in many: Not all orders have to be executed, only the humane ones. This idea will hardly "prevail among the masses"—everything is as good as lost, there is no army anymore, and it will be succeeded by a conglomeration of people in uniform who philosophize on the subjects of legality and humanism. The idea of choice: To execute or not to

execute an order is usually professed by the opposition that is aspiring to power. After it gets it, it immediately demands the unconditional subordination of the military. There is no clarity and completeness today in the authoritative structures. And there is no stability in the Army.

The uncertainty of tomorrow and fear for one's own fate force people to think not like the old song—first about the Motherland and then about oneself—but the opposite. Moreover, the concept of Motherland has been devalued, and its outlines are vaguely eroded. And characteristics are bared in people that are far from the best—because of hopelessness and lack of faith in anything.

But is it possible, despite the situation, to justify the boorish colonel, the district princeling, and the complacent official who mercilessly insults a junior in rank in front of others, as happened with Major N. Zhirnov. And this because, writes the officer, he openly talked about abuses in the unit.

Indeed, it appears that in recent years life has soundly beaten the major. In the letter there is extreme caution, and even fear. "Have a talk with honest people," he writes, and he gives their names, "but in private. And so that no one will know about the conversation; otherwise, they will not let them live in peace, or they will discharge them. This sort of thing has already happened."

It is painful to read this letter, which is reminiscent of notes from the underground. The officer is secretly keeping a notebook in which "notes are maintained on the highhandedness of officials," revenge, command elements trying to get around commissions, etc.

As the saying goes, this is what we have come to. We are hiding things from each other, and we are carrying petitions to high offices. The opposing sides are pinpointing each step that the other takes, in order to deliver a strike at the appropriate moment: Some for the purpose of defense, for there are no other means, and others, in order to put the objectionable person "in his place."

But this, after all, is the tragedy—many collectives are splitting up. On the basis of "one's own" people and those who cannot be tolerated, those who accept the unhealthy situation and those who oppose it. Finally, for political motives. There are cases of veiled revenge against former political workers. Several letters recount the behavior of certain chiefs during the August events: Those "who praised the State Committee for the State of Emergency," who removed the portrait of the head of state from the wall, but afterwards returned it to its place...

But, of course, these are denunciations, covered with a democratic veil. There are also fashionable accusations of nationalism, political unreliability, and adherence to

old procedures. Then suddenly mention is made of the lack of military training and the failure to comply with the secrecy program.

But because of the excited writings in secret notebooks and scrupulous calculations of another's transgressions, how can you think of combat training? Indeed, even this concept itself has faded away and is consigned to oblivion. Especially because the image of the enemy, as they almost convinced us, is destroyed, and we are tightly encircled completely by friends, who send us parcels with shabby pants and an expired Bundeswehr ration. Apparently, that is why the unit commander where B. Asladiyev served is now searching for an "enemy" among his own, setting the officer against the collective, "taunting a person with little jibes, and he incites retaliatory insults." And he drove the unit to the point that "it is unable to fulfill its task."

God forbid, as they say, that the isolation of the individual follows immediately after the breakup into groups: I would like to survive and to hold out, but there, I could not care less what happens. As on the eve of Armageddon and the second coming of the Messiah, indiscriminate sin is starting. No one needs anyone, and there is no place from which to expect a helping hand. Everyone is for himself. At best—for the clan. Arouse the crowd, which strained the flabby muscles of its body and soul during the years of "stagnation!"

The quintessence of an indifferent attitude toward a person is described in detail in the story of Major B. Syrets, a battalion chief of staff. Quite unexpectedly, the battalion commander proposed that he sign his name in the interview record, saying that he wants to serve in the Transcaucasus. Boris Sergeyevich refused. "Sign it yourself," the commander of the large formation (soyedeniye) summarized.

Inasmuch as the position of battalion commander was mentioned for replacement in an order, the chief of staff was speedily advanced to the position without asking consent. Moreover, his own unit already had a commander. Immediately after the appointment, an order arrived to turn in his file and depart for a "hot spot." They were not expecting a replacement there, and they had no vacancy. Making the rounds of offices in vain, Boris Sergeyevich returned to his home unit. The position was already occupied, he had been taken off the manning roster, and soon they stopped paying him entirely. The chief of the personnel department refused to talk about it...

"Is all of this," asks Boris Sergeyevich, "the norm for army life and human relations?" The only thing that can be done is to join this half-question and half-confirmation. To what limits can personnel disorder go, and how can this wall of callousness be breached? Are there at least some kinds of laws in effect in our country that protect the rights of the military? Including from military bureaucrats.

It is impossible not to heed the bitter, here and there excessively radical—but not without justification—conclusion of an officer: "It seems to me that the impending reduction in the Armed Forces is an enormous outflow of honest and respectable officers." It is with this feeling, and against his desire, that the officer is leaving the Army. And he is not alone.

But this is approximately the same story with the transfer of Captain Yu. Shpakov. And each time, calling for justice, he heard: I do not have time for you and, indeed, no one else had time. But, after all, now is as good a time as any for officers to unite and to support one another at a difficult moment (it is not easy for anyone now!). Let us finally change our emphasis: Before asking for social protection at the state level, let us think about everyone's protection at least inside the collectives—companies, regiments, and battalions. We will display concern and that same officer fraternity for which the Russian and the Soviet Army were famous.

At a congress of one of the parties that has a patriotic inclination, I heard something that was hopelessly perplexing: Officers were rudely pushed out the door, and they obediently left, with their heads lowered. And this is so. At best, they will write a complaint. But do the officer assemblies often lift their voices in defense of cargo loaders in uniform? But those who indifferently watch the harassment of their brother officers, including the leadership, will they not themselves meet the same fate tomorrow?

The military collectives are united and fine-tuned to the level of machinery, when operational work is in progress and when it is necessary to execute an order. What prevents them from defending their interests, honor, and dignity just as monolithically? It is incorrect that we were trained disgracefully even in the years of "stagnation" themselves. Indeed, there was a lot of ideology that was stale and historically distorted. But there also was honor. Otherwise, the Army would already have fallen apart then, and it would not have been able to maintain parity with the strongest military power in the world, and it not only could not have been "imperial," as it is now called, but it could not even have been a principality.

What is happening to us? Why are we officers turning into military Philistines, amorphous and infantile? On the basis of what kind of good motives do we meekly endure the insults of some semi-criminal who has nothing in common with the people? Why do we allow bandit formations to disarm entire subunits without a sound, look at the murder of a comrade from a combat formation as an inevitability, and coolly view the new "internationalists" who are jumping across state borders?

And the reason, apparently, lies not just in the presence or absence of a pertinent order, but primarily in the erosion or downfall of a globally organized idea—be this the preservation of a unified Armed Forces, the state

itself, and the Motherland in its primordial understanding. The main thread has been lost. And many today are gnawed by the thought: In the name of what am I serving? Where is it, the Motherland, to which I swore an oath, and within what borders does it reside now, and where will it reside in the future? Will they not expose me, my unit, and the Army one more time, making us the scapegoat in political games?

And still... We look around, and we shake off the dizziness of irritability and animosity. An overwhelming majority of the officers are highly respected people who above all stand for duty and honor. We still wear the uniform, and, possibly, tomorrow it will be necessary to employ military professionalism for a specific purpose—for the preservation of peace.

We look around. Indeed, the eyes are dimmed by "smoke," and by lies, evil, and cowardice. But courage, valor, and nobility, after all, are still alive. These values cannot and must not perish.

No matter what the epoch, what the system, and what way of life prevails, betrayal is betrayal, cowardice is cowardice, and dishonor is dishonor. Well, but honor is always honor. Dignity is always dignity. Very soon, our sick society will have to remember this, for without a revival of these fundamental principles, no kind of civilized organization of human society is possible. And who then, if not us, the officers, should be the first to revive it?

Procuracy Official on Lack of Military Legislation

92UM0375A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Col Justice L. Smertin, chief of the Legislation Section of the Main Military Procuracy, under the rubric "The Opinion of a Legal Expert": "The Army Is Being Destroyed by Lawlessness"]

[Text] The armed forces presently find themselves at the center of attention of political forces. They have become that touchstone on which the strength of the Commonwealth of Independent States is being tested. Emotions sometimes overflow in the debate. And how does the situation look from the legal standpoint?

The editors asked Colonel Justice L. Smertin, chief of the Legislation Section of the Main Military Procuracy, to express his opinion.

For most servicemen, particularly the regular officers, who elected to devote their lives to protecting the homeland, recent events have been a difficult ordeal. In what country do we live? What people do we serve? Whose orders are we carrying out? Today we face these and other difficult questions. The officer has sworn allegiance, taken an oath, and he cannot betray it. Today, when the constitutions and old laws are universally no longer in effect and no one is observing the new ones, at

least the oath of loyalty to the homeland should not become an empty formality.

And it would seem that this is possible. All servicemen, from the common soldier to the marshal, serves under the Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty. Formally, it has not been in effect since the establishment of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. The army cannot be disbanded because of this, however, and we do not yet have other legislative enactments governing the manning of the armed forces. The heads of government of the states making up the CIS must therefore immediately reach agreement to extend the functioning of this law. It is equally important to extend the functioning of the general military regulations governing, among other things, matters of discipline and the material liability of servicemen.

The Union Law on Criminal Liability for Military Crimes has been incorporated in the criminal codes of the former Union republics which are members of the Commonwealth today. Since for a certain time the independent states which have joined the Commonwealth will have on their territories not only their own formations but joint armed forces as well, the legal status of all servicemen and their criminal liability for military crimes should be the same. The heads of state could conclude an agreement on this matter as well.

It is also essential to preserve the centralized systems of military law-enforcement agencies. In the future, if we do not return to a unified military, the functioning of these agencies should be coordinated on the scale of the CIS.

Equally acute is the question of pensions for servicemen which have been paid on the basis of a unified Union law. The politicians must understand that the officers have not trekked around the nation by choice. They were fulfilling their military duty. It is essential for the heads of state to agree to extend the Union Law on Pensions for Servicemen. This will relieve the strain which has developed not only among the current military pensioners but also among all the servicemen who are at a crossroad right now. All of them will know that their pension is guaranteed, whether they continue to serve in a republic army or in a joint armed force.

Our leaders could also reach agreement on other aspects of the social and legal protection of servicemen. For example, they could make exceptions in their laws on citizenship for servicemen and their families. After all, for many officers taken by the service far from their native parts citizenship can be an insurmountable problem.

And then there is housing, of course. There are hundreds of thousands of officers without apartments in the armed forces. This situation is used in some places for political blackmail and can only exacerbate the situation in the military. Concluding an agreement immediately to provide every officer and warrant officer transferred to a

new station as part of the reform of republic armies or joint armed forces with housing will relieve the severity of the problem.

All aspects of social and legal protection for servicemen are regulated by the Law on the Status of Servicemen which has been worked out. Unfortunately, those elected by the people in the Union have not gotten around to dealing with it. By returning to this law and passing it without delay the parliaments of the Commonwealth states would demonstrate not only political maturity but also enviable far-sightedness.

The legal vacuum which has formed in military law with respect to the military oath is especially troublesome. An extremely complicated situation has developed. All servicemen presently serving, except for the new recruits, took the military oath established by the 1960 Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Laws of the USSR have not been applied since the breakup of the Union and the establishment of the CIS. On 13 December 1991, however, the former President of the USSR, who was also commander in chief of the armed

forces and was still performing his duties, issued an ukase with the text of a new oath without repealing the old one. Some time later the Ukraine and Russia established their own oaths, and others will obviously follow suit. The old oath was not repealed, the new one is not in effect, and now the republics have their own. It is not surprising that passions are flaring.

I am convinced that servicemen in the armies of the sovereign states should take an oath of allegiance to their people. The wording of the oath has been approved in the Ukraine, in Russia and Belarus as well, even though the armies have not been established. At the same time, however, those who are going to serve in a joint armed force cannot take an oath only to their own people. A common oath must be worked out for them, as well as another ceremony for taking the oath. However, national oaths and a common oath for troops of the Commonwealth should only be taken by servicemen newly drafted into the military.

The oath is a formal vow, and a vow is not taken twice.

Chernavin on Missions, Composition, Continued Strategic Value of Navy*92UM0413 Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 11, Nov 91 (signed to press 6 Dec 91) pp 3-12*

[Article by Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin under the rubric "Time and the Fleet": "The Navy. Problems of Reduction and Development"]

[Text] The high dynamism and depth of the processes that are transpiring in the contemporary world are today not only bringing forth a host of new questions of the most diverse nature for resolution, but are also demanding immediate and suitable answers to those questions. The search for and finding of such answers has particular significance in the sphere of ensuring international stability and security, which was confirmed once again in connection with the recent proposals of U.S. President G. Bush and the reciprocal Soviet initiatives.

The new political thinking, proceeding from the unconditional acknowledgment of the higher priority of general human values, the necessity of the de-ideologization of international relations, the unacceptability of war as a means of achieving political aims, the senselessness and destructiveness of the arms race and an understanding of the need for non-traditional approaches toward ensuring international and national security, the interconnected and conditional natures of which are becoming more and more obvious and necessary, is fully defining the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in recent years. The negotiations to eliminate intermediate- and shorter-range missiles (INF Treaty) cut back conventional forces in Europe and the strategic offensive arms of the United States and the USSR, the Joint Declaration of the 22 member-states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO and the Paris Charter for a New Europe should all be included among the practical results achieved on that basis. Agreements with the United States and a number of other countries to avert dangerous military activity have been concluded and are now in force. Negotiations are continuing within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Conflict Avoidance Center has begun operating in Vienna and consultations and meetings are being held among politicians, military experts and the representatives of public organizations and movements at various levels.

An understanding that the intrinsic security of any state—large or small—can be reliably assured in the post-confrontational world only within the framework of global stability and security is becoming more and more widespread and clear as a consequence of this, even though it is of course clearly premature to disregard the existing military potential of individual states as yet. The fundamental correctness of this approach to the problem of national security is confirmed by an attentive analysis of the political and strategic military situation around the world and the military conflicts and clashes that still

arise occasionally in various regions of the planet. This analysis testifies quite convincingly that a reliance on political, economic or diplomatic means of resolving conflict situations is effective in most cases only if those means possess a certain component of force, i.e. are buttressed by the essential intrinsic military power. This situation was reflected overall in the Soviet military doctrine adopted in 1987, or more precisely in that part of it that had an exclusively military-political aspect.

At the same time, the essence of our military doctrine consists of the fact that it is directed, for the first time in the history of civilization, first and foremost not toward preparing the state for war and the waging of combat operations for the destruction of an enemy, but rather at averting them and expanding and reinforcing confidence-building measures and mutual security. A natural and logical reconsideration of a number of the most important and long-standing traditional ideas of the armed forces of our state on a military-technical plane is occurring under new conditions and with the transition from a system of sharply pronounced bipolar relations, where much was determined by the political climate that was formed by the Soviet Union and the United States, to a multipolar world. This aspect of the matter has primary immediate practical significance for the army and navy, insofar as it, being derived from fundamental political postulates, determines the nature and direction of the organizational development of the armed forces: their technical sophistication, the forms and methods of waging armed warfare, the repulsing of possible aggression from wherever it may come and the preparation of the troops and manpower for the accomplishment of the assigned missions. A constant regard and analysis of the potential military danger, the nature, level and directions of it, is required for that as before, and the choice of the concrete means and methods of formulating a unified system of military support for the security of the Soviet state depends on it.

Whereas the United States was the principal likely adversary until comparatively recently, however, currently one cannot fail to see the existence of a considerably more uncertain situation. It must be acknowledged, however, that the refusal of the United States and NATO to consider the USSR as its military adversary was largely conditioned by the reduction of the intensity of that situation. The direct threat of a world war arising really does seem unlikely today, which can in no way be asserted apropos of the danger of the appearance of regional or local armed conflicts of any scale. Who would have dared to predict with confidence the development and outcome of the events in the Persian Gulf region, and the reaction to and participation in it of the world community, just a year and a half ago? And probably hardly anyone can give any guarantee today that these or those possible local conflicts will not lead to global consequences hazardous to all mankind, or will not drag, say, the Soviet Union into their orbit, seriously affecting its national interests.

For the Soviet armed forces, called upon to ensure reliably the external security of the country, then, the problem of their possible participation in maintaining global stability—and, clearly, first and foremost in the regions adjoining the USSR—is a topical one. The situation with the extant disproportions in the structures and qualitative and quantitative levels of the armed forces of various states seems wholly tolerable in this regard, and there is no necessity of strictly observing uniformity in their composition or combat capabilities. Only the fact that the armed forces of no state possess either striking or defensive supremacy, making it possible to utilize military force to achieve its own narrowly nationalistic military-political aims, remains the important one. Naval forces and manpower gain especial significance under contemporary conditions from that point of view, and the more so in the long run as the most universal and highly mobile branch of the armed forces with all types of manpower and troops, weaponry and hardware, i.e. all of the existing means of armed struggle that are able to operate without limitations under any conditions and in any regions of the world. This branch of the forces, as is well known, remains as yet outside the negotiating process aimed at reducing or substantially restricting the arms of the ground forces and of aviation.

Taking this into account, we understand that whatever reductions or limitations the ground forces and land-based aviation are subjected to, they can be compensated for comparatively easily through augmenting and utilizing the corresponding branches of naval forces. This situation cannot fail to evoke legitimate anxiety due to the fact that processes in this sphere also clearly require monitoring on the part of the world community.

It is no secret that the navies of the United States and its allies are still governed by the provisions of a specially developed naval strategy that is founded on the concepts of "forward naval lines," "deep strike" and "selective deterrence," in accordance with which force generation and the training of the navy is conducted. And even though evidence exists that an understanding of the necessity of shifting the focus of the use of naval forces away from their global activation against a single threat to global activation against several regional threats is growing in the West, the answer that was given by the leaders of the navy to the question of what to do with a naval strategy of the United States, formulated during the Cold War and focusing chiefly on a global conflict with the Soviet Union, is of definite interest to us. "We are extracting the permanent principles from the strategy and using them in current planning. The naval strategy itself, propped up on the left and right by operational plans in the Atlantic and the Pacific, is on the shelf, ready to be taken out in the event that a global threat arises once again" (the article "The Way Forward" from the magazine *MARINE CORPS GAZETTE*, April 1991).

Without going into an analysis of the various positions relative to the place of naval forces and fleets in the modern world, but at the same time not losing sight of

them, it should be noted that views of the role and purpose of the navy in the Soviet Union differ radically from those that have been adopted in the West. This explains in particular the thrust of force generation and manpower training of our navy.

Our own navy has no separate naval strategy or doctrine with independent significance. The navy, as a branch of the country's armed forces, is intended for operations in the seas and oceans and occupies an important place in the system of ensuring the security of the Soviet Union. It should be noted that the navy of our country has never been considered to be some autonomous, self-contained system. Recall Peter I: "Any potentate who has only ground forces has one hand, and if he has a navy as well, he has two hands."

The Soviet Union has never tried to achieve undivided sway over the seas and oceans, and after the adoption of the new military doctrine we have even less intention of transforming our navy into an instrument of dictate, thrusting our own will on anyone, or into a tool of aggression and threat.

The naval component of the military might of our country, the manpower and equipment for armed struggle at sea, is subordinate to and is developed on the basis of a unified state military doctrine and an overall conceptual framework for the waging of a possible war with a regard for the situation that is taking shape and the specific features of the most likely theaters of military operations.

The chief mission of the navy, in conjunction with the other branches of our armed forces, consists of averting the unleashing of war and, in the event of aggression, in repelling it, protecting facilities and troops against strikes from maritime and ocean directions, depriving the enemy of the opportunity of conducting offensive operations and creating conditions for the restoration of peace. The substance of the main mission of the navy is thus wholly determined by the overall political stipulations of Soviet military doctrine.

The thrust of the operational and combat training of our navy is confirmation of this in particular. We devote particular attention—in both a theoretical and a practical regard—to practicing the missions of defense and repulsion of aggression, protection of coastal lines of communication and interaction with the other branches of the armed forces in conducting defensive operations in continental theaters. The areas where the operational exercises of the fleet are held have been reduced considerably over the last five years, and are virtually restricted to the adjoining seas today. Our ship forces and aviation do not train in executing strikes against targets on the territory of other states. The practice of anti-assault, anti-air and anti-mine operations are the main issues at operational-training functions. The quantity of forces (ship and aviation) taking part in the exercises has decreased markedly, the number of long voyages has been cut back and the activeness of our fleet in the

Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean, the western shores of Africa and other ocean areas has declined. Our plans, of course, are also lacking in large-scale exercises, under the guise of which it is possible to conduct the actual deployment of forces for the waging of combat operations and which can elicit justified concern not only on the part of the states neighboring us, but the whole world as well.

Some data describing the navy with the necessary completeness should clearly be presented for a more complete depiction of the missions, structure and force composition of the navy. The composition of the navy, as the navies of the leading Western powers, thus included naval strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) and general-purpose forces.

The **naval strategic nuclear forces** are part of the well-known triad of offensive strategic weapons (OSW) that are obliged to provide against the unleashing of nuclear war and the restraint of a potential enemy first and foremost. They thus act as a guarantee of peace and security for our country. In the event such a war is unleashed, the NSNW should take part in reciprocal actions and inflict unacceptable losses on a possible aggressor. The overall diminishment of nuclear potential and, naturally, the potential of NSNW after the ratification of the treaty to reduce OSW between the USSR and the United States, in our opinion, will not inflict any harm on the defensive capability of the country, since the level of restraint that is provided for after the implementation of the cutbacks is entirely sufficient for the purposes of defense as well. We are forced at the same time to keep constantly in mind the real danger of violations of the extant balance of strategic forces as a consequence of the creation and possible deployment of new anti-missile defensive systems in the United States. If the advocates of SDI in the form that it was initially conceived gain the upper hand on this issue, a new, qualitatively new and very expensive spiral in the arms race becomes inevitable in the realm of OSW.

The principal missions of the **general-purpose forces** of our navy are in essence reduced, first of all, to ensuring the physical preservation and sound functioning of the naval strategic nuclear system under any conditions and, second, creating and maintaining such operational conditions in the maritime theaters that would be the least favorable for a likely adversary to start and wage military operations. This same task—providing for the corresponding operational regimen—remains the main and principal one for the navy in peacetime as well. The navy's contribution to the whole set of measures to keep a new war from being launched, including using conventional and non-nuclear weapons, is determined by its ability and readiness to perform these tasks. In the event of aggression our general-purpose forces face the task of inflicting defeat on enemy naval strike groups and impeding the execution of broad-scale operations or those in depth by him, as well as ensuring the creation of the necessary conditions for the effective performance of

defensive operations in the continental theaters of military operations in conjunction with the other branches of the armed forces.

The organizational structure of the navy includes four fleets—two ocean fleets (the Northern and the Pacific) and two (Baltic and Black Sea) operating in closed seas. There are also two other relatively independent forces—the Caspian flotilla and the Leningrad naval base. There is no need to divide these organizational structures into administrative and operational with a regard for the missions facing the navy, traditions, force composition and their training, as has been done, for example, in the United States.

The navy includes, in a qualitative regard, submarines, surface ships, naval aviation and coastal troops, consisting of formations and units of missile and artillery troops and marines, as well as troop formations intended for the defense of naval bases and other facilities from ground-forces sectors.

All of these types of forces are represented in the composition of the fleets in the corresponding fashion. The force composition of the ocean fleets thus includes flotillas of various types of forces, flotillas (and squadrons in the Northern Fleet) of submarines, operational squadrons of surface vessels, one division of marine assault forces each, naval bases, fleet air forces and shore-defense troops. The Baltic and Black Sea have one squadron of ships apiece, a division of marine assault forces, naval bases, air forces and coastal troops, naturally of substantially lesser numbers.

The composition of our fleet today includes 59 strategic-missile nuclear submarines¹ with 896 ballistic-missile launchers, 163 attack submarines, including 88 nuclear-powered ones, 151 surface combatants with a displacement of more than 1,200 tons, including 17 cruisers, 5 of those carrying aircraft, and 87 destroyers, large ASW and patrol vessels, 331 coastal vessels and 298 small combat craft for various purposes, 1,638 aircraft and 561 helicopters in naval aviation. All of these naval forces are reduced to roughly 70 large formations and task forces. The overall number of naval personnel is about 442,000, including 29,000 serving in the shore-defense units, including the marines.

The leadership of the fleets, the Caspian flotilla and the Leningrad naval base is exercised by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy—a Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR—from Moscow, where the Main Naval Staff and a number of special directorates are located, such as Combat Training, the Shipbuilding and Armaments apparatus, the Main Servicing and Repair Directorate, the apparatus of the naval aviation and rear-services directorates, the Main Engineering Directorate, the Communications Directorate, the Scientific-Technical Committee, the Cadres Directorate, the Finance and Chemical services, the Administrative and Business-Administration Department and a number of other

subdivisions. There is also a small apparatus for administration of the higher naval training institutions, including ten higher naval schools and the higher special officer classes. They have their own Naval Academy. And, finally, the Chief Directorate of Navigation and Oceanography of the USSR Ministry of Defense, located in St. Petersburg, is also subordinate to the naval Commander-in-Chief.

For the sake of completeness it is also necessary to say a few words about the actual naval budget. About 13.5 billion rubles, 14 percent of the overall spending approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet for defense (96.6 billion rubles), were allocated to the fleet for all of its needs in 1991. The most important line items of the spending are:

- about 15 percent of the naval budget for the upkeep of all categories of naval and civilian personnel;
- a little less than 31 percent of the naval budget, or a little more than four percent of all defense spending, for new shipbuilding; and
- about 16 and 2.2 percent for the maintenance and repair of ships and other arms and hardware respectively.

It is possible to reveal the substance of all the remaining, exceedingly numerous line items as well—there are no particular secrets there—but the figures cited say a great deal. The question of whether these funds are sufficient for the navy to perform all of the tasks it faces today is not a rhetorical one, but the framework of this article does not allow a detailed consideration of it.

One should clearly talk about the prospects for the development of our navy, and how they currently look with a regard for all of the aforementioned.

It is assumed, in accordance with the purpose and missions that are characteristic of the navy, first of all, that the composition of the navy will undoubtedly continue to include strategic submarines—the naval component of the country's strategic nuclear forces. There will be fewer of them than there are today, but they will be able to perform combat patrols both in difficult-to-reach ocean regions and in well-protected coastal zones, as well as in other regions of the oceans and seas. New strategic missile carriers will meanwhile not be being built or put into service with the fleet in the next ten years.

Second, as concerns the general-purpose forces, we feel that priority in their development should be assigned to the submarine forces, comprising the foundation of the strike potential of the fleet and a universal branch of the services able to fight any naval enemy effectively. Surface vessels and naval aviation, under the terms of the defensive doctrine, should become the chief means of winning supremacy in the seas adjoining the territory of the USSR and actively waging operations in conjunction with other branches of the service in the course of repelling enemy aggression.

Our aircraft-carrying cruisers with carrier-based fighter and ASW aircraft on board, able to operate much more

effectively than shore-based aviation for analogous purposes and which could occupy a larger place in the ocean fleets, are deserving of special mention. It should be noted that the equivocal (and often simply negative) attitude toward those vessels is based first and foremost on an incorrect and erroneous idea of their role and place in supporting the combat capability of the navy, as well as unreliable data pertaining to their actual cost. Military scientific research that has been carried out confirms that the use of heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers in certain operational sectors raises the combat capabilities of the groups by 1.5-2 times and leads to a significant decrease in the losses of our forces, which will be protected by carrier-based fighter aviation under conditions of clashes with an enemy. Even if we were to talk only about the value of the forces preserved (including those for strategic purposes), it is several times all of the spending on the creation and operation of the modern naval aircraft-carrying cruisers of the Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov class.

Such a substantial impact, from the standpoint of "cost-benefit" criteria, cannot be provided by any other alternative variation for the comprehensive development of naval forces. These are undoubtedly quite expensive ships, and an average of up to 200 million rubles a year are required for their construction (if there are, for example, 2-4 ships in this class in various stages of creation; there are two being built today, by the way). Consequently, taking into account the fact that one aircraft-carrying cruiser takes 7-8 years to build, its overall cost in 1989-90 prices reaches 550-650 million rubles. It could also be added that the first of our aircraft-carrying cruisers, which entered service in 1975, cost half that much. We can say for comparison that an American aircraft carrier (and namely an aircraft carrier, not a cruiser, albeit an aircraft-carrying one) of the Nimitz class costs roughly three billion dollars; pricing, however, is not an issue for this article, and we will not consider it.

Preference in the shipbuilding programs in other classes is given to small ships (displacements of 2,000 to 4,000 tons) and surface craft that are intended for operations primarily in coastal regions and seas. Only destroyers of the *Sovremennyy* class will be entering service among relatively large surface vessels. Other ships, and guided-missile cruisers in particular (one nuclear and one with conventional power) are in the stage of completion of construction, and will be accepted for service in the fleet in the next few years. The laying down of new ships in this class is not planned. The construction of large ASW and large assault ships is also not planned. We are, at the same time, proposing somewhat of an upgrading of the minesweeping forces via the replacement of obsolete sweepers with more modern ones.

Naval aviation—missile-carrying, assault, fighter, ASW and reconnaissance—will retain its significance in the long run, although its force composition will be cut back substantially. Definite priority will be assigned to ship-based aviation therein.

The coastal troops will remain an indispensable part of the fleet. These troops, taking into account the fleet infrastructure, including the specific factors of basing conditioned first and foremost by geographical factors, are intended chiefly for ensuring the protection and defense of the bases of ships and naval aviation, as well as supporting the operations of ground troops on the maritime flanks.

Our overall approach to the further development of the fleet is based on an understanding of the objective necessity of an orientation toward qualitative parameters and the preservation of close ties with the other branches of the armed forces, as well as toward the most complete possible utilization of the overall scientific and military-engineering potential of the country and the maximum standardization of combat systems and equipment.

We are, at the same time, continuing to work on reducing the force composition of the navy. The scope of it may be judged, for example, by the fact that the ship composition of the navy has decreased by 402 combat ships and 129 assault craft since 1986. Some 260 ships have been eliminated from the composition of all of our fleets over the last two years alone, including submarines, cruisers and destroyers, and more than 60 ships of all classes this year. The fact that we are reducing those types of naval forces that have always been part of the main strike forces—the submarines and naval aviation—should be singled out in particular. The number of nuclear-powered attack submarines has thus decreased by 178 vessels over the last five years, from 341 in 1986 to 163 today, *i.e.* by half (the force composition of submarines in 1981-86, by way of comparison, was reduced by 18 boats). As for aviation, we are realizing the decision to restrict the strike and fighter aviation of shore-based naval units in the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets to an overall level of 400 combat aircraft, which signifies a reduction of 60 percent. More than 400 aircraft, including 75 percent for strike purposes, are being dismantled in connection with this.

The plan to realize the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty envisages the removal of more than 30 strategic missile submarines from the force composition of the fleet before the year 2000, and a cut in half in the number of formations of those submarines. Substantial reductions are also projected in the general-purpose forces: roughly 20-25 percent in submarines (including up to 20 percent for attack submarines) and 22-25 percent for surface combatants. The quantity of aircraft and helicopters in naval aviation will be reduced by 40-45 percent.

It should also be noted that reductions in the size of the force composition of our navy are of a non-replaceable nature. We are of course striving to build and put into fleet service new combat vessels that meet the highest of contemporary requirements, but the rate of their arrival from industry is extremely limited.

And, finally, reductions in the number of ship and aviation formations and units are underway, organizational staff structures are being straightened out and excess and intermediate levels of command and control are being dissolved in parallel with all of this.

The Soviet leadership has repeatedly and persistently proposed that the Western countries begin negotiations on reductions in naval activity in the Pacific Ocean and the manpower and armaments of the fleets. This sphere, however, remains as yet virtually untouched by the negotiating process despite the radical changes that are occurring in the political and strategic military climate. This situation could, after all, be regarded as an attempt by certain forces to achieve military superiority through the unmonitored development of the navies of the United States and its allies in its blocs, and to obtain the opportunity of thereby exerting the pressure of force not only on other countries in the world community, but also on the Soviet Union. I am sure that this will not facilitate a strengthening of stability in the world.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly been advancing proposals since 1984 that are aimed at reducing confrontation and ensuring security on the seas.

I would like to remind you that the Soviets have advanced proposals on setting into practice normal international relations of notifying of naval activity and redeployments of military forces by sea to areas adjoining the borders of another state, inviting observers to major exercises and maneuvers, restricting the scope and quantity of naval exercises, especially in areas of heavy shipping and fishing or in straits with international significance, as well as the activity of ASW forces and equipment in certain regions, notifying of the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on board ships calling at foreign ports, as well as the absence of nuclear weapons in bodies of water that have been declared free of them (nuclear-free zones), removing or restricting nuclear weapons in certain regions, including in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea (one example could be the refusal of the USSR to put nuclear weapons on naval or air carriers in the airspace or water regions of the Baltic), and restricting the number of combat vessels in the principal classes, eliminating naval bases on foreign territory and implementing a series of other measures.

Submarines could, in the future, be left in the force composition of the fleets, for example, only with antiship weaponry on board without encroaching on anyone's interests; there could be a ban on arming ships with cruise missiles with ranges greater than 300-500 km; the carrier-based wings of strike aviation intended for striking at targets in depth in the rear areas of ground forces theaters could be removed from service; the spatial sweep of the operations of amphibious-assault forces could be restricted to the 12-mile zone of territorial waters; surface combatants and submarines carrying nuclear weapons could be withdrawn beyond mutually agreed security lines.

Naval forces and fleets, in our opinion, would effectively cease to represent a potential threat to peace and could not compensate for the military might of the reduced forces of ground troops and land-based aviation with the fulfillment of these conditions.

The USSR, on the other hand, has repeatedly advanced proposals to create, under the aegis of the UN, multilateral naval formations operating on a permanent or *ad hoc* basis in the interests of the world community, especially in the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf. The Soviet Union introduced a proposal to create a United Nations Navy at the 3rd Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament in 1989. The procedure for the formation and use of the forces of such type under the strategic leadership of the Military Staff Committee of the Security Council for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security is provided for by the UN Charter. These naval forces could ensure freedom and security of navigation, fight terrorism, piracy and drug trafficking at sea, perform essential measures to fight ecological disasters or, where necessary, accomplish other tasks. This proposal was blocked at the time, in 1989, by the United States and its allies, although one may assume that there is some sense in returning to it today.

The problem of ensuring security in maritime sectors should be resolved through the coordinated efforts of all interested nations, and it requires considered and collegial consideration and discussion. The refusal to conduct, or the dragging out of, negotiations on naval problems could lead to the next spiral in the arms race, wherein the wholly realistic possibility arises of devaluing the results of the treaties and agreements that have been concluded in the realm of disarmament in recent years.

The fastest possible start to a dialogue on cutting back naval forces and arms is the behest of the times. It is essential that negotiations on reducing naval forces and armaments and restricting the activity of naval fleets become a reality, in order that the negotiating process to limit and reduce armed forces and armaments that has been developing in the interests of reinforcing international security and stability around the world not be stopped, not get into a dead end. They should go beyond the realm of good intentions and unilateral initiatives and obtain the requisite substance through the concrete and purposeful work of politicians, diplomats and the military.

It would clearly be useful, as a start, if naval and diplomatic experts of the interested states, first and foremost the major naval powers (the United States, USSR, Great Britain and the other NATO countries), discussed mutual concerns in this realm through official delegations, defined the problems and priorities for problem-solving at future negotiations, conducted an objective joint analysis of the tasks and principles of the utilization of naval forces under conditions of the new multipolar world and, on that basis, came to a unified or

approximate understanding of the structural, quantitative and qualitative changes that are needed in the navies of the leading states in order to retain for them the ability to protect effectively the interests of their own countries in the Pacific Ocean and, where necessary, repel aggression from the sea.

The aim of the first stage of the negotiations could be the creation of a system of mutual confidence-building and monitoring measures in the area of the naval activity of the parties, the constituent elements of which could be notifications of exercises, concentrations and movements of troops and naval forces, invitations of observers to exercises and the regular exchange of information on the overall structure, size and positions of the navies, including those located on the territories of third countries, as well as current and planned activity. It would be logical to determine the priority and sequence of future symmetrical and asymmetrical restrictions and the possibility of reducing (or limiting) the forces, arms and activity of the navies at the same time on the basis of observing the principle of not causing harm to the security of the participants in the negotiations.

It seems expedient, in the second stage, to set about coordinating concrete measures to restrict naval activity and cut back or prevent the augmentation of navies and their armaments. An acceptable frequency for the holding of major naval exercises and maneuvers (no more often than once every 3-4 years, for example), restrictions on the areas of operations of the forces that are carrying nuclear weapons and carrier-based aviation, as well as anti-submarine and amphibious forces, could also be negotiated here; a ban or a mutual refusal to conduct exercises in straits and areas of heavy navigation and fishing, along with other "sensitive" zones, is also possible. The area of reducing or not augmenting navies and their armaments could include negotiating restrictions on the size of naval aviation and missile systems with ranges exceeding defined levels, the withdrawal of ships with ship-based attack aircraft and restrictions on the range of antiship weapons and weapons in the "sea-to-land" class, as well as a number of other possible restrictions.

The path to real reductions in naval armaments and the force compositions of the navies by specific types and kinds of weapons and classes and subclasses of combat vessels will open up as a consequence of the achievement of these agreements.

The necessity of subsequent stages in the negotiations could naturally also arise, while the substance of the stages proposed above could be clarified or supplemented, but this approach seems to be quite considered and substantiated on a conceptual plane under contemporary conditions.

The fleet is ready to participate in this work. The navy, for the purpose of preparing for it, as well as achieving mutual understanding and removing suspicion and mistrust of each other, is proposing the continuation and

expansion of the practice of mutual visits by ships and the exchange of delegations of specialists from the navies of foreign countries and the USSR Navy—which practice has acquitted itself well—and will strive to expand the agenda of the annual consultations on the course of fulfillment of the bilateral agreements on averting incidents at sea and the ever more broad and constructive participation of naval specialists and military experts in discussing naval problems both at an official level and at an unofficial level, at non-governmental international conferences, symposia and seminars.

The future of mankind, and not just the present day, is tied to the Pacific Ocean to a considerably greater extent, and it cannot be permitted that the ocean expanse become a sphere of armed opposition or an environment of political and military confrontation.

Footnote

1. Three of the ballistic-missile submarines with 46 launchers are planned to be removed by the end of the current year.

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Baltic Fleet Chief of Staff Interview

92UM0379C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Jan 92 p 2

[Interview with Vice Admiral V. Grishanov, chief of staff of the Baltic Fleet, by Captain Second Rank V. Gromak, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent; place and date not given: "Command Enterprisingness"]

[Text] **The market and the Armed Forces. Combat training and enterprisingness. These and other previously mutually exclusive concepts were discussed by our correspondent, Captain Second Rank V. Gromak, with Vice Admiral V. Grishanov, chief of staff of the Baltic Fleet.**

[Gromak] Valeriy Vasilyevich, the Baltic Fleet is stationed on the territory of five independent states. The sociopolitical situation in the region is fairly complicated. This, apparently, also determines the style of the activity of the commanders under the new conditions.

[Grishanov] All changes in the sociopolitical situation enter directly into the economic, social, and legal situation. And that is the sphere in which any commander operates. But the newness is determined by two fundamental aspects: the practically complete change of economic, social, and legal relations (especially in the Baltic republics, and the free economic zone of Yantar) and the rapidity and aggressiveness with which this change is taking place. Hence the new demands placed on the commander-manager. Of course, the commander was a manager before too, "before the market," when he was allowed independence if only in trivial matters. Therefore today you do not have to go far to find the old reserve of knowledge and skills. Among the major concrete demands of the day is rapid acquisition of the skills

of market management and knowledge of market conditions and the procedure for interacting with the new power and also commercial structures.

Also of fundamental importance is effective change of our regulatory documents, keeping up with the times, so that a commander who is actually keeping up with this life itself does not end up, as was previously the case, in the position of an inveterate violator of instructions, if not a criminal...

Such are the general reference points. One could speak for a long time about specifics. The situation in the places where various of our units are stationed, for example, Lithuania and Kaliningrad Oblast, differ significantly from one another. But what we consider to be the main specific achievement today is the fact that in the local areas they are getting rid of their old ideas about management, overcoming their inertia, and recognizing the need to learn to act—and act in a new way.

It seems to me that the enterprising commander today is mainly a person who has high moral qualities and a sense of the new. He is an organizer with initiative who has a profound understanding of his official duties and helps to find the shortest path from intention to execution, from word to deed. I can name, for example, Captain First Rank V. Andreyev. The units he commands were forced by circumstances to move to a new location at the height of the training year. Along with setting themselves up in the new place, they had to solve problems of combat readiness and teach the personnel. There were plenty of difficulties but the unit coped with them successfully. For the most part this was largely thanks to the commander.

This is not just a matter of the regulation framework, which is fairly broad, but of specifically who is doing specifically what. I am deeply convinced, for example, that even with the best motivations commanders of ships and combat units should not engage in commercial problems. Because of their position and their direct work with people and combat equipment in the places where the fleet is made combat ready, the officers of this level should not have to work miracles of enterprisingness in any other sphere than combat training, education, and development of the personnel. This should be handled by the people who have the corresponding rights—commanders of forces and individual units and chiefs of fleet administrations and services. Of course, strictly within the framework of the documents and in the interests of the combat readiness of the fleet and the ensurance of social protection for military servicemen and their families. A special demand is placed on them. For a lack of initiative, just like initiative in evasion of the law, could end up in very, very appreciable losses.

[Gromak] Valeriy Vasilyevich, S. Ozhegov's dictionary of the Russian language interprets "enterprising" as "able to undertake something at the necessary moment, resourceful, inventive, and practical." But sometimes in the fleet enterprisingness is taken to mean the ability to

"scare up" the necessary means for the ship or unit. What is your opinion about this?

[Grishanov] To act "according to Ozhegov" means to achieve success in a place and time when the conditions for success do not exist and are not anticipated. This, of course, has to do with the success of a matter entrusted to you and not the well-being of your own pocketbook. This must be said because in all times there have been plenty of people who have been resourceful and inventive when it comes to their own advantage and selfishness, and all the more today when they have to get around the market. But it is becoming more and more difficult to draw a clear line between the necessary and the allowed, between "our good and mine." So I would say we have to be careful about welcoming and especially supporting enterprisingness as such.

A concrete manifestation of enterprisingness of an officer is an efficient, resourceful-creative, and, of course, extremely optimal solution to both simple and complicated problems, large and small issues. For example, in combat training, achieving the greatest possible results with the least expenditures of time, material funds, and motor vehicles. The way it is done in the services where officers V. Ivanov and V. Tserkovny work. The firing of rockets, which involves the assignment of large forces to cover and protect the area, as a rule, is planned and carried out in one day. Test rocket firings of newly built ships are combined with firing according to the combat training plan. Last December, for example, when one of the ships was performing test rocket firings, only four submarines, instead of the 18-20 which are usually allotted, were needed to organize protection of the areas for eliminating and dropping the missile-targets (when the equipment for automatic elimination was not working). At the present time specialists of the service for rocket-artillery weapons of the fleet staff are developing methods for performing artillery fire with a wind simulator of a sea target instead of towed artillery shields and the method of performing anti-aircraft rocket fire with a rocket projectile. This will make it possible to save on rocket cutters and rocket-targets.

[Gromak] In our day, let us say directly, there are also greater possibilities of abuse "under the banner" of market relations...

[Grishanov] In the fleet there are, unfortunately, people who confuse enterprisingness, initiative, and resourcefulness with self-centeredness and craftiness. We are now investigating a case of illegal sale of military property to a cooperative by Captain Second Rank Borisenko.

In this connection I should like to emphasize once again that any initiative or enterprisingness of the commander must strictly correspond to the legal and moral norms.

I am sure that the most objective evaluation of the enterprisingness will be provided by life itself: the level of preparation of the subordinate personnel and people's combat readiness and sense of themselves.

Incidentally, I think that work using commercial structures is a necessary but temporary measure. In the future the Russian fleet should be and will be fully supported by the state. Both economically and socially.

Estonia, Latvia Demand Hard Currency for Fleet Ship Repairs

*PM2001150192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 17 Jan 92 p 3*

[Captain Second Rank V. Gromak report under "Direct Line" rubric: "Baltic Fleet May Be Left Without Repair Base"]

[Text] Kaliningrad—Our correspondent has learned that the ship repair plants of Estonia and Latvia have informed the Baltic Fleet Technical Directorate that they are demanding that ship repairs be paid partially in hard currency. Now the fleet is having to modify the plans for refitting its warships. True, the final cost of repairs per ship is not yet known. But in view of the fact that the cost doubled in the last two months of last year, and that estimated dry dock costs have increased by a factor of 2.5, it will not be less this year. And the fleet, of course, has absolutely no hard currency.

Baltic Delegates for United Navy

*92UM0376D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Jan 92 p 2*

[Report by Capt 2nd Rank V. Gromak, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The Baltic Delegates Are for a United Navy"]

[Text] Officers of six nationalities serve in the landing-ship unit commanded by Captain 1st Rank V. Apanovich. The officers' assembly unanimously spoke out for the integrity of the armed forces and for a united and indivisible Navy. The officers charged Captain 1st Rank O. Samchuk, a Ukrainian, with delivering this opinion to the All-Army Conference of Representatives of Officers' Assemblies. The officers' assembly of a hydroplane unit delegated Captain 2nd Rank G. Garibyan to convey the same opinion to Moscow. Representatives of all the Baltic Fleet units will arrive at the conference bearing the same parting words.

Group Appeals to Yelstin To Save Fleet

*92UM0312D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Jan 92 p 2*

[Article by "Our Correspondent": "For Navy Unity"]

[Text] The new Committee for Navy Unity, created in St. Petersburg and headed by I. Krasnov, chairman of the All-Union Scientific and Technical Society section imeni Academician A.N. Krylov, issued an appeal to Black Sea sailors calling on them to preserve the unity of our Navy. Members of the organizing committee, which

includes shipbuilders, experts from the First Navy Institute, and representatives of Navy schools in St. Petersburg, came to the steps of the Navy Museum to collect signatures to this appeal as well as to an address to the president and vice president of Russia. The address contains the demand to prevent the separation of the Navy, which is currently trying to resolve problems concerning the entire Commonwealth.

The Committee is hoping that several thousand such signatures will be collected before the date for taking the Ukrainian loyalty oath. They should convince Black Sea servicemen and the Russian Government of the necessity of making an unequivocal choice with respect to preserving the unity of our Navy.

Admiral Kasatonov in Kiev

92UM0339B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Jan 92 p 1

[Unattributed, untitled article]

[Text] Admiral I. Kasatonov left for Kiev on January 9th. Along with other documents, he is also carrying with him a Black Sea Fleet Delegates Officers' Assembly resolution and an appeal to the Council of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Heads of State that was adopted by the Delegates Officers' Assembly.

Admiral Kasatonov Press Conference

92UM0345A Moscow TRUD in Russian 11 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by V. Badurkin, Sevastopol: "The Black Sea Fleet Is Not Subordinate to Ukraine"]

[Text] Black Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Igor Kasatonov confirmed this at a press conference that occurred on January 10. On the evening of January 9, he returned from Kiev where he had discussed Ukraine armed forces structural development issues. Kasatonov agreed with the opinion of President Leonid Kravchuk that they cannot sell the military oath and therefore he will not place the choice before the fleet of whom to swear to. Politicians must determine this. For now, even seamen who were drafted last fall have not taken the oath.

The commander noted that no substantial changes whatsoever in the position of the Ukrainian leadership had occurred with regard to the Black Sea Fleet. Although individual statements of Leonid Kravchuk permit him to hope that the dialogue may become productive in the future.

The main disagreement between the fleet command and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense—is whether the Black Sea Fleet is part of the strategic forces. Naval combat documents state that all fleets, including the Black Sea Fleet, are operational-strategic formations and strategic forces and they carry out strategic missions. Both surface vessels, submarines, and aircraft can be nuclear weapons platforms. These formations of forces,

each taken individually and all taken together, are also capable of performing strategic missions in the Black Sea while covering the common strategic space, including air space and outer space, and in the Mediterranean Sea where the American 6th Fleet is based. This long-lived system has been proven by experience.

"We are not refusing to cooperate with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense," said I. Kasatonov. "The Black Sea Fleet is ready to transfer 39 units and ships, the infrastructure of the western part of the Black Sea, and other facilities to Ukraine. But all of this must be resolved through negotiations."

The admiral sees the primary threat of the current situation in the stratification of officers' and seamen's collectives according to ethnic origin. This may result in not only a decline of discipline but also in a loss of combat readiness of ships and the fleet as a whole. Officers are worried about the possible loss of an established way of life and the need to leave the warm Crimea for the north or Far East in their old age.

The admiral is also concerned about the attitude toward the navy in other republics. "If we are under psychological pressure in Ukraine, we are under the barrels of assault rifles in Georgia," he said. "There have been cases of murder. The children of our officers have not studied for a long time and they have been subjected to hounding and persecution. In Moldova, they are not giving food or money to our units. There have been cases of encroachments against military personnel. Some of our men and equipment are also on the Caspian Sea. When General Dudayev carried out all of his actions associated with acquiring weapons and with the deployment of forces, it was as if our people were in a combat atmosphere there. Is this not too many for one fleet—four areas of tension."

To journalists' requests to comment on Russian President Boris Yeltsin's statements that the Black Sea Fleet is Russian, Kasatonov replied that it was perceived with great enthusiasm in the fleet. "I am deeply convinced," he said, "that the Black Sea Fleet is Russian. And this concept is historical and deep."

While answering a TRUD correspondent's question, Kasatonov said that they do not plan to augment the Black Sea Fleet with new warships. Everything that is being built and repaired at the Nikolayevsk wharves belongs to the Black Sea Fleet. But there is nothing in readiness for now and he does not foresee anything in the near future.

The commander sees a solution to the situation that has developed in preparation of a special agreement. "We must not forget," he stressed, "that the Black Sea Fleet has a relative salvo that is equal to the salvo of three military districts. We cannot approach the reform of the fleet without painstaking preparation and without speaking straight from the shoulder. No less than two-three years are required to do this. The trend toward a shift to a professional navy and to contract service is one

of the forms which will accelerate the establishment of national formations. The main thing is that the process proceed in a civilized manner and not under the influence of force or of momentary political sentiments."

Admiral Kasatonov Profiled

92UM0380A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 16 Jan 92 p 4

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Correspondents Yu. Geyko and A. Ryabushev: "ADMIRAL: Black Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Igor Vladimirovich Kasatonov Has Attracted Universal Attention in Recent Days. We Want To Acquaint You With Him"]

[Text]

Where Are We From?

Almost all of Sevastopol Bay, which is densely crammed with the gray-blue hulls of warships, is visible from the windows of his office. A nail, protruding from the wall over his head, held a portrait of Mikhail Gorbachev until recently. And he sits in the office of his father whom he idolizes...

During the years of stagnation, we learned quite well how to make heroes.

During the years of perestroika, we learned marvelously well how to drag things through the mud.

What are we learning now?

To be ourselves.

His great-great-great-great-grandfather on his grandmother's side, the Peasant Selyukov, was a native of Kursk Province, a tiller of the soil and carpenter.

His Great-Grandfather Stepan Kasatonov was also from there and was also a tiller of the soil, he did not know his year of birth but, according to the calculations of relatives, he was born eight years prior to the repeal of serfdom in the Russian Empire.

His Grandfather Afanasiy Kasatonov—a full Georgievskiy Award recipient and a cavalry sergeant-major of Empress Aleksandra Fedorovna's uhlan regiment's household guard. On Holy Easter, he exchanged a triple kiss [as Easter salutation] with the empress, received an Easter egg from her hands and Afanasiy Stepanovich received prizes many times from the hands of the emperor for his cavalry daring.

We asked the admiral to tell us about his father and his family, he delayed a bit and then took a red-bound book of 300 pages from his safe.

"Let us save time": his father wrote that. "Not for the public—for the family."

It turns out that his father's book is the first of four books that describe the life of each member of the dynasty: Igor

Vladimirovich continued his father's work and has written three more books, he knows everything about each of his relatives up to the fifth generation in the depth of the Russian centuries and he is proud of their fates.

And this was the second thing with which the admiral surprised us: there really are few of us in this state, Ivanov, who do not remember their relatives, who do not visit the graves of their ancestors, and who do not even know something about the fate—the names of their own grandfathers and grandmothers?

Captain 3rd Rank Igor Kasatonov married late but for the first and last time. Whether or not it was by chance that Rear Admiral Trofimov asked him, a 32-year-old officer who was leaving for Odessa, to deliver a gift to the admiral's 19-year-old daughter, no one knows. But as soon as she opened the door, he understood that he was lost. Igor Vladimirovich proposed to Yuliya Aleksandrovna two days later.

God gave them happiness and three children. It is enough to spend minutes in their home to understand that the entire atmosphere of the family is permeated with love: voices are not raised here, "expressions" are not used here, they do not smoke and they do not drink.

"I do not doubt for a minute that my dear Tamara, my dear friend, you are precisely my ideal. You need to be a stone not to adore you and not to be enchanted by your marvelous spirit, which has become both my joy, my happiness, and our children and grandchildren,"—his father wrote these words in the 76th year of his life. In them is the key to the happiness of his son's family: love engenders love and kindness—kindness.

Father and Son

"....According to our human standards, I have achieved quite a bit. But humility did not rapidly come to me. I consider this my most important achievement. When it came to me, I understood the simplicity of peace—the quiet, simple basis of life, the goal of life."

These words of his father are also from the book published by his son in a single copy. Igor Vladimirovich became involved with his father's notes for the first time immediately after his father's death in 1989. After the funeral, he left for America on a courtesy visit at the head of several warships. There was enough time while they were crossing the Atlantic. Their fates intersected and interwove in a quite fantastic manner—his father's "revolutions" on the seas and fleets from the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic coincided with his son's "revolutions," the father's many years battle for the restoration of the good name of repressed Admiral Kuznetsov ended with the descent into the water of the first Naval aircraft carrier "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N.G. Kuznetsov" which his son commanded. The son still did not know that two years later he would have to occupy both his father's position and office in Sevastopol but for now he still again, for the hundredth time, was repeating

his path: Vladimir Afanasyevich was the first Soviet military leader to visit America already in 1977.

And certainly the memory of the first Admiral Kasatonov lived in America when it received the second Admiral Kasatonov—he and his fleet were rendered the highest honors on American soil. Imagine a man, who had been left alone with his father's notes for long days, who was following his father's course across the Atlantic, imagine how he looked with his father's eyes at the American soil which opened up before his eyes and, imagine that this land unexpectedly erupted with a salute and imagine that it was precisely on his father's birthday: he stood on the bridge with tears in his eyes.

Son and Father

On August 19, 1991, the Northern Fleet, whose first deputy was Admiral Kasatonov, did not support the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency]. And in September, Igor Vladimirovich occupied his father's office. The telephones rang, the adjutants and aides were exhausted, the sixth year of the collapse of the previous world had passed—if there had been just five quiet minutes during these months to go up to the window and look at the bay and ask himself: "What do I do?"

Today is the hardest and most tragic time in his life. Leonid Kravchuk and Kasatonov's military personnel have already been conducting the conversation about resubordinating the Black Sea Fleet to Ukraine since December 1991. He reported on the conversations to Moscow, sought advice, but no one perceived them as a reality—until Ukraine established a strict time period to take its oath—by January 20.

And then he assembled the Military Council. He did not conduct polls or voting on the ships. Not because he is a dictator and not because the answer was clear for the Black Sea Fleet officer—he protected them all from the game of politics and from the risk to which they would be subjected, having stated his own disinclination to swear to the country in which they found themselves at the drunken whim of the sly general secretary and from which also hung salaries and apartments on shore: "Do not swear to Ukraine." This was the commander's order.

But the officers' assemblies occurred later—the honor of naval officers did not permit them to take cover behind the admiral. They nearly unanimously supported their commander and Sevastopol also supported him: "Do not hand over the glory of the Russian Black Sea Fleet."

Defend the Black Sea Fleet? And from whom, from the brothers with whom they shared historic misfortunes and victories for decades and centuries? Harsh, bitter questions. They were only certain that these questions were not for them, for the people in the black navy overcoats. History will not ask the warrant officers and admirals but the politicians who today with such unusual ease cut to the quick.

Father

During the summer of 1965, he received the rank of admiral of the fleet with the presentation of the large Marshal's star. A little more than a year later—the Star of a Hero of the Soviet Union.

Vladimir Afanasyevich certainly received these awards not only because two years prior to this he had sailed in his submarine precisely to the pole, having broken through the ancient ice with the steel hulk.

They certainly did not give him these awards just because his nuclear submarines had circled the earth without surfacing a single time—an event which shook the world at that time no less than the flight of the first cosmonaut.

They certainly gave him these awards for everything. "For the aggregate," as they are accustomed to expressing it in official documents. And this "aggregate" was composed of his entire life. He was mistaken in it. But he never went against his conscience.

When in the 1930's, they summoned him to an interrogation and asked: "What did your Commander and Japanese Spy Kholostyakov teach you?", Vladimir Afanasyevich answered: "He taught me to love the Homeland."

When everyone cursed Zhukov in a friendly manner in the 1950's, he dissociated himself from this although, just prior to this in 1954, Georgiy Konstantinovich had placed not just Vladimir Afanasyevich's career but his entire life at stake: "If the people in the sunken submarine die, we will convict you." They raised the submarine in time and everyone in it remained alive, but the admiral never forgot the fear that Zhukov forced him to experience.

But nevertheless, he never permitted either himself or others to drag the Russian military leader through the mud and the marshal's yellowed portrait always hung in his office in front of his face—it hangs even now in front of his son's face.

The Son

Son of the first deputy commander-in-chief of the Navy—it was certainly easier in life for him than for others: Papa could do something for his son without even wagging a finger, the family name itself would set things in motion. He is already accustomed to such questions and he smiles:

"Then I would have had to wear a hole in my trousers at headquarters—ship captain—How will you hide behind your Papa? But commander of a squadron of ships—in general, God himself cannot help you," he says with a wave of his hand.

Actually, if you hypercritically calculate the time periods at which he was promoted—there is not a single "leap" in his entire career ladder. And nevertheless, it was easier

for Igor Vladimirovich Kasatonov than for others—his Papa helped. He helped by sitting down many nights over his family tree, he wrote articles, loved poetry, theater, music, and he read a lot, and each day he once again fell in love with his own wife. He helped his son by the fact that he protected his honor and he was a real officer and he knew his roots.

Incidentally, it turns out that the legendary Aleksey Kasatonov, the goalie of our hockey team, is a direct descendant of our admiral. They love him in both Russian, Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia—everywhere in that country which still yesterday was called the USSR. Let it be called something else today but it has remained our Homeland.

Crimean Group Opposes Fleet Division

92UM0339A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Jan 92 p 1

[Unattributed, untitled article]

[Text] A rally against the transfer of the Black Sea Fleet to Ukraine that was organized by the Republic Movement of Crimea [RDK] took place on Nakhimov Square in the center of Sevastopol on January 8. More than 2,000 people, every fifth one a military member, participated in the rally. In the opinion of the majority of the speakers, the Black Sea Fleet must remain Russian and be subordinate to the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Command.

Black Sea Fleet Controversy Continues

92UM0340A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 10 Jan 92 pp 1, 3

[Article by Vladimir Skachko: "To Whom Does the Black Sea Fleet Belong?"]

[Text] The political situation in Ukraine continues to grow worse.

The confrontation is moving from the military sphere into the area of politics and, as it commands public awareness, it is emerging into the familiar principle—"Who is on top?"

On 8 January in the central square in Sevastopol there was a large rally with the slogan "The Black Sea Fleet to the Commonwealth of Independent States!" The fleet's commander, Admiral Igor Kasatonov, held a news conference on the same day. In particular he announced: "The situation in the Black Sea Fleet is under control. Work is proceeding normally and successfully, and it is under command control. But the fleet's military council is being drawn into political games. The fleet is not faced with the question of whether or not to follow the order of Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk. The fleet is under the direct jurisdiction of the commander in chief of CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] forces,

Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, and the former commander of USSR Naval Forces, Admiral Chernavin."

In the opinion of Admiral Kasatonov, technically it is impossible to divide the fleet up among the republics, and Ukraine itself cannot maintain it in the proper condition and combat readiness. At the same time he added that today Ukraine provides 98 percent of the fleet's food. And it has taken responsibility for paying the wages of the fleet's personnel as well. But Igor Kasatonov expressed no desire to take an oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine. "The Black Sea Fleet has already taken one oath—of fidelity to the Soviet people," he said.

Various political forces of Ukraine assess the situation that has developed in their own ways. The chairman of the Union of Officers of Ukraine, a former USSR people's deputy, Colonel Vilen Martirosyan, accused Marshal Shaposhnikov and Central Television of attempting to derail the process of creating Ukrainian armed forces. He also announced that the fleet commander, Admiral Kasatonov, had cut off communications with the Ministry of Defense and sent coded messages to all the fleet subdivisions demanding that they follow orders only from Marshal Shaposhnikov.

The mass media have also entered into the struggle for the Black Sea Fleet. In the republic press there are reports of some alleged unpublished ukase from Russian President Boris Yeltsin about transferring all armed forces of the former USSR to Russian jurisdiction and appealing for Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy not to raise the Ukrainian flag over the Black Sea Fleet, and also statements from the chairman of the Russian Armed Forces, Ruslan Khasbulatov, to the effect that all four fleets of the former USSR would belong to Russia. The Russian Federation is being accused directly of trying to start a war. On 9 January a statement from the Ukrainian National Information Agency was disseminated, which said, in particular: "Claims about the agreements signed on 30 December 1991 in Minsk are completely groundless. As we know, in Minsk participants in the Commonwealth affirmed their legitimate right to create their own armed forces in keeping with their national legislation. According to Ukrainian law, property and financial resources of facilities under Union jurisdiction located on the territory of Ukraine (and the Black Sea Fleet is stationed mainly in Ukraine) are the state property of Ukraine."

In the other kinds of forces the personnel continue to take the oath. As the deputy chairman of the political department of the State Committee for Questions of Defense of the State Border, Major General Yuriy Babanskiy, said, there are no overt refuseniks among the border troops.

The oath was taken by 8,000 people in the National Guard of Ukraine on 8 January. During three days 505 military service personnel left Ukraine. They had been called up from other republics and did not wish to serve

Ukraine. About 200 military servicemen of various nationalities expressed a wish to complete their service in the republic. With respect to the students in the military schools who did not wish to swear an oath to Ukraine, Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov stated that they could continue their studies in peace. Their subsequent service would be determined by bilateral interrepublic agreements concerning the policy for training in military VUZ's [higher educational institutions] of Ukraine. Morozov also added that officers and warrant officers need not worry about their future. In a couple of days the laws on social and legal protection of military servicemen and the policy for their material support would go into force.

But still, in spite of Konstantin Morozov's optimism, alarm is growing in the republic. Will they manage to avoid disturbances in the military units or even a mutiny? So far the Ukrainian leaders, having created their own system of communications and leadership of the troops, are controlling the situation.

On 9 January in the republic capital there was an all-Ukrainian conference on questions of military construction in Ukraine. The conference was devoted to two basic issues: creating the Ukrainian Armed Forces and taking the military oath, which is regarded as the first stage of the Ukrainian military reform. And the reform in Ukraine is to be completed in three stages with the creation of their own armed forces: ground, air, and sea. This was announced in the report by the republic defense minister, Colonel General Konstantin Morozov. He reported also that the reform would consist not only in changing the jurisdiction of the troops in Ukraine but also in reforming and transforming the three military districts into three strategic areas: western, southern, and reserve. Ukrainian aviation will consist of three ground groups and one sea group. The Black Sea Fleet will be transformed into 16 naval brigades, naval aviation, and shore guard. They will create special border troops, a national guard, and military VUZ's. New military regulations will also be adopted. Troops of Ukraine are to take the oath not by 20 January but by the end of the month. The postponement apparently has to do with difficulties in the negotiations with the military units. Prime Minister Vitold Fokin announced that Ukraine would take over the social, financial, and material support for the troops. He announced also that the money from Germany intended for the construction of 17 compounds for military servicemen shipped out of that country had been frozen in Moscow. The chief of military communications of the Ministry of Defense of the former USSR had prohibited shipping cargo to Ukraine.

Leonid Kravchuk read the coded message from Marshal Shaposhnikov in which he ordered all troops stationed on the territory of the republic to take the oath of fidelity to Russia on 10-12 January. The text of the oath was attached and it contained these words: "I swear to obey the laws of the Russian Federation and not take up arms against my own people." Even the generals could not

understand what the relationship between the Russian people and the Ukrainian people was.

Major General Bashkirov, commander of a strategic aviation unit located in the city of Uzin, stated outright that although his unit is a part of the strategic forces, it would like to take an oath to Ukraine. "When there were debates about who would have their finger on the nuclear button, we, who have more than 100 of these buttons, did not feel protected by the Commonwealth of Independent States. Therefore I would like very much for Ukraine to guarantee us control in the refusal to use nuclear weapons," stated the general.

Other generals, except for Black Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Igor Kasatonov, were not against being under Ukrainian command either. He said that the Black Sea Fleet had become a hostage in political decisions which had not yet been made. Moreover, in Minsk it was decided that the Black Sea Fleet belongs to the strategic forces of the CIS. On the basis of this, stated Kasatonov, we are prepared to contribute to the creation of the Ukraine's own fleet, but the Black Sea Fleet has been and is Russian. His deputy vice admiral Aleksandr Frolov said that one-third of the personnel were prepared to swear an oath to Ukraine, but 50 percent could still not get over the notion of "Sevastopol—city of Russian sailors."

Kravchuk denied Kasatonov's statement and said that no decision about the Black Sea Fleet as a constituent part of the strategic forces of the Community had been made in Minsk. Only the part of the fleet that has nuclear weapons, said Kravchuk, is included in the CIS forces under the general command. It will return to Ukraine after its nuclear weapons are destroyed. Then Kravchuk publicly asked Kasatonov if he were prepared to obey Shaposhnikov's order and swear an oath to Russia. The admiral did not answer either yes or no. The participants adopted an appeal to the military personnel in the republic, which says in particular: "We call for all military personnel of all military formations located in Ukraine to make their choice and by voluntarily taking the military oath show fidelity to the people of Ukraine."

The conference came to the conclusion that the main legislative acts on questions of military construction and social-legal protection of military servicemen and their families had already been adopted. In the future the Armed Forces of Ukraine will complete the creation of a legal foundation which will provide for resolving the complex of issues in the military sphere.

Black Sea Fleet Misses Major Issue

92UM0344A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Jan 92 pp 1, 2

[Article by Vladimir Nadein, IZVESTIYA: "The Black Sea Fleet Moves up to Firing Ambitions"]

[Text] The first crisis to shake the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] has to do with possession of the

Black Sea Fleet only to a tiny degree. The fleet itself has practically nothing to do with things. No one needs the fleet itself. Not the Ukraine. Certainly not Russia.

With a NATO Pass

Even the Soviet Union did not need it. It is enough just to look at a map of the Black Sea, at this wineskin tightly corked by the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.... It is enough to cite just one statement from the diaries of czarist diplomats, who noted way back then that without "straits" the Black Sea is a Russian-Turkish lake.... In short, one needs only basic common sense to assess the whole folly of maintaining a powerful fleet where only a few dozen patrol boats are needed for intercepting smugglers and poachers. The new cruisers and helicopter-carriers with their astronomical cost undulated there in an aquarium which could only be exited with a pass with a NATO signature.

A nation in which 20% of the maternity homes do not have running water and 40% lack a hot-water supply, however, willingly spent more than those things would have cost for the sake of military prestige. "The flag of the native land waves proudly from the mast."

Incidentally, how many native lands do the Soviet Army and Navy protect today? Fifteen, the number of members in the CIS? Wrong. All 15, just as before.

The most surprising thing is that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict over the Black Sea Fleet has omitted the real interests of the only department which does need the fleet, the USSR Ministry of Defense.

I did not misspeak. Despite verbal assurances the USSR Ministry of Defense has outlived the USSR itself. Like a loyal Ruslan it continues to guard the sacred borders, which are violated only by aircraft carrying humanitarian British beef not of the freshest sort.

The Soviet Army's magical indestructibility is one of the main puzzles of the era. The nation has reached a state of extreme poverty. We are begging, but we still produce missiles.

It was scary to abandon the five-year plans. We held on to them as long as we could. We did find the courage finally to free prices.

To reduce the world's largest army, however.... We did not have the fortitude for that. We no longer have enemies in the world. Only supporters are left, but we keep contriving a reduction which is somehow actually an increase.

Since no agreements have been adopted on mutual arms reduction on the territory of the CIS, unrestrained envy prevails throughout. Who gets this fleet? Who has this army?

Soviet patriotism, which was immediately given a national coloration, gave off the usual glow of righteous rage: Don't yield an ounce of our fleet to the enemy!

Sevastopol is a city of Russian sailors. Our Nakhimov was not their Osman-pasha so that today.... And so on. It is even becoming profoundly undesirable to calculate or pose questions calmly. If they take an oath to Russia in Sevastopol, for example, should those in Vladivostok take an oath to the Ukraine? If Russia retains the Northern, Pacific and Baltic fleets, then what is its share of the most modest of the four, the Black Sea Fleet?

War Is War?

Popular Mayor Sobchak calls for the Ukraine to return the Crimea to Russia and give up even dreaming about the combat ships. The main reason is that party bureaucrats and nationalists dominate in the Ukraine. But what if democrats dominated? The answer is self-evident: They would voluntarily give it all to Russia. The mayor eliminates the doubts which naturally arise in such matters by citing his Ukrainian blood. This is an irrefutable argument in the lawyer's mouth.

President Yeltsin maintains that the fleet must not be split up. Why should it? For whom? In what agreements is it written? It must be, and that is all there is to it.

Marshal Shaposhnikov, who has committed his sword to the service of all 11 noble members of the CIS, calls over the head of one independent nation for the troops to take an oath of loyalty to the people of another independent nation.

President Kravchuk promises to remove Shaposhnikov from his job, even though the mechanism for removing a commander in chief is just as crude as the method for appointing him.

A train brought to Moscow 300 servicemen who refused to take the Ukrainian oath. One can see on their faces that these boys were taking advantage of the situation to get home to their native Central Asia as soon as possible. In its reports, however, the Ministry of Defense portrays them almost as naval dissidents.

A Devastating Victory

Although the food situation in the Ukraine is somewhat better than in Russia, this is still not Canada. It would therefore not be surprising if Yeltsin and Kravchuk were to engineer a public quarrel by giving up the Black Sea Fleet and thrusting the brunt of this burden upon the other. Or would it?

Let us try to imagine what the Russian authorities would do if they should have the dubious good fortune to wrest victory from the first conflict inside this disjointed, envious commonwealth.

There are three possibilities. The first would be to send the fleet to the Baltic. But where specifically? The Estonians insist that we leave Tallin; the Lithuanians, that we leave Klaipeda. There are no moorings in Kaliningrad. And Saint Petersburg? In any case the mayor has not invited to the city 100,000 people who could claim housing out of turn.

The second option would be to move them further north. To Murmansk. Through the howling forties. To where women of the Arctic growl in lines. To the Arctic base, where there is plenty of only one commodity: live nuclear bombs. Condensed milk can be acquired for the sailors' children, but it has to be delivered in the night. The Arctic night.

That leaves only the blessed Far East. The route has been known since the Tsushima period. We would only have to slip past Japan without catching the virus of pacifism. Peaceableness is dangerous in Vladivostok. Those waiting for housing there are so determined. The former kamikazes would be no match for them?....

In general, though, using a sextant and piloting, if you like. Or, if you like, using a calculator and pay schedules.... Every analysis shows that either government needs the conflict over the Black Sea Fleet even less than it needs the Black Sea Fleet itself.

The Ministry of Defense still needs it, though. By retaining its integrity it could survive any breakdown of the state on paper. For that state in which this ministry served, the measure of success was the caliber of the weapons and not the assortment of goods in the rural food store. That ministry which the entire state served has still not accepted the idea of independence for nations of the CIS. This is why it has so calmly and confidently ignited public opinion in Russia by setting out on the not so lengthy path to a Russian-Ukrainian Yugoslavia.

Or, considering the naval slant of our subject, why it has cast off the lines.

Public opinion of people of good will of the former USSR has possibly never before been tested as it is today. It is perfectly apparent that many Soviet politicians were too near-sighted to see even the immediate consequences of their actions. They were incapable of protecting our former republics from a fierce customs war. They proved incapable of coordinating any sort of creative move and not a destructive one. They regard one another with suspicion and do not believe the promises which they so generously heap upon us and upon themselves. They are confused.

So what? They are human beings. Just human beings.

There is a point toward which we must not move even a single step, however. Under any pretext. That point is war between former republics of the Soviet Union.

It is difficult to live in peace. We have to know how to love. We know how to hate. The difficulties are exacerbated by the fact that, unlike that saying, we have something to divide up. We have to divide up a great deal, almost everything. Plants, embassies, dams, hand-outs, gold, missiles, trophies, space, resorts, writers, readers. And in all things we immediate neighbors share a common destiny.

The best way to keep the Black Sea Fleet on our side is to keep the Ukraine as a friend and ally. In that case the canons, friendly to the Russians, will not cost Russia one gram of butter.

Black Sea Fleet Sailors Unsure of Future

92UM0325A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank V. Pasyakin under the rubric "Local Reports": "Sevastopol"]

[Text] In what form and to whom they should pledge their allegiance is the most serious question for the Black Sea Fleet at present.

"We train specialists for all navies," Captain 1st Rank V. Golubev, commander of the training detachment imeni F.S. Oktyabrskiy, told me. "Future sailors of the Baltic, Northern, and Pacific Fleets will unquestionably take an oath of loyalty to the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], but as for the Black Sea sailors, it is not quite clear yet..."

In a poll of the 59 officers from the training detachment under the command of Captain 1st Rank T. Shvarts, 25 said they were ready to take an oath of loyalty to Ukraine; two officers were categorically against it; others are still waiting. This number includes officers who served enough years to have their minimum retirement pensions guaranteed. But who is going to pay pensions to them when they retire: Ukraine, Russia, or the CIS?

The absence of any clear answer to the question of whom to pledge allegiance to can somehow be smoothed over on shore. But what should the crew of a battle ship do if some of its members are subordinate to one commander and the rest to another? The possibility of having to choose between mutually exclusive orders from different commanders remains alive in the Navy. Once again politicians are trying to force the servicemen to make their choices, personal ones now, instead of allowing them to function according to the completed accords.

"We have asked 400 people," I was told by Captain 1st Rank A. Bukov, head of the Black Sea Fleet hydrographic service. "Everybody supports the concept of unity and indivisibility for the Navy. Only 32 sailors, out of 90 polled, are ready to take the Ukrainian loyalty oath but not before there is a legal basis for it."

Apart from the human factor, as one is choosing the future of the Black Sea Fleet one must remember that the fleet is being deployed on the territory of five, now sovereign, states. Its ships are not being built and repaired in Ukraine only; the training of its specialists is also done in various locations dispersed on the once united economic territory of the former Union. The transfer of the Black Sea Fleet to the jurisdiction of Ukraine will bring its system of vital supplies to the verge of a collapse and that will inevitably entail reduced battle efficiency and lower morale among personnel.

In order to avoid a crisis into which the Black Sea sailors might be plunged through a short-sighted interpretation of the Minsk agreements, the Fleet Military Council adopted an address to the heads of the independent states in which it suggests considering, in the shortest time possible, the issue of protecting the CIS sea borders, as well as designing a mechanism for the transfer of certain units of the Black Sea Fleet to the Ukrainian Navy.

Sailors on Oath, Fate of Fleet

92UM0372A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 14 Jan 92 pp 1, 2

[Article by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA special correspondent A. Orlov: "Why the Sailors Are Ashamed... *Games Surrounding the Black Sea Fleet*"]

[Text] I have returned here twice from the sea. From the Atlantic and the Indian. Finally, after long months in alien waters and shores, the Konstantinovskiy Ravelin, the Monument to Lost Ships, Inkerman all appeared in the sun's hot haze... The Motherland started here, tears welled up from the long-awaited meeting with it.

That Motherland stretched from the Sevastopol roads to Cape Dezhnev on the Pacific Ocean. Immense, across a good ten time zones, it was one for a ship's boatswain who was a Russian and for a rudder lookout who was Ukrainian, for a navigator electrician's mate who was a Kazakh... With what feeling do the sailors return here today? I thought about that for a minute on the Minnaya Stenka, and tears almost began welling up again immediately—from bitterness at the misfortune that has befallen the great power...

Sevastopol was, in general, living an ordinary life on this January morning. Service craft were gliding along the smooth surface of the gulf, bringing sailors to their ships. The Moskva ASW cruiser was strikingly etched against the roads. The crews were forming up on the upper decks—the flag would soon be raised, the bells would sound, and the blue-and-white panels would fly aloft on the flagpoles. And the first lines were forming in the city itself. At the newspaper stands, before everything. The city, which has lived through a great deal over its two centuries of history, is entering difficult times once again. The alarm today consists of a single question: "Whose are we?"

Candidly speaking, I do not know which side to stand on. The side of the leaders of the Ukraine? But I feel sorry for them first and foremost. God forbid that their aspirations in regard to the BSF [Black Sea Fleet] be fulfilled. Then they will get millions of uncompromising people in the form of the people of Russia. Take the side of Russia entirely? The Black Sea Fleet is Russian, of course, Russian from time immemorial, but Russia, "winning it back" today, in its current economic condition, it seems, won't be able to pull through either. That means

the CIS then, anyway? This Commonwealth of Independent States that has been proclaimed, however, is turning out in reality to be the rivalry of those states...

A little more detail on the Black Sea Fleet. Sailors surrounded the journalists at once on the pier of the submarine task force. A brief break in drills on the boat, and now a discussion of the latest news on the fate of the fleet—and, that means, the fate of these people. The officers speak in a reserved manner, but their positions are firm: "We do not want to be pawns in somebody's political games. They tell us that everyone will take the oath that suits him. But there are three of these oaths in all—the Ukrainian, the Russian and the one prepared by the armed forces command of the CIS. A game with three cards?"

One can understand these people, highly qualified specialists on one of the most modern submarines. It has been proposed that each take individual responsibility for the future not only of himself, but also his family and close relatives. The emigrants from Russia are reflecting out loud: if you take the oath to Russia they will declare you an alien in the Ukraine. If you twist your soul and take the oath to the Ukraine, where is the guarantee that you will not soon become an undesirable to it as well?

We are talking with the sailors. I propose that they introduce themselves and express their opinions about the oath.

Petty officer 2nd class M. Khusnutdinov, Samara: "One thing is clear to me: I will not take the Ukrainian oath."

Senior sailor A. Olekseyenko, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast: "The oath to the Ukraine."

Sailor V. Zverkov, Krasnoyarsk Kray: "I'm for the CIS."

Sailor M. Rychkov, Sverdlovsk Oblast: "The oath to Russia, of course."

"And how is service on the same ship possible, in your opinion, under various oaths?" I ask them.

These young, fit and far from stupid young men are bitterly silent. People of the same age somehow divided against their will.

We were talking later with the commander of the submarine, Capt 2nd Rank A. Romanov from Leningrad: "Judge for yourself what kind of a crew we will have in a couple of weeks," said Aleksandr Yuryevich.

I do not think that the climate on other ships today differs much from this. The same day the commander of one of the task forces that I had occasion to speak with ripped into the political leaders of today and the recent past with gusto: "I have to put to sea in a few days, and I do not know what flag to run up the mast. Russian? Ukrainian? If I enter the Mediterranean under the flag of the Union, the whole world will laugh at us. They will say there is no such nation."

Yes, we have learned how to amuse the world in recent years. And frighten them at the same time. Willingly or unwillingly. At least by the lack of circumspection with which we are transforming a single nuclear power into several principalities suspicious of each other, each of which will be left with nuclear weapons in the near future. So people say do not touch the army, that is the guarantee of stability. If you touch it, the end will come for everything, including the radical reforms themselves.

The human passions aroused overnight are great. And they have splashed out into the streets in Sevastopol. As at the many-thousands-strong mass meeting of public organizations that was held last week. The position expressed at this meeting was unequivocal—the transfer of the Black Sea Fleet to the command of the president of the Ukraine is illegitimate from a military, historical and other points of view. The participants in the meeting declared, on the basis of a Crimea-wide referendum on January 20 and the Minsk agreements, that the BSF should be a fleet for the whole commonwealth. They declared the oath of loyalty to the leadership of the Ukraine before the holding of the referendum and self-determination for the Crimea as illegal, and the servicemen of those units and ships who were located in the Crimea that took the oath of loyalty to the president of the Ukraine would be considered occupiers carrying out armed intervention in the Republic of the Crimea.

Such are the statements at the meetings. The stance of the fleet itself? It was expressed first and foremost by the appeal of representatives of the officers' assemblies of the BSF to the heads of the commonwealth: "The crews of ships have never yet, in the history of the fleet, been subjected to such a terrible test as the breaking of the historical bonds and the continuity of traditions. A climate of mistrust in each other, or even hostility, cannot reign in the multinational crews of the ships."

But people are troubled at the day-to-day level about how to live. The coupons that the Ukraine went over to starting January 10, say, have not been issued to many officers and sailors in the fleet. What is that about? Our usual mix-ups or a sign to remember who feeds you? The dilemma also was sounded on Sunday on the "Results" program—either the fleet or sausage. And I saw a different slogan in Sevastopol: "Man does not live by fat alone."

The latest press conference by the commander-in-chief of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral I. Kasatonov, did not reveal anything new in the position of the fleet or the Ukraine either. He had just arrived from Kiev, where he met with Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk. This meeting brought him practically a reproach—isn't the commander-in-chief of the fleet turning up on television screens too often? But he must stand up for the fleet. Who will do that besides its commander-in-chief?

L. Kravchuk, by the way, is not pushing the problem of the fleet. He is ready to leave it in peace, as he expressed it, for a certain time. The opinion is being expressed that

the decisive statement of B. Yeltsin that the Black Sea Fleet belongs to Russia had an effect on that.

The thought was broached in a conversation with Admiral Kasatonov before he left that "There is no place for emotions here now. The fleet should remain unified and fulfill its missions in the interests of the whole commonwealth." He asked that the newspapers tell all the people who have expressed support for the fleet in this difficult moment that "The fleet will not ruin the honor of the flag."

Fleet to Construct Housing

92UM0342D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Jan 92 p 5

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank V. Pasyakin: "The Tenants Are Building Housing"]

[Text] It was correctly noted: the rescue of drowning people is a matter for the drowning people themselves. This saying is also entirely applicable to those people who have not acquired their own apartments during their years of service in the Armed Forces.

The mass media has already reported on the experience of apartment-less Black Sea warrant officers who have constructed their own homes. The story, as they say, has received a continuation.

"They began to build the first 'warrant officer's' apartment building in March 1987," said Captain 1st Rank V. Zakharov.

"And a total of five apartment buildings have already been erected. These are 520 apartments, 325 families of warrant officers have received housing—first of all those who had rented nooks in the private sector...."

They also decided to extend the warrant officers' experience to the officers. At the beginning of December 1991, the fleet commander signed the appropriate documents for the construction of a 45-apartment building on Dmitriy Ulyanov Street—in one of Sevastopol's prestigious areas. Initially it was designated for officers of operations and repair organs but then other officers from a ship squadron, a coastal unit, the naval school, and the military communications service became part of the 30-man team headed by Captain 3rd Rank V. Korobkin....

They plan to turn over the apartment building in October 1992. Officers are laboring untiringly—each wants to more rapidly move into a separate apartment. The remaining 15 apartments will be distributed in the fleet according to seniority.

"We would like very much," Viktor Vasilyevich Zakharov shared his thoughts, "for Nevikon Joint Stock Company, which has assumed responsibility for solving the social problems of military seamen, to help us purchase building materials for these officers' apartment buildings."

Black Sea Fleet Food Situation Viewed

92UM0369A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Captain 2nd Class V. Pasyakin: "From Sevastopol: Black Sea Fleet Sailors Will Eat Bread With Butter. But For 100 Rubles"]

[Text] The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent office at the Black Sea Fleet has received indications that the food supply to the units is worsening. There is talk of the scarcity of meat, its replacement with canned goods, a lack of butter and a reduction in food items made from grits.

I asked the head of the Black Sea Fleet's food supply service, Captain 2nd Class V. Dmitriyev, to comment on the situation that has taken shape. This was his response:

—The complex situation with food and food prices in the independent states, to include in that the Ukraine where major deliveries originate, has indeed had an effect on our supply. In regard to meat, we were allocated three trucks with trailers of it the other day in Kazatin, we have an arrangement to receive 57 tons of goods in Yevpatoriya, and deliveries are being made from Kiev and Kerch. I would remind you that the supply is governed on a territorial basis. The situation with butter is much worse. To the point, the price for these products has jumped sharply. We are therefore forced to buy meat at 108 rubles a kilogram, and butter at 100 rubles. Nonetheless, in spite of state difficulties with food goods and high food prices, the fleet's food service is doing everything possible to provide the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet with the necessary foodstuffs.

Black Sea Officers on Moscow Assembly

92UM0376A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Jan 92 p 2

[Report by Capt 2nd Rank V. Pasyakin, correspondent, under the rubric "Onto the Agenda of the All-Army Conference": "The Sailors Have Questions"]

[Text]

Conference Participants Speak

Seventy people from the Black Sea Fleet will attend the All-Army Conference of Representatives of Officers' Assemblies. The delegation will be headed by Adm I. Kasatonov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet.

Capt 2nd Rank V. Pasyakin, our correspondent, interviewed two officers in the delegation before their flight to Moscow and asked them for their ideas and thoughts as they departed for the capital.

Captain 2nd Rank A. Glavkov, chairman of a unit officers' assembly:

A fairly alarming situation has developed in our unit with respect to food. Even this problem has been overshadowed by another, however: the future of the Black Sea Fleet. We held an officers' assembly the other day, at which we approved an appeal to the presidents and parliaments of Russia and the Ukraine. It calls for everything possible to be done to see that the campaign for the adoption of military oaths by this or that state is not detrimental to the combat readiness of the fleet's units and ships, does not undermine the moral and psychological climate among the personnel and does not destroy the previously strong friendship among servicemen of various nationalities.

Before the former Union republics distribute the oaths and establish their own armed forces, they must prepare the legal norms and pass laws on defense and on social protection for all servicemen serving on their territories. Nor do we have new regulations. In short, there are many unresolved issues.

The appeal also contains these alarming words: "With your failure to take steps you will set two great peoples, Russians and Ukrainians, against one another...."

Rear Admiral S. Alekseyev, deputy fleet commander for combat training and chief of the fleet's combat training directorate:

People are concerned about the fate of the fleet and the armed forces in general. We recently held a conference of representatives of officers assemblies of fleet formations, units and ships. It is the opinion of the entire officer corps that until a final political decision is adopted on the status of the Black Sea Fleet, the Navy Flag and other traditional navy symbols should be kept inviolable on fleet ships. That we should request the military people's deputies of the Ukraine to take all necessary steps to see that matters pertaining to the Ukraine's adoption of laws on universal military duty are resolved as rapidly as possible.

An appeal to the heads of the Commonwealth of Independent States approved by representatives of officers' assemblies contains the following: "We do not want to be hostages in political intrigues or participants in conflicts between nationalities. We urgently request that you halt the breakup of the armed forces, specifically the Black Sea Fleet. A climate of hostility and mutual distrust must not be permitted to reign in the multinational ship crews, which can develop into direct confrontation based on nationality...."

The most acceptable solution to the problem might be to preserve a unified fleet in the Black Sea to perform missions in the interest of the Ukraine and Russia and of other Commonwealth states.

The appeal calls for calm and restraint, for resisting despondency and strengthening friendship and naval comradeship. And so, we delegation members are in earnest.

Black Sea Fleet Flyers Problems Viewed*92UM0390B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Jan 92 p 3*

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank S. Tkachenko: "Black Sea Fleet Air Regiment Stuck Between the Sea, the Mountains and the Sky"]

[Text] Black Sea Fleet—The last time I visited this air garrison I was struck by the contrast between the magnificent country and the wretched housing and general living conditions at the base. And the specialists serving here would have a special status in any other army. I would mention just the recent Persian Gulf War, in which the air force demonstrated its role.

Listening to the news from Georgia, I thought to myself with alarm: Just what is it like for the airmen on their little "island" among the citrus crops? Now, once again, I am seeing familiar faces. Perhaps only on long ocean cruises have I seen eyes express such envy toward those just arrived from the "big country" (and soon to return there). But we are supposed to be at home here.

My father, a Red Navy sailor, served at one time not far from this garrison. My mother worked here in the tea crops. I was born in Georgia. When I meet people, I am accustomed to saying, not without pride, that although my father was Ukrainian and my mother Russian, I also carry traits of the masters of the ancient Kolchis land. Today, however—more than once (even before 1992)—I have felt like a foreigner in my native land, felt constrained and guarded. And, as in a foreign country, I cannot afford many things here.

It would be interesting to hear what the airmen and their families would say about the "outstanding features" of their lives and service.

A pilot:

"Please write this down. We are forced to go to the bazaar in the nearest town every week. Each trip for groceries (I am not flying for now) costs a minimum of 200 rubles. When you add the cost of clothing and rent, our budget is "in the hole." And even if there were a theater, a circus, a restaurant... here, we could not afford to go.

"I can honestly say I am glad the first-term seamen are now receiving good pay. But I share my money with a family of three, and our standard of living is below that of yesterday's students, who receive almost total state support....

"This has to do with our everyday life. I am also troubled by something else. I did not want to retrain as a helicopter pilot, and I am awaiting transfer to a different garrison. Time flies, but I have the impression that no one needs me as a fighter pilot, even though I want to serve in the field for which I trained. How is that bad?"

Senior officer at an air maintenance base:

"Everything the pilot told you is true. I would add to that the fact that I also have to pay to have my uniforms made: overcoat, trousers, jackets—around 300 rubles. Who wants to pay this 'extra payment?' Furthermore, they have increased the cost of municipal services here—and we pay it, even though we live far worse than the local residents.

"In addition, the school where our children study together with those of local residents has operated intermittently in the past, and still does. We have been told, however, that the children will soon stop being taught here. I shall have to send my son to my parents. You can imagine the emotional and material damage from this kind of training and life.

Wives of pilots:

"We are very much alarmed at the uncertainty in our husbands' service. A reduction is underway, and troops are being withdrawn from Eastern Europe and the Baltic area. Will our husbands not be discharged (as part of the reduction) as well? We would be left totally without housing and livelihood. Many of us have no work, because the garrison is a small one and it is practically impossible to find a job."

Female workers at the flight crew messhall:

"Some of us have lived here 20 years with our families, some of us 30 years or even longer. The only roofs over our heads are old wooden houses or five-story apartment buildings. We will be deprived even of that, though, if Georgia's leaders, which are forming their own military formations, suddenly decide to exclude our garrison from the republic's territory. What will we have left if that happens? Who is going to take care of us?

Now a few words about the commander. Perhaps only a highly rated fighter pilot accustomed to stress could stand up under the kind of emotional and mental strain which Valentin Mikhaylovich Gerasimenko has felt on his colonel's shoulder boards for several years now. Inspections by higher headquarters, mass meetings at the unit gates, and so on. In addition to the enormous accumulation of tasks and problems, however, he also has to support and see to the main thing: the flights and the safety of the men. For 24 years he flew a fighter. He has now mastered an ASW helicopter.

Here are the professional problems which trouble the commander:

"We old-timers no longer feel so acutely the situation surrounding the garrison. We are used to it. More recent arrivals are intimidated, however. Here is an example. A captain recently came here from the North on a long-term assignment. What happened? He spent a Saturday and Sunday here, and on Monday he submitted a request to return to where he came from.

"I am telling you this because I am concerned about the fact that the unit is undermanned, particularly with

navigators. Although there is a reduction underway though, no one wants to come here.

"A second problem is that, sadly, the equipment which we receive is not new."

From the author: My compatriots will forgive me. I also asked those with whom I spoke a troubling question: Is there not a hidden purpose in the high prices in the markets, the operation of the school and the disconnection of utilities?

They convinced me that my opinion was not without foundation. In the market, for example, products are frequently sold to the military more cheaply than to the Georgian residents. This is also true of transport. It would appear that the local residents sympathize with the military and their families.

The airmen can count only on themselves. Those who travel here with the typical purpose of "providing practical assistance" are basically generous only with instructions, comments and promises. They would like to help, they say, but they lack the possibilities, lack the funds for this. And the Georgian government has its own worries.

Incidentally, when a regiment from the Transcaucasus Military District was transferred to the Black Sea Fleet, the order from the minister of defense left the rear and finance services with the district. Matters of construction and maintenance were also left with the former "proprietor" for two years. A year later, however, the Transcaucasus Military District washed its hands of these concerns. And those responsible for running the fleet, I repeat, have no funds or means...

When acquaintances learn that I have been in Georgia, they always ask: "Why didn't you bring back some lemons?"

Indeed, why did I not think of them? Probably because things were sour enough without them.

Submarine Commander Sharply Criticizes State of Fleet

92UM0228A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 20 Nov 91 p 6

[Interview with former nuclear submarine commander Captain First Rank Anatoliy Gorbachev, retired, by Vadim Ledovyy: "An SOS From Deep Within the Fleet. The USSR Has More Submarines But It Is Easy To Find Them Because They Are Noisy"]

[Text] Former nuclear submarine commander Captain 1st Rank Anatoliy Gorbachev, retired, became widely known following the loss of the nuclear submarine Komsomolets. His expert assessments of the condition of the country's Navy have evoked fierce anger from the admirals and leaders of the military-industrial complex. Today Captain Gorbachev talks about the combat capabilities of our Navy.

[Ledovyy] Anatoliy Nikolayevich, according to even the most modest estimates, over the past 35 years trillions of rubles have been spent on the navy. Where did the money go?

[Gorbachev] Into a bottomless pit! It was planned that this money would guarantee a 1:1.8 ratio of combat potential between the navies of the USSR and the United States, and a 1:3 ratio between the navies of the USSR and the United States and its allies.

For defensive actions by our country on the oceans and seas those kinds of resources would have been adequate. These ratios were recognized de facto with the subsequent cutbacks in the fleets to a level of reasonable sufficiency, as it is now called, such as would exclude the possibility of an attack by either side.

[Ledovyy] What did we get from these gigantic investments?

[Gorbachev] Judge for yourself. The real ratios of combat potential were as follows: between the navies of the USSR and the United States 1:12, for submarines 1:8, for surface ships 1:10, and for naval air forces 1:18.

[Ledovyy] That is, in the event of war there would be no light in the window, as they say?

[Gorbachev] In the event of combat actions for eight or nine days, the losses of the sides would be as follows: the USSR Navy, 85 percent to 88 percent (total catastrophe); for the U.S. Navy 9 percent to 13 percent—full retention of combat capability.

The term "renewal of navies" means restoration of the fleet following a major defeat in war. But the Soviet fleet is in a catastrophic situation even without a war, in peacetime. And this is a situation in which in "gross" terms—the number of combat units—we are outstripping our enemies. For example, we have 1,380 combat ships while the Americans have something on the order of 420 (including 130 submarines).

[Ledovyy] Where, then, is the catastrophe? How are our ships worse than the American and British ships?

[Gorbachev] The noise levels of Soviet submarines are greater than the noise levels of the American submarines by a factor of from 6 to 50. And the submarines are the main strike force in the Navy. In terms of average distance for detection we are 11 times worse than foreign analogues.

The surface ships are unprotected against the weapons of the quiet foreign submarines, and against low-flying cruise missiles. We have many fatal flaws, from bad acoustics to extremely old facilities for electronic combat. And now, the naval air forces. For almost 20 years the carrier-based combat aircraft on our ships have had a combat range 15 times less than foreign strike aircraft.

[Ledovyy] Why is it that only now, when you are retired, you have started to tell the truth about the Navy?

[Gorbachev] I am doing it publicly and openly now. But I started the fight with the high-ranking officials of idiocy 8 years ago when I was working in the apparatus of the Navy Commander-in-Chief. When I shifted the thrust of my criticism they transferred me to the reserves. Vice-Admiral Ye. Chernov and many other high-ranking officers suffered the same fate.

Early in 1986 and late in 1987 I submitted two reports of particular defense significance to the USSR Committee for State Security. In the first I demanded that objective data be requested on the funds spent over the previous 25 years to build the Navy's ships. In the report I pointed out the ruinous mechanism of combining individual leaders in industry and the Navy, the quite impermissible "gross" factor in the building of the fleet, and the disgusting boom in awards and bonuses for ruinously expensive output. Naturally, in addition to an analysis of the state of particular Navy resources, the report also contained a number of proposals to relieve the catastrophic situation. The report was to have been submitted to CPSU Central Committee Politburo member Chebrikov. A month later they informed me that the report had produced a strong impression and that urgent steps would be taken to correct the situation.

The other report contained what was virtually a ready-made solution for one of the Navy's most acute problems—how to inflict damage on the antisubmarine war assets of the United States and the other NATO countries. When this was done, the Soviet naval strategic combat potential worth more than 11 billion rubles [R] would be preserved (previously it had been doomed to absolute destruction even before the first missiles would be launched).

[Ledovyy] And what happened after your reports?

[Gorbachev] What happened next is an interesting story. On representation from the USSR Committee for State Security, the country's Procurator General, Rekunkov, opened a criminal case against a number of former naval chiefs, including the former Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, S. Gorshkov, and his deputies. Naturally the investigation was closed to public view, and this enabled a group of highly placed persons, in particular Solomentsev, Romanov, and Zaykov, to have the case closed. I now understand why Zaykov at that time showed such a great interest in the course of the investigation: At one time he had been the general director of a very large shipbuilding association. It was in his hands that many of the threads of the Soviet military-industrial mafia were collected. And incidentally, Gorshkov did not die, as the Soviet press reported, but committed suicide.

[Ledovyy] The Navy has quite a talent for covering its own tracks. For example, I know that after the tragedy in the Sea of Norway there were at least two more accidents. But none of that was reported in the Soviet press...

[Gorbachev] The USSR Procurator General should go back and review the criminal cases opened earlier and then closed by the military procurator. Most often they were closed under pressure from the military-political organs and specific highly placed persons. Behind each case there are billions, and indeed tens of billions of wasted rubles.

[Ledovyy] Which "cases" do you have in mind?

[Gorbachev] The list will be very long but I am prepared to make it public:

1) Two nuclear cruisers—the Kirov and the Kalinin—were handed over to the fleet in a condition not fit for combat.

2) Since January 1980 thousands of general purpose, very expensive torpedoes (each one costs about R500,000) with limited combat capability and a number of serious defects and anomalies have been put into service on submarines and third general surface ships.

3) Poor personnel training and staffing before a long cruise by a strategic missile-carrying nuclear submarine led to the catastrophe in the Atlantic in October 1986. The missile-carrying submarine put to sea with a number of defects, including a defect in the No. 6 launch tube, in which a missile exploded. Some of the crew were killed.

4) The reasons for and the serious consequences of reactor accidents aboard nuclear submarines are being covered up, when an objective investigation would have made it possible to take steps in good time to improve the operation of submarines and nuclear power stations, and perhaps prevent Chernobyl.

5) Except for fighter air cover, the first Tbilisi-class and Varyag-class Soviet aircraft carriers do not have real combat support at sea by other naval assets.

6) In recent years expensive major ships have been written off along with their weapons and equipment, often before they have reached the end of their service life. Here, due consideration should be given to the opinion of naval officers that this is all being done primarily to conceal from the country's leadership and the people their numerous design, industrial, and operating defects.

Submarine Fuel Sale in Poland Denied

92UM0390A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Major M. Zheglov: "But None of Our Submarines Were at Gdynia"]

[Text] A Polish citizen was recently arrested in the Polish city of Gdynia and accused of the theft and sale of diesel fuel. For some unknown reason Polish officials decided to analyze the fuel. They determined that this was the very type of fuel used on our ships. And since several

Baltic Fleet ships were undergoing repairs at Gdynia at that time, the conclusion was obvious....

A TASS correspondent learned of the incident. The report contained certain details, to be sure: "The theft involved a total of 37.5 tons of fuel drained from two Soviet submarines. It was sold to the Poles by several officers, who were arrested by the Polish police."

Naturally, such a report could not escape the attention of our newspaper. We learned through our own channels that there were no Soviet submarines at Gdynia at that time. An audit was taken on submarines under repair at

Polish docks, which revealed no missing fuel. And according to information from the public communications group of military counterintelligence, knowledgeable agencies have no information on the arrest of any of our naval officers by the Polish police.

Incidentally, we first attempted to obtain the necessary clarification at the Navy General Staff. Unfortunately, however, the navy's press service, and specifically Captain 1st Rank V. Novikov, its chief, not only had no information on the matter but did not even demonstrate any interest in it. Has it actually become unfashionable to defend the honor of the navy and its officers?

Lopatin: Three Reform Alternatives

92UM0408A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 52, 91 p 9

[Interview with V.N. Lopatin by Alexander Tsygankov:
"Armed Forces Don't Exist As a Single Entity"—first
paragraph is MOSCOW NEWS introduction]

[Text] The Russian State Committee for Defence seems quite happy after the signing of the Brest agreement. Instead of the Soviet armed forces, the committee prefers a different term reflecting the new reality of the Eurasian conglomeration with no name: joint armed forces.

Location of General Purpose Forces

Republics	Maneuver Divisions ¹	Interceptor Aircraft ²	Tactical Aircraft ²
Armenia	3	0	0
Azerbaijan	4	30	100
Belarus	10	110	360
Georgia	4	50	190
Kazakhstan	4	100	240
Kirghizia	1	0	0
Moldova	1	0	0
Russia	71	1,400	980
Tajikistan	1	0	0
Turkmenistan	4	70	90
Ukraine	20	230	620
Uzbekistan	1	30	260
Estonia ³	1	110	0
Latvia ³	1	30	150
Lithuania ³	4	0	70

1. There are 16 more active divisions in Eastern Europe and Mongolia.

2. The number excludes aircraft of the Naval Air Force

3. The presence and ultimate withdrawal of forces from the recently independent Baltic states is the subject of talks between the Baltics and Moscow.

"To hope that political controversies die down, leaving one army intact, amounts to a display of incompetence in political matters, which could lead to complete disintegration of the armed forces," believes Vice-Chairman of the Russian State Committee for Defence Vladimir Lopatin. "In fact there are several independent states on the territory of the former USSR which have diverse views on the defence issue."

"Three options for the armed forces have emerged: continuation of one army with one command; formation of joint armed forces with one common component: a nuclear deterrent force; acceptance of national armies in the republics (taking control of all the armed forces stationed on their respective territories).

"Each of the three options have been represented here. The Baltic republics want their own armed forces. Central Asia wanted one army with one command. Now the Commonwealth of Independent States has opened up the second option (though only as a draft project).

"The interests of each of these groups are obvious. Central Asian republics want one armed force since their state budgets won't bear the burden of maintaining individual armies. There is a disquieting tendency there: gravitation towards the idea of ethnically homogeneous officers corps. Officers are transferring to the republics they originate from. Units stationed in the republics will mostly be staffed by local conscripts, according to special decisions by local government."

"So the republics will form their own armies at the cost of the Union budget?"

"Acceptance of the concept of unity of the armed forces would eventually lead to formation—in a year or two—of the republics' own armies.

"Incidentally, representatives of all the fifteen former USSR republics agreed during their meeting in September that the joint armed forces concept developed by our Committee was optimal. However, the concept hasn't yet been adopted because the Centre has always primarily heeded the position of the Central Asian republics—perhaps because that position allowed the Centre to be idle."

"Can you expand on that concept?"

"The idea of the joint armed forces emerged in the course of consultations with the republics. We have streamlined the concept into what seems to be the optimal option for the present day.

"The first component is single strategic containment nuclear forces, including antimissile and air defence to ensure strategic stability, nuclear means in the Air Force, Navy and Army (strategic missile force), shorter-range tactical nukes, and perhaps several other branches as a component of containment strategy—they will be specified in the course of concrete talks (and perhaps include the Navy).

"The second component is armed forces to be controlled by the republics (units stationed on their territory and not included in the first component). But then again: can the republics afford such armies?"

"What if they can't?"

"In that contingency the forces in question will be controlled by the Commonwealth (though this matter has to be further discussed).

"The third component is the republican national guards to be formed on the basis of existing internal forces units.

"Central control of the armed forces—the Defence Ministry and the General Staff—must be modified. Some of

their functions will be transferred to the republics. I favour a variant envisaging a council of heads of state as supreme command for the joint armed forces. It is proposed that this be attached to a council of defence ministers which will coordinate control over the joint armed forces. The functions of the joint defence committee and the functions of the General Staff are to be made different. The military mustn't get involved in the political matter. Neither should they be allowed to decide for themselves about their functions—this is the prerogative of the state. But transition to this system has to be agreed upon in the course of the talks. Our plan offers a feasible solution to the present crisis."

Reasons for Failure of Military Reform

92UM0283A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Dec 91 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Article by Major-General (Retired) I. Vorobyev, doctor of military sciences, professor, under the rubric "Point of View": "The Thorns of Military Reform"]

[Text] The cardinal change in the state structure of society has with particular sharpness raised the question of what is to become of the armed forces, what path should their further reorganization take, and, in general, what is the fate of military reform under the new conditions.

If an attempt is made to characterize briefly the process of reformation of the army and navy that is occurring, then it may be said that it is being conducted in a muddled way, with great haste, and literally in a helter-skelter manner. True, there are specific objective reasons here—His Majesty Time is pressing: With the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, questions of military force development have arisen in a totally new aspect, and they will have to be resolved without delay. And still, it seems that this does not justify chaos in such a paramount state matter. After all, in the final analysis, we are talking about our defense capability.

In this connection, it is appropriate, it seems to me, to turn to the history of the Russian state, for example, to the experience of military reform in the middle of the 19th century by then minister of war D.A. Milyutin. This is especially appropriate because the present situation in the military sphere is in some measure similar to that which developed then. The country was in a critical stage of development. The state and military leadership at that time was also faced with the question of defining a new path of military force development. And it must be given its due—it displayed the wisdom of foresight and deliberation. The political conditions and the economic and defense capabilities of the state were weighed carefully, and reasons were identified and ways were outlined for overcoming the backwardness of the military organization. This guaranteed a purposeful and systematic conduct of reforms in the 1860's and 1870's, which made it possible to reorganize the Russian Army in a radical way, and to transform it into one of the most advanced armies

in the world. Why not be guided now by this positive experience that was gained by our state, not to mention the experience of conducting military reform in the years 1924-1925?

However, contrary to historical experience, the present military reform, it seems to me, from the very beginning began to be conducted "not from the right end"; that is, it is being carried out prior to development of fundamental doctrinal positions on questions of defense structuring. From this come all kinds of wiggling, vagueness, and even discord in the upper echelon of the military leadership. And it is not necessary to be a prophet here to predict that many "reefs" have yet to be overcome on the way to the reorganization of the army, as well as to conversion. Thus, is it necessary with such haste to destroy defense structures that were built over decades and to create principally new ones, without weighing and evaluating beforehand the developing military-political situation in the world arena and the new apportionment of military-strategic forces inside the former Union, without defining the real degree of military danger and, what is especially important, without determining the nature of a possible war? Is it really not clear that to act blindly in the defense sphere means to stake one's all and to risk the destinies of peoples?

As is known, up to the present time we have not properly developed the concept of military reform itself. The official documents published on this score are of an abstract-declarative nature, based primarily on slogans, general requirements, and appeals allegedly for that which is necessary "to create a mechanism for guaranteeing the security of the country," and "to bring the armed forces to a level of defense sufficiency" (the draft concept of military reform). However, it is absolutely unclear as to how this is to be done, what "defense sufficiency" means in a realistic tangible way, what its criteria are, and what kind of objective quantitative and qualitative expression it should have. It need not be proved that the purpose of the concept is exactly to determine precisely and clearly the specific ways for achieving "a level of guaranteed defense" and the "provision of a mechanism for military force structuring."

Neither these documents, nor other publications, define the purpose of the military reform. If one is to judge by those practical measures that are being implemented, or that it is planned to conduct in this direction, then the conclusion can be reached that the main content of the reform is an effort, as soon as possible and no matter what, to find resources by a reduction in budgetary appropriations for defense, conversion of the defense industry, and a cut in the numerical strength of the armed forces.

There is no argument—under conditions of the grave economic crisis in which practically all of the states of the commonwealth find themselves, it is necessary to reduce military expenditures, and without delay. The wisdom, however, given all of this, is simultaneously not to undermine once and for all the combat capability of

the army, and not to lose the military-strategic parity that was achieved in the past. In other words, there is a need to display great foresight and prudence in carrying out such a cardinal reform.

This does not exist at present. It can be said that what has been chosen now is the most irrational and the most ineffective path of trial and error. It is easy to be convinced of what this will lead to in the example of conversion, which is being implemented unsystematically, without plan, and thoughtlessly; and, of course, it was not justified in any way, and, indeed, it could not justify the economic hopes that were based on it.

The people must now be told absolutely firmly and distinctly that no kind of reduction of the armed forces and armaments promises an immediate boon for society. On the contrary, as paradoxical as this may seem, it will lead, especially in the near term, to an increase in material expenditures. This is associated not only with the withdrawal of groups of forces from a number of countries, but also with the creation of a new infrastructure within the boundaries of independent states that are united in the commonwealth; with regrouping, redeployment, and the reformation of large units, establishments, military educational institutions, and a change in their tables of organization [orgshtatnaya] structure; and with the establishment of a new antimissile system, air defense system, and also military command and control systems. To this has to be added the substantial expenditures that are associated with the social support of servicemen and members of their families. And if the hopes for improvement in the lives of people owing to conversion and a reduction in the numerical strength of the army is quite illusory, then standing out with absolute clarity is the threat of destruction of a previously created system of defense and the tendency of increased crisis phenomena in the armed forces.

If the reform was being organized, so to say, thoroughly, then one would expect that before it was put into effect the entire powerful scientific potential of the army, defense specialists, and military experts would be put into operation so that, not hurrying, all possible versions of the reorganization of the armed forces, defense branches of industry, and the entire intricate defense economy would be sensibly and cautiously evaluated, checked, and modeled not once, and not seven times, but dozens of times. But to this day, this has not happened. Moreover, instead of this, hasty steps began to be taken that, I make so bold as to assert, were unreasoned in advertising the measures being conducted in consideration of causing a world "sensation," and in order to "amaze" the West once more.

Thus, at the very representative international forum of military in Vienna in October of 1991, where representatives of 38 countries of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] participated, the Soviet delegation put forth a new concept of military

reform. It can be concluded from this that practically the entire currently functioning structure of the armed forces and their leadership down to the tactical echelons, even including the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, and the main and central directorates, are subject to reform. It is planned to radically reorganize military educational institutions, the tables of organization of large formations [obyedineniye], large units [soyedeneniye], and units [chast], and to rebuild from the bottom up the operational-strategic grouping of troops. And it is planned to do all of this right now, immediately, without delay.

And here dozens if not hundreds of questions arise: But what is the reason for all of this? Why such feverishness? Why is it necessary with a certainty to mess up that which was developed over decades and approved by practice, including by the experience of the Great Patriotic War? And, in general, where is the guarantee that a new, hastily cut out, expensive defense system will prove to be better than the former one? It is unlikely that any of the reformers will answer these questions.

The only certainty at the present time is the change in the military-administrative division in connection with the destruction of the previously existing state structure. As for the other reformist ideas, not all of them look sufficiently studied by any means.

Particular vigilance is called for regarding the proposal for fundamental revision of the tables of organization structure of large formations and large units—in particular, the change from an army to a corps structure, and from a division to a brigade structure. This is explained by the effort to "reduce the administrative echelon and to optimize the complement of these formations." It is not known precisely what is hidden behind this vague term "optimize," but, on the other hand, it is perfectly obvious that, in the event of implementation of such a reorganization, the combat potential of our army can prove to be incommensurate with even one of the neighboring foreign armies, including the Turkish and Iranian armies, not to mention the large formations of the armed forces of the NATO countries and the armies of the KNR [People's Republic of China].

A careful analysis of official documents and speeches of leading persons on questions of military reform discloses a one-sided orientation on favorable developments in world events. The future is seen through rose-colored glasses. At one time (in 1987), this affected the content of a new Soviet military doctrine "of an especially defensive direction," which placed the country and the armed forces in wittingly unequal conditions with respect to a possible aggressor. It seemed that it was necessary then to come to the conclusion that it was impermissible to ideologize the military force development process in a crude way, and especially military art, inasmuch as this gives a lopsided direction to its development. However, it turns out that up to now the proper conclusion has not been drawn from this obvious error. In the reformation

of combined arms large units, the idea of switching them to a so-called "defensive structure" is being conducted persistently even now.

The report of the aforementioned international forum gave as a regular "achievement" the fact that in the new reorganized motorized infantry and tank divisions, there is a significant reduction in their combat potential, fire, strike, and maneuver capabilities, inasmuch as in their composition "the quantity of armored weapons is reduced, and means are excluded that provide for increased maneuver on the battlefield and in a march" (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 17 October 1991.) A valid question arises: The resolution of what kinds of tasks is intended for the kind of divisions that are not capable of maneuver, and what kind of an enemy are they designed to confront?

It seems that the moment has now arrived when the problems of military reform in conjunction with military doctrine must be brought up for discussion without delay. It is necessary as soon as possible to develop a real, scientifically based comprehensive program for the transformation of military policy and structures that manage the military sphere, with a precise definition of their new tasks and functions and their consolidation with legislative acts.

It is extremely important in the very near future to adopt a position on the resolution of defensive tasks that will accurately define the tasks and degree of responsibility of all states that are part of the commonwealth. Without this, the amorphous concept of a "single military-strategic space" turns into empty words.

Unit Efforts To Feed Troops Viewed

92UM0362A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
11 Dec 91 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant S. Loktionov: "There Are Reasons For the Alarms"]

[Text] Quietly meandering around the position of the anti-aircraft missile battalion was...a cow. She was not disturbed in the least by the bustling people around her in military uniform. Turning her jutting, copper-looking sides toward the rays of the sun that was no longer providing warmth, she broke the surrounding silence from time to time with a long drawn-out moo.

Times are, however, such that neither a cow, nor fowl living alongside military equipment now surprises anyone. Today even small sub-units are trying to do a little of their own farming on the side. This is all the more so because the question of how to feed people at the present moment has become one of the most urgent issues. In Lieutenant Colonel A. Sokhnich's sub-unit, this question is among those taking top priority, even more so because this year the number of personnel assigned to him has almost doubled. The reason: a major overhaul begun on one of the neighboring battalions. The more the merrier, as they say. It just took place so unexpectedly, and there was no time for making the necessary preparations for the addition. Neither the facilities, barracks, nor dining hall were equipped for this number of people. Nonetheless, is it a wonder? It is a paradox, but we always take care of people last.

Sub-unit commander Lieutenant Colonel A. Sokhnich, is a well-known figure throughout the unit. By virtue of his popularity he is bound above all to seeing to matters of "housekeeping."

No, very likely Aleksandr Petrovich has more serious concerns than food preparation. The warehouse facilities (because of their small size) will not hold all of the vegetables needed until the next harvest. So, Lieutenant Colonel A. Sokhnich comes up with a solution to the problem: What other facility could be used as a warehouse? In fact, he raised the question more than once, and turned for help. The sub-unit is small, and building a new warehouse would be no problem, more so because he suggested that they would do it all using their own means. However, they were not allotted any materials, and the unit had no materials of its own due to the overall shortage.

Aleksandr Petrovich himself feels that he has already resolved the majority of problems, and can manage entirely the ones that remain. The situation is complex, but, as they say, it isn't hopeless. While the weather still permitted, the battalion provided for itself by farming a little on the side. There is a small garden here, several pigs, and even a cow. Namely the cow, more than anything else, will be their saving grace. The problem is that, in accordance with the existing regulation, the pigs are first sent to the unit, and from there the meat goes to

the sub-units according to the distribution order. Thus, people lose their vested interest in farming. They do not see its real results on their tables. The cow, however, in the sub-unit is a "supernumerary," her own entity, and she "delivers" milk to the soldiers' table without fail. Because of this the soldiers love her. They have already prepared enough hay for their "wet-nurse" to last the winter.

Anticipating no instructions "from above," Aleksandr Petrovich made an agreement with nearby kolkhoz farms for a supply of vegetables. The latter was not only for the soldiers, but for officers' families as well. The first centners of potatoes, beets, cabbage, and carrots have already arrived at the warehouse. The unit purchased onions centrally, so that there would be no problem with those during the winter. The kolkhoz farms are also of the mind "the more the merrier." The soldiers are their most reliable helpers in the "battle for the harvest." The soldiers are ready to come to the rescue of the kolkhoz workers at any other time as well. As Lieutenant Colonel A. Sokhnich put it: "We have already become an integral part of the neighboring settlement. They could not do it without us, and we could not make it without them either."

The problem of providing living quarters for the soldiers is also being resolved at the battalion. In the barracks, of course, it has become more crowded. However, the soldiers themselves requested that the beds not be made into bunk beds. As a result, the usual comfortable atmosphere in the barracks has been preserved. It was more difficult to resolve problems of providing quarters for officers' and warrant officers' families though, the number of which has almost tripled in the sub-unit. Their two buildings house a total of eight families. Those warrant officers whose wives work in the kolkhoz settlement managed to obtain apartments there. However, the platoon leader, the launch battery commander, and the crew chief were forced to rent a place to live. There was not even any room to house the bachelors. There was talk that two apartments would be set aside in the kolkhoz settlement, but nothing came of it. One cannot blame local authorities for it either.

Training classrooms in the sub-unit are tiny: Half of the new personnel cannot fit in them. It was easier during the summer. Classes were conducted outdoors or directly on site with the equipment. However, the cold weather arrived and it became necessary to find a new solution to the situation, if any such solution exists. The small dining facility cannot accommodate everyone. Meals are organized in two shifts now. It is a shame to write, but there are not enough dishes to go around for the soldiers. And well, the conditions in which the cooks work are unspeakable.

Somehow or other, personnel in the battalion are being fed and training is being conducted according to plan. In all likelihood, the cold weather will not interrupt the battalion's usual rhythm of life. That is, of course, if the heating manages to hold out. And this is very doubtful.

The old boiler room is capable of producing any "surprise." They readied it for winter as best they could. Coal was obtained and the equipment was serviced. The problem, however, was not solved in its entirety. They could have after all, gotten rid of it altogether. Three hundred meters from where the battalion is located rises the pipe of the kolkhoz settlement's new boiler room with, as it is called, state of the art equipment. Back in the spring Lieutenant Colonel A. Sokhnich had coordinated connecting the battalion's heating system to it. But there is always a reason capable of ruining any good beginning. In this instance everything was contingent upon pipes. And even though the unit had succeeded in "dislodging" from the warehouse glass, paint, and wood for the repairs of the barracks, all their efforts to obtain pipes were in vain.

Why, winter has begun. And it namely will be the best test of the work done in preparation.

Food Packets May Substitute for Officers' Pay

92UM0363A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
12 Dec 91 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Will the Officers Have Rations?"]

[Text] The information that officers will be issued food rations instead of their food allowances of 50 rubles starting in January of 1992 was not at the level of rumors and discussions alone.

The officers were receiving this in a positive light. They were talking about the order of the minister of defense on this score. Not much time now remains until January. How are things in the local areas, in the Black Sea Fleet, for example?

"Yes, this issue is being studied," the chief of the food service for the Black Sea Fleet, Capt 2nd Rank Vladimir Dmitriyevich, tells me, "the discussion concerns the directive of the USSR Minister of Defense where it was stated, in particular, that the deputy minister of defense and chief of the rear services for the armed forces was to coordinate, with the appropriate governmental bodies, the question of issuing food rations for free to the officer corps that does not have the right to obtain foodstuffs through the state starting on 1 Jan 92.

"This question is of a great deal of concern today, perhaps even paramount, for the chief of the Central Food Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, Lieutenant General Nikolay Borisovich Kozlov. It is difficult to say how it will come out in practice, however, since the food situation in the country is so strained. Whether we will have food rations here in the fleet will become known precisely only on December 20, when the allocations come in for us. It is difficult for me to say anything definite as yet."

The comments by the deputy chief of the food service for the fleet, Capt 2nd Rank Igor Travkin, are also not without interest.

"The institution of rations would of course greatly ease the difficult situation of the officers and their families, but we have to look truth squarely in the eye here. According to the order of the USSR minister of defense, we were permitted to sell certain quantities of five types of foods to officers. We have been making very limited sales due to the difficult situation with foodstuffs. I would moreover say that we cannot issue submariners and pilots the chocolate or coffee they are supposed to get, the dried fruits that go to more than the submariners and pilots alone are at an end..."

The officials that I approached cannot say unequivocally whether food rations will be issued to officers or not, since the directive is not categorical on that score. It is even difficult to make any predictions today. Judging from the current situation in the country, however, it is not very likely, although improvements in the food supply are possible through the coming cutbacks in the armed forces, including in the Black Sea Fleet.

Table of Food Prices at Military Garrisons

92UM0326B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 2 Jan 92 p 2

[Table: "Prices at Markets in Military Garrisons"]

[Text]

Price per 1 Kilogram				
Food products:	Yekaterinburg	Alma-Ata	Chita	Kalinin-grad
Meat	70-90 rubles	60-80	60-80	80-90
Lard	60-70	80	70	70
Potatoes	5	10	5	10-12
Butter	130	150	none	—
Apples	40-50	40-50	40-50	15-25
Cabbage (sour)	20	10-15	10	8-10
Yellow onions	10	10	8	—

Baltic Fleet Able to Produce own Bread

92UM0342A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank V. Kostomarov: "Tallinn: Our Military Personnel in Estonia Will not Be Left Without Bread. Their Own Bread Plant Is Operating in Paldiski"]

[Text] As we all know, the Government of Estonia has decided to stop supplying bread products to CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Armed Forces units that are deployed in the republic. But the military will not be left without bread.

This is what Baltic Fleet Food Services Chief Captain 1st Rank Nikolay Kirsu said in this regard:

"The decision, it cannot be denied, is unpleasant but we had not excluded this development of events. Therefore, we were prepared for it. The fleet has its own bread factory at Paldiski Garrison. Its capacity permits us to provide bread not only to Baltic Fleet units and subunits but also to other units of our Armed Forces in Estonia. According to the data that I received from Plant Chief Petr Lapshov, the supply of flour that is currently on hand at Paldiski will permit them to support uninterrupted operation."

Hunger Strike Highlights Housing Problem

92UM0359A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
11 Dec 92 p 2

[Article by Major V. Kamenetskiy: "A Journalist Convinced Them Not To Starve, But the Problem Remains Open"]

[Text] "Please help! My husband, Nikolay Ivanovich Bogoslavets, a reserve officer and afganets [Afghanistan veteran], declared a hunger strike beginning 20 November in defense of his rights. Now he is in the Third Cherkassy City Hospital.—Valentina Bogoslavets." (From a telegram to the editorial offices.)

I made brief preparations and on the morning of 29 November I was already in Cherkassy.

"I thank the NARODNAYA ARMIYA editorial staff for responding, but it is as though a vacuum has been created around my husband," Valentina Iosifovna said through her tears as she invited us into her temporary dwelling. "Everyone has forgotten about him... Although I have reported his hunger strike to many official levels..."

"And what happened?"

"I will begin way back in the past," V. Bogoslavets said in agitation. "In September 1989, after my husband was discharged from the army, we moved from Turkmeniya to Cherkassy. In December of that same year our family of four was placed on the apartment register. Unfortunately, they did not promptly assign us a three-room apartment. And now they have no intention of doing that."

"Why?"

"On 9 November when my husband was in the hospital I was called to the city ispolkom [executive committee] and informed, 'We know that on 26 October your elder son Aleksandr graduated from military school and was

sent to serve in Semipalatinsk. Therefore you are not entitled to a three-room apartment. All we can offer you is a two-room one on the ninth floor with an area of 27 square meters.' You get the impression that the workers of the city ispolkom were just waiting for the moment when my son would finish school and the size of the family would change.

"When he found out how our apartment problem was resolved, Nikolay declared a hunger strike. Although I did everything I could to talk him out of this step"—Valentina Iosifovna concluded, sighing deeply.

...I went to see Reserve Major N. Bogoslavets in the hospital.

"I served in the army for 26 years and with extra credits of special duty assignments—36 years. I performed my "honorable duty" mainly high in the mountains of the Eastern border district. For example, my first outpost was at a height of 3,890 meters above sea level. And after that my outposts never descended below 2,000 meters. And from 12 February 1980 through 27 May 1983 I was in Afghanistan."

The major is reminded of the days he spent in the mountains of Afghanistan by his medals "for combat services," and "certificate of the right to benefits," as well as a number of diseases: radiculitis, deforming osteoporosis. Now there are signs of shell-shock.

It seems that now one can understand why Valentina Iosifovna refused the apartment on the ninth floor. After all, we know that the elevators in our buildings do not work. And because of the disease of his legs, it would be very hard for Nikolay Ivanovich to climb that many stairs. Incidentally, they now live on the ninth floor.

"And what did I earn for all these years?" continues N. Bogoslavets. "I did not even earn a regular apartment. The best one had cold water, but only in the morning and evening.

"But in spite of hardship and deprivation we were healthy and happy and lived with the hope of a better future," Nikolay Ivanovich smiles bitterly. "We believed that we were protected by the state. But after I was discharged I understood that nobody needs my family and me any more."

Bogoslavets has weighty reasons for talking like that. Judge for yourselves. For a whole year his family was forced to live with relatives in one room. And all the time Nikolay Ivanovich had to be knocking on doors of various officials. Fortunately, he ultimately found some good people: Valeriy Vasilyevich Malikov, Ivan Lavrentyevich Berez, and the deputy chairman of the oblast ispolkom, Gennadiy Ivanovich Kapralov—they put the family of the afganets up temporarily in a plant dormitory.

Indifference to the fate of a specific individual, manifested for many decades both in the army and in our

state in general, prompts people to do the most unpredictable things when everything would appear to have been resolved in keeping with the law. Driven to despair, reserve Major Bogoslavets did such a thing. When he declared his hunger strike he sent the city ispolkom a letter with two demands: to be assigned an apartment with an area of no less than 36 square meters and to meet with the chairman of the Cherkassy city ispolkom.

"When I took the letter to the city ispolkom, they said to me: A hunger strike? Let him starve!"—complains Valentina Iosifovna. "In a word, I did not take their friendly advice."

"Stop the hunger strike while I investigate your complaint"—this was the proposal I made to Bogoslavets. Very reluctantly, Nikolay Ivanovich agreed, but first he wrote the following statement: "I, Nikolay Ivanovich Bogoslavets, declared a hunger strike because my family was not assigned the apartment to which we are entitled according to the law. I announced my hunger strike to the city ispolkom and the Union of Internationalist Soldiers. But up to this point no measures have been taken. A correspondent from NARODNAYA ARMIYA, Major Kamenetskiy, came to see me on 29 November and persuaded me to stop my hunger strike until his article is published in the newspaper and the city ispolkom reaches a decision."

"If my demands are not satisfied, I will resume my hunger strike on 11 December."

I made the statement from the afganets known to the deputy chairman of the Cherkassy city ispolkom, Vladimir Arkadyevich Aleksandrov, the head of the department for registration and distribution of dwelling space, Vasilii Prokopyevich Bacherikov, and the inspector for this department, Pavel Ipatyevich Gonchar.

"There is no possibility that the chairman of the city ispolkom would go to meet Bogoslavets," noted V. Aleksandrov. "But I can receive Nikolay Ivanovich and his wife at any time that is convenient for them..."

"Valentina Iosifovna misunderstood us," emphasized P. Gonchar. "The apartment on the ninth floor was offered to her as one of the possible variants. But since she did not like it, now they are being assigned a two-room apartment with an area of 29.21 square meters and on the third floor. Unfortunately, we do not have any two-room apartments with any more space."

"Why was Bogoslavets not given the key to the three-room apartment when he was still entitled to it?"

"The plan for the introduction of housing in 1990 was fulfilled by only 27 percent," explained P. Gonchar. "And the picture does not look much better this year. Therefore the waiting list for housing is not decreasing. Thus in the Cherkassy garrison there are 110 officers and warrant officers on the apartment waiting list, and they are still in the service. On the city ispolkom registry there

are 402 military servicemen who have been discharged from the Armed Forces and more than 100 disabled persons and members of families of deceased soldiers. And as of 1 January of this year Bogoslavets was number 158 on this list. In a word, we could not assign him housing any sooner. Now, if the city approves your suggestion in December, the Bogoslavets family will move into a new apartment in January 1992."

Yes, the times are long gone when cadre officers or retired personnel received apartments a couple of months after they arrived at their new duty station or permanent place of residence. Now they can only dream about that. But can anything change?

"Yes, it can," retired Colonel V. Bacherikov is convinced. "To do this the USSR Ministry of Defense or now the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine will have to create a dispatcher apartment service which links the commands of the military districts and fleets with the local authorities. I see the main task of the dispatcher service as gathering information about where military servicemen wish to live after discharge and by which date they will need housing. And they should not be discharged until they receive the keys to their apartments. It would not be hard to do that if our construction organizations were to receive everything they need to construct residential buildings."

"So far the situation is such," added Vasilii Prokopyevich, "that beginning on 1 January 1992 we do not know who will be financing the construction of housing for retirees..."

In brief, the fate of the family of reserve Major N. Bogoslavets is a clear example of the triumph of the "new political thinking," the desire of the politicians to win the good will of the leaders of highly developed capitalist states at the cost of hardships for military servicemen and their families. The housing problem in Ukraine is getting worse and worse. New units are arriving from the groups of forces. How are we to regard the fact that the construction of housing for them does not begin until after they arrive? And what will happen to the combat readiness of our Armed Forces if, following the example of the retired "afganets," tens of thousands of cadre officers and warrant officers declare hunger strikes?...

In a word, even with a positive resolution to the question of Nikolay Bogoslavets, the problem of providing housing for military servicemen remains...

And another thing. Indeed, from the standpoint of the law there can be no complaint about the fact that the city ispolkom offered Bogoslavets a two-room apartment instead of a three-room one. Life is life, the more so if the family decreased and the son himself selected the difficult path of a soldier. But this is not just about the formal aspect of this incident. For a person who had devoted his strength and health to the homeland was going through an ordeal. And instead of being grateful, they tried to drive him up to the ninth floor and brushed off what

seemed to many to be his importunate complaints instead of calmly explaining everything. It is true that we will not get far with this kind of attitude toward another's misfortune.

Poltava Officers Protest Housing Shortage

92UM0358C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
11 Dec 92 p 6

[Article by V. Goshko, NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent: "Letter with Commentary: 'Patience Is Exhausted, We Will Sell the Vehicles Ourselves...'"]

[Text] I took the headline for this material from a resolution of the general officer and warrant officer assembly held in the Piryatin garrison in Poltava Oblast. We quote its beginning: "Officers and warrant officers in the garrison of the city of Piryatin have not been getting housing since the beginning of 1986. There is no construction, and the local soviets are not allocating 10 percent of the apartments."

Similar cases are not new today. The number of servicemen without apartments is increasing not by months, but by weeks. People are in despair over tomorrow. That is the way it is here in Piryatin as well, and families of officers and warrant officers are in an extremely difficult position. Is there a way out of it? We read further: "The construction of a 199-apartment dwelling unit, planned for 1989, was delayed to 1990, and it was later removed from the plan. The monetary resources were available in part, but subsequently they were used for the conduct of demonstration exercises of the USSR Ministry of Defense."

And further: We found a contractor on our own, a house-construction combine in the city of Kremenchug. B. Skrinets, the director, agreed to build a house out of his own materials in the course of six to eight months on condition of sale to the combine of six tractors of the KamAZ [Kama Automobile Plant] type for the transportation of building structures to Piryatin."

The unit, of course, was delighted over this turn of events. But it turned out that they were hoping for the better prematurely. As was proper for the resolution of this problem, the officers turned to the staff of the Kiev Military District and to the Deputy Minister of Defense for Construction and Billeting of Troops with a request for assistance in the resolution of this question.

Everything turned out in vain. The families were left to face their problem alone. The resolution states: "The number of families without apartments in the unit has reached the 107 mark, and it continues to increase in connection with the discharge of officers and warrant officers into the reserve. By the middle of 1992, the unit can safely be called "apartmentless."

Naturally, the uncertainty of such a situation and the complete vagueness of the outlook have created a tense situation in the collective. The patience of the people has

been brought to the limit by the callous attitude, for example, of some senior chiefs in the resolution of social questions in the Piryatin garrison where it is impossible for an officer or warrant officer to rent housing.

And all of this rested on the ill-fated KamAZ's, which, as is known, are written off and sold to various civilian organizations. They are bought by cooperatives and by small and large enterprises. Of course, in a substantial amount. Thus, why did what seemed to be a simple question turn out to be a stumbling block?

But unfortunately no one knows this. Everyone promises to look into it and to help, but they just as easily forget about it. It is felt in the unit that six sold vehicles will not lower combat readiness.

"We officers and warrant officers reserve the right to appeal to prominent businessmen to take us under their social protection, if our legal demands remain unfulfilled," the adopted document emphasizes. "Our situation is desperate. In the event of repeated rejections, the general assembly will assume responsibility itself to sell six KamAZ vehicles to the indicated house-building combine."

What can be added to what was stated? The adopted resolution is a kind of ultimatum which, as is known, is impermissible under army conditions. But, on the other hand, the people have been pushed into this desperate step by those who are obligated to concern themselves with the well-being of their subordinates. As a matter of fact, so many motor vehicles have been sold to civilian organizations by private persons that they cannot be counted. But when reference was made to the fact that it is necessary to help the collective, everyone began to look for paragraphs in instructions in order to prohibit this.

It is always easy to prohibit. Really, many became skilled at this. It is easier to say no than to show concern for a person.

The meeting was attended by 125 officers and warrant officers. Let us ponder this figure. These are families who do not have a place of their own. These are our citizens who, after declaring their desire to become defenders of the Motherland, ended up by the will of fate on the roadside of an already rather difficult life. This is hundreds of children who under such treatment will not know their own childhood. Where are we headed?

I would like the command authorities of the KVO [Kiev Military District] to take heed of this article.

Turkish Firm Completes Military Housing Early

92UM0312A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel P. Chernenko: "There Will Be House Warming Parties Tomorrow"]

[Text] **Belorussian Military District—The Turkish firm Enka has completed the first military residential development built under the Soviet-German program.**

Let us be honest: Very few people in our country believed that this work would be completed by the beginning of this year. That includes even us, journalists, who visited Borisov several times and saw the scale and the tempo of work on the site where they were building residential housing for the military. They were not building a house or two, it was a whole development of 12 five-storied houses (728 apartments with all modern conveniences), a kindergarten with a swimming pool meant to accommodate 280 children, a public services facility, a post office, an automatic telephone station with the capacity of almost 1,000 phones, various auxiliary structures, etc. The Turkish firm Enka promised to build all that in six months or, to be exact, in 180 days. Our doubts could be easily understood: Nobody in our country has ever seen such construction rates.

But we, the doubting pessimists, were put to shame when the Turkish builders kept their word. Here it spreads, in front of our eyes, the housing development which until now we could see in its entirety only on paper. Here it is, in all its splendor! Tall, shapely pine trees are surrounding snow-white houses (the builders did their best to spare every single tree), fairy tale-like wooden structures encircle the kindergarten. Our interpreter, Melkhmed Bayraktar, a Turk of Bulgarian descent, told us that the houses were practically ready for occupancy. Only landscaping was left to be completed and they postponed that until spring when the weather gets warmer.

The landscaping could, of course, be done in winter also but there was no guarantee that the trees and shrubs would take or that the ground would not sink as it thawed. The Turkish builders value their reputation and the Enka firm is doing everything at the highest level. To be honest with you, if somebody offered to let us move from our apartments where we live now to ones similar to these premises that are going to be occupied soon by the servicemen of Borisov garrison, we would have jumped at the offer.

No, these are not spacious suites, in spite of what was written in some newspapers. These are ordinary apartments similar to the ones that we build in our country. A two-room apartment, for instance, has 55 square meters of total space—31.5 square meters of living space and a 9-meter kitchen. But the interior layout and decoration are several levels above our ideas of a home. There are oak wood floors, embossed wallpaper, built-in cabinets made of expensive wood, etc. In a word, wherever you

turn, you see something pleasant to look at. We thoroughly examined several apartments in different buildings but did not find any noticeable construction defects.

"There are no obvious defects," says Abdulla Kasapoglu who is responsible for the work quality control. "We are pleased with the work quality. This does not refer to us, representatives of the Turkish side only, but also to the German experts who accept the houses along with us (it is their money, after all). But I would not lie to you, there are minor defects to be found in some places."

As we walk around the development, we cannot stop wondering why we are not able to build the same way. Are construction materials different? Are our builders poorly qualified? Does construction work pay low salaries? All this must be true, taken together. Let us compare: The Enka builders are paid a minimum of \$800 a month. We do not even want to mention the construction materials: We could not find a single warped or cracked panel.

"Our people earn good money," says Shan Gyurdamar, the construction manager, "but they also work a lot. You will not see anyone idling on the site, everybody is doing some specific job. It is true that the intensity of our labor and our construction rate are quite high. But let me tell you that this fact does not affect the quality of our work. You are already convinced of that. In order to survive constant competition with others, our firm has to care about its prestige. Incidentally, we had been offered the end of 1992 as a completion date for this development. But we decided to do everything in six months. Nobody believed us. We did not try to argue with anyone, we just worked. Now the houses are built."

Yes, they are built and on the highest level, too. For one year a team of Turkish builders will fix any problems with plumbing, electric wiring, or correct any construction defects, if they appear.

Whatever you say, the Turkish firm Enka does a class job.

Sakhalin Pledges Military Housing

92UM0379E Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Jan 92 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Eight Percent of Housing Released on Sakhalin Allotted to Military"]

[Text] The head of the administration of Sakhalin, Professor V. Fedorov, has issued instructions according to which eight percent of housing released for use by any department located on the territory of the oblast will be offered to families of officers and warrant officers. Moreover, the municipality has decided to pay for kindergartens and day nurseries for children of military servicemen.

Head of Committee on Personnel Interviewed

92UM0347A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Jan 92 p 2

[Interview with Major General of Aviation Nikolay Stolyarov, head of the Committee of the Ministry of Defense on Work With Personnel, by Natalya Gorodetskaya; date and place not given: "How Should We Organize the Main Political Directorate?"]

[Text] It is necessary to strengthen culture in the army and to humanize interpersonal relationships, says Major General of Aviation Nikolay Stolyarov, head of the Committee of the Ministry of Defense on Work With Personnel.

[Gorodetskaya] Your appointment as chairman of the Committee of the Ministry of Defense on Work With Personnel was a surprise to many.

[Stolyarov] I spent 17 years in teaching work. By disposition and nature, I am a person who is predisposed to work with people. The choice of the minister of defense was apparently influenced by my position during work as chairman of the TsKK [Central Control Commission] of the Communist Party of the RSFSR and deputy chairman of the KGB, where, incidentally, I was involved in similar work—the selection and placement of personnel. I have known Shaposhnikov a long time, back during service in the Soviet Air Force. We were both delegates to the CPSU congress, we met frequently afterwards, and we took part together in preparation for the flight to Foros in August.

[Gorodetskaya] You agreed immediately?

[Stolyarov] Reflecting on it was not easy. I had just learned the new work, and I had ideas about reforming the committee. But Yevgeniy Ivanovich was insistent and I decided. I had a serious discussion with both presidents...

[Gorodetskaya] Your impressions of the meeting with Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev?..

[Stolyarov] Yeltsin made a very strong impression on me. In my opinion, he is a noble person. Yeltsin is the victor because he was ahead of life. I do not want to say that Gorbachev was a person of yesterday. He is a very strong politician. Only a person with a servile psychology can say: "Thank God the epoch of Gorbachev is over." It is only starting, and we are only entering civilized society, and we are just learning democracy.

Incidentally, like Gorbachev, I am devoted to the preservation of a multinational state. I am a cosmopolite, for any partitions are alien to me—national and political. As the poet said, the whole world is my home, love is my sacred object, and the universe is my homeland.

[Gorodetskaya] But the commonwealth of sovereign states is already a reality.

[Stolyarov] We have to find new forms of living together on a unified territory. Today, the attraction to full independence is strong. But, I am convinced that sooner or later the integrational processes will prove stronger. And who knows: Perhaps it will be the army with its high political culture combined with a traditional attraction to conservatism—that is to say, to preservation—that will help us unite?

[Gorodetskaya] What in your opinion is the place of the Committee on Work With Personnel in the structure of the armed forces?

[Stolyarov] It is very important. A serviceman should have a good understanding of the processes occurring in the economy and in political life, at least in order to understand when to employ weapons in peacetime and when not to.

[Gorodetskaya] This means that political training is not being abolished?

[Stolyarov] The "unforgettable" political training is a parody on political training. The present political culture depends on living conditions, on the way of life, and on the general culture. This means that it is necessary to raise its general level, and what we—workers of the socio-cultural infrastructure of the army—will actually be doing.

[Gorodetskaya] How?

[Stolyarov] The circumstances of life and the system of education will make it possible to advance culture in all respects. For this purpose, we created the directorate of culture and relations with the public. On recommendation of Dmitriy Antonovich Volkogonov, General Yakimov was appointed chief of the directorate. We will propagandize traditions and study the history of the Soviet army. Whole systems and schools of education existed in Russia. Take RUSSKIY VESTNIK, RUSSKIY INVALID, and other publications—there are tremendous articles by officers that raise questions of permanent significance: How to enter the conscience of a person, and how to win his mind and heart. An enormous network of military institutions will be directed to work with the individual. The cultural-commercial department will get the money that is necessary for the development of our infrastructure. I do not think society will be able to provide the army with everything that is necessary, we will have to earn it ourselves.

[Gorodetskaya] In what way?

[Stolyarov] We will make a good film, for example, and we will sell it to you. There is an enormous number of talented people in the army. The pressing of old monopolized structures did not give them an opportunity to be discovered. Doing away with all of the stereotypes, we want to put the principle of the "individual approach" into practice. And in religion, also. There was a meeting recently with American army chaplains, and we intend to learn from their experience.

[Gorodetskaya] Will the institution of priests be introduced?

[Stolyarov] For the present, we are thinking of establishing a department for liaison with religious denominations. But in the future, apparently, the question will come up about the institution of priests. I think that in 5-10 years about 60 percent of the people will be believers, and this has to be taken into account.

There is one more large subdivision—the directorate of socio-legal work. It was headed by Colonel Radul, a lawyer. The directorate had departments on the rights of servicemen, on work with veterans and youth, on analysis of the practice of law violations, and on work with servicemen's families. Incidentally, this department was headed by a woman who was not in the service. A reception office will be attached to the minister of defense. We will coordinate with public organizations.

Independent departments—military-sociological, military vocational guidance of personnel, and international humanitarian contacts. The names alone tell the story.

[Gorodetskaya] The names are a poem, but what will happen in practice?

[Stolyarov] I am a realist, and I by no means think that everything will be done very quickly. I look at what lies ahead with a great sense of responsibility and, I would say, even with a thrill. It is an enormous and noble field of activity.

[Gorodetskaya] What kinds of newspapers and journals are subscribed to for the libraries of the units

[Stolyarov] We granted the broadest opportunity, at the discretion of the commander, of course, and within the scope of financial capabilities.

[Gorodetskaya] Are you not afraid that the soldiers who read, for example, NASH SOVREMENNİK, GLASNOST, and DEN, will develop a peculiar outlook?

[Stolyarov] This is our general problem, and at times, trouble as well—exaggerated attention to the national factor.

We envision officer-sociologists who will observe the moods and processes in the army environment. Specialists from the information-analysis directorate will analyze the situation, and make appropriate recommendations.

[Gorodetskaya] Your political predilections? You took part in the work of the congress of the DPKR [Democratic Party of Communist Russia], now the People's Party of Free Russia, and in the work of the congress of the DDR [Democratic Reform Movement]?

[Stolyarov] I took part. But I was only an observer there. These are simply my old attachments—from my past civilian life. I stopped my membership in the CPSU after the August events. If I return to politics, then obviously

I will choose the party from the position in which I find myself at that time. Now, because of my service duty, it is simply impossible to allow any kind of party bias.

[Gorodetskaya] You think the army should not be politicized?

[Stolyarov] The army must be outside of politics. But this is impossible in principle, for the army is a tool and instrument of the state, and the state is a political organization. The main thing is that this organization respond to the interests of the people and subordinate itself to the law.

[Gorodetskaya] In the selection of personnel, do you attach significance to a person's party affiliation?

[Stolyarov] Of course, I am trying to clarify the relationship of the individual to policy and to his world outlook. That he reads NASH SOVREMENNİK or ZNAMYA with great pleasure. But there are two main criteria: professionalism and decency. I try to attract new people to work. Both of my deputies, Major General Bogdanov, a graduate of the General Staff Academy, and Docent Zhyuskevich, candidate of philosophical sciences, are not political workers. But I believe that it is unreasonable to reject the experience and knowledge of former political workers. We are trying to find among them people who are searching for and are oriented on the future. A great help to us was the decision of the commission on the elimination of political organs under the leadership of Volkogonov—approximately 95 percent of the recommendations were taken into account. Unquestionably, officer-political workers who are attracted to education will remain.

It must be recognized that in the context of the overall reduction of the army there will also be an appreciable reduction in the numerical size of our committee—out of 345 general positions, 37 remain. Now, all officers have completed efficiency report certification, and a special temporary department was established in the Main Directorate of Personnel of the USSR Ministry of Defense to complete the work for the discharge and retraining of political workers. It will finish its work in about three months. Some will go to commanders' positions, some will go through retraining in the Military Humanitarian Academy, and some will have to be discharged. But I would not want to remain a destroyer. The party is destroyed, the KGB is disbanded, and I do not want to gain the image of a person who is mercilessly driving people to retire.

[Gorodetskaya] But the communist party is alive, and it is even coming out from the underground.

[Stolyarov] These are splinters. Right after August, I proposed that Gorbachev convene a plenum to admit its mistakes, repent, dissolve by itself, and to recommend to the fanatics of immediate comunization of life that they create a new party. I think that it is not necessary to

obstruct either the communists or other parties, and to follow very closely the extent to which their activity complies with the law.

[Gorodetskaya] Your opinion on the reorganization of the KGB and the establishment of the MBVD [Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs].

[Stolyarov] I long ago proposed to Yeltsin and to Bakatin the transfer of the USSR KGB to the jurisdiction of Russia, but, in the process, not to hitch up "a horse and a trembling deer" to the same wagon...

[Gorodetskaya] The destroying process is pursuing you. With the creation of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], the USSR Ministry of Defense is no longer necessary in its present form.

[Stolyarov] I, believe me, am a philosopher, and not only by education. A philosopher has to be ready for the vicissitudes of life. I am not holding on to this chair. As for the committee, I am convinced that if we succeed in accomplishing a part of what is planned, the committee will live.

[Gorodetskaya] Even independently of the Ministry of Defense?

[Stolyarov] Even independently of the Ministry of Defense. It does not have to be a committee, let it be a commission and a department in the end. But I am convinced: A department is necessary that objectively, thoroughly, and seriously involves itself with the individual and his anxieties and concerns. Especially in the army, and particularly now.

Fate of Cam Ranh Bay Facility

92UM0336A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 9 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Correspondent A. Kabannikov, Hanoi: "Generals of the Sandy Beaches: Whom Does our Naval Base in the South of Vietnam Defend Today?"]

[Text] (Conclusion. Introduction in January 7, 1992 issue.)

To a newly arrived person, our largest military base outside of Eastern Europe at first glance looks like a resort town. Sandy beaches and emerald hills frame the azure bay. The level road leads to white and pink structures that are surrounded by palm trees and accurate corps squares which we would never recognize as barracks. And even sunburnt seamen in light blue shorts are rather more like young Pioneer leaders.

Military men have long since fallen in love with Cam Ranh. The French were the first to use the bay. Then an American base was here. Our navy arrived here in 1980. The facility was modestly called a "logistics and technical support point" [PMTO]. However, at its height, up to two thousand construction workers were working on structures at the "point." A garrison with a microrayon, its own electrical power plant, a school, hospital, a tribunal and a military orchestra rose up on the shore of the South China Sea. The PMTO has become the real base of the Pacific Ocean Fleet at whose piers submarines, destroyers, and cruisers have performed combat duty. And squadrons of TU-16 strike bomber and MiG-23 fighter aircraft have been on alert on the take-off and landing strip that remained from the American airfield.

"This is a marvelous spot," military seamen told me, having in mind not nearly the area's beauty. Cam Ranh is the only and, furthermore, ice-free port, which our ships can enter on their way to the Indian Ocean. From here we can use our military fist to threaten anyone in Southeast Asia and, using TU-95 reconnaissance aircraft and spy-satellite tracking stations that are based here, we can see what the Americans are doing in the region.

Today, however, in the land of eternal summer, it is obviously not the season. The village streets are deserted and its population has decreased from over 4,000 to 1,500 people. The naval squadron has ceased to exist, the submarines and warships have left for their native shores, and military aviation has been removed. And although staff intelligence officers as before on a daily basis place figures of "enemy" ships, that are moving toward it, on the mockup of the American Subic Bay Base, only one missile boat has remained on alert at our pier. "If I speak honestly, I do not know why we are needed here," its likable Commander Captain-Lieutenant Zalesky told me. An outstanding officer according to the comments of the leadership, he has simply soberly assessed what his small boat can do in the event of a conflict with the Subic Bay armada.

Now there is not enough money for the maintenance of Cam Ranh. The military also cannot get by due to the lack of money, which has affected everyone. But in the case of Cam Ranh, this problem has gone far beyond the base that is surrounded by a concrete wall.

At the recent negotiations on the future of military cooperation, the Soviet side announced to the Vietnamese that, beginning with the new year, it will not be able to deliver military equipment, spare parts, or train army cadres free of charge as it has been done for over three decades here. In response, the Vietnamese military announced that it would like to receive rent payments for our presence on Cam Ranh Peninsula which we previously utilized free of charge. How much do they want? The amount is commensurate with the amount of our military aid in recent years—\$350-400 million per year.

I assume that maybe the military will be distressed at the publication of these figures which they are keeping a big secret. In this regard, I want to note that the Americans, whose military might our generals love to cite, quite recently widely discussed the cost of leasing Subic Bay. The Philippine Senate has made a decision on the bases.

The matter is not the numbers but the real situation that stands behind them. The 12-year-old treaty that concerns Cam Ranh (naturally, also secret) was compiled in a very strange manner. At that time, we certainly could have stipulated for ourselves the most comfortable terms of our presence here. But this is what we signed: All of Cam Ranh's facilities, as soon as they are erected, are immediately transferred... to the Vietnamese side. And the Vietnamese, in turn, will turn them over to us rent-free. That is, not even a peg belongs to us of everything we have built at Cam Ranh. And the base has been turned into a hostage of our military aid to Vietnam. Now the Vietnamese are playing in a risk-free lottery. They either win over \$300 million for their weapons or they actually receive in their hands real estate at Cam Ranh which is like a resort where we have squandered more than 800 million rubles (not current rubles—former rubles that were backed-up with goods).

How all of this occurred, who is to blame, or if this base was generally needed at all—are belated questions. The base exists and it arose because of our past. What do we do with it now? I have sincerely attempted to understand my military interlocutors who were firm on the need to maintain some sort of our presence at Cam Ranh. Alas, I did not manage to understand, like a simple taxpayer, whom it is customary to convince in civilized countries before launching expensive projects at his expense. Cheap refueling on the way to the Indian Ocean? But we are releasing prices and soon there will be no difference where we purchase fuel—at Tyumen or Singapore. Our warships have even traveled up to Cam Ranh in this ocean. Yes and do we need any trips there at all when our own country has been bled white to the limit?

"Well, how are the Americans doing?", repeated the military. And here it was as if they did not have any way to object. Cam Ranh at its height cannot even compare with the still existing giant Subic Bay in the Philippines, even if the reduced U.S. presence in the region is not comparable with our reductions. But it is a strange matter—it is much more understandable to me which interests the Americans are defending here. What are we defending? Fraternal Vietnam? No one is now threatening it. The system of socialism? This is in the past. Our capital investments? With the collapse in the country, peaceful cooperation with Vietnam and its neighbors is being rapidly reduced to naught. We are leaving the region as an economic partner and our political influence is fading away in proportion. Under these conditions, the maintenance of the military presence is nothing other than a goal in and of itself and the logic in it is the same: because we have a navy and the navy needs to sail.

There is a concept in popular psychology—professional cretinism. I do not want to offend anyone, this quality is at times also inherent in journalists and in all others who are involved for a long time with one and the same business and who do not allow critics and opponents access to it. I recalled this while I was walking near one of Cam Ranh's most notable new buildings. A gigantic area, surrounded by a double barbed-wire fence, has an arsenal hidden under it. More accurately—an enormous underground storage site which we have just proposed to fill with weaponry. But already a year ago, when the withdrawal from Cam Ranh began, it became clear that the arsenal would not stand the base in good stead. And that is how it has turned out. The Pacific Ocean Fleet is refusing to take it onto its balance sheet. The already constructed buildings are slowly becoming empty and the builders have become exhausted from guarding the facility they erected on it. But the most surprising thing in all of this is that the construction itself continues to this very day! No one has rescinded the order and the money has been allocated. What will the Vietnamese do with this 96 (!) hectare-area powder magazine? Maybe they will begin to grow mushrooms.

I went to see the customer's representative who was sitting under the sign "MVS [Ministry of the Armed Forces] Main Technical Directorate" in order to ask him one quite obvious question. Why has the military department, that had already begun to experience a shortage of resources a year ago, now not frozen construction and why does it continue to spend money on an obviously unneeded arsenal? "What arsenal?", the representative repeated the question while angrily staring right through

me. "I do not know anything about an arsenal. There is facility number 86. Planned and, you yourself understand, secret. I am not authorized to talk about it." He was operating strictly within the framework of the psychology of the department that authorized it. Function as best you can and provide a product since this is the condition of your existence. Does anyone still need this product? But that, you know, is none of your business...

Enormous resources are disappearing at impoverished Cam Ranh. A solid fleet of equipment—cranes, bulldozers, trucks—nearly 270 vehicles altogether—has been abandoned. We could lease them for dollars and, maybe, if worst comes to worst, we could sell them. Only it is impossible to leave these vehicles without movement under the maritime winds and tropical sun. They have already been sitting there for a year. A powerful construction facility is standing idle, they are being told to apply somewhere else, and they are drowning in the coordination of a proposal on the auxiliary fleet's commercial freight charges. A screen of secrecy cuts Cam Ranh off from the businessmen who are capable of finding a profitable application for everyone and for everything that has been discarded and is being destroyed or stolen here.

The military department's flight of fantasy has dashed off in another direction. It is even probing: Is it not possible, since the power does not have any cash on hand, to pay off part of the Vietnamese debt to our country with Cam Ranh? Tempting, is it not? The total amount of our non-reimbursed military aid to Vietnam is approximately equal to the economic aid, that is, it totals somewhere around \$10 billion. Let us therefore, so that we are not driven out of here like in Somalia and Egypt, forgive them for the other several billions that we have entered in the debt books for them. Why do we need their rice, meat, coffee, rubber, and clothing? Then we can maintain Cam Ranh and the cruises to the Indian Ocean.

And still, let the military, if not through its own will, but under the pressure of circumstances, slowly pack their suitcases and sea bags. The most sober-thinking of them name the latest departure date—the middle of next year. What will then become of the military cooperation between our two countries? Well, in my opinion, it still has great prospects. The Vietnamese Army that has been armed and trained with our help will still not get by for a long time without us. And we, with our excess of weaponry, will send both equipment and specialists here with pleasure, maybe those same generals if the purchasers also have enough money for them.

Market Problems Of Tula Small Arms Plant

92UM0350A Moscow TRUD in Russian 11 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by V. Gorodetskiy: "Begging With Assault Rifles: Even Though They Make the World's Best Arms, Tula Craftsmen Find Themselves in Poverty"]

[Text] Tula—Gage maker Pushkin, after finishing his shift, came home with a small package. When the canned fish was divided up in his shop, he ended up with two small sprats.

"One for each Gold Star," said his wife, bitterly summing up the situation. Gennadiy Aleksandrovich Pushkin has spent 54 of his 70 years working at the Tula Small Arms Plant. A multitude of books and sketches have been written about the old craftsmen, films have been made about him. When he was awarded his second Star of the Hero of Socialist Labor and people wanted to erect a bust in his native Tula, he declined: "Why during my lifetime? I'm here now. Maybe later, for my grandchildren."

The hero city of Tula, Russia's small arms capital, is on short rations. The sprawling food stores that were recently built next door to the Pushkins' apartment are deserted; even the clerks have gone. On the grounds of the small-arms plant, a gray, taciturn line stands outside the glass-walled pavillion. They are waiting for cutlets. Under a local barter system, which should more accurately be called a second-hand goods market, the plant trades rifles for coats, suits, meat, women's shawls, and bed linens. This year Pushkin got a fall jacket and three jars of canned fish. And he was thankful for that; you can't realistically go to the market when you make 500 rubles.

And in this situation, the Tula Small Arms Plant, on whose gates there is no sign to ensure greater secrecy, was visited a few months ago by a trade specialist from a hunting store in Tbilisi, who presented the plant management with a letter on the personal stationery of the Chairman of the Georgian Republic Council of Ministers. The head of government was asking them to sell 10,000 hunting rifles, 500 Kalashnikov assault rifles, 500 Stechkin pistols, and shells, to be used to "protect state installations in the republic," in exchange for sausage, canned stew, evaporated milk, fish products, tea, juices, and fruits. There were also messengers from the Baltics, Ossetia, and Chechen-Ingushetia.

The plant managers refused. Even though they had hungry families, they withstood the temptation, to their credit and dignity.

Outside the plant entrance stands a monument to Peter the Great, cast by the plant's workers. It's the only one of its kind. The czar is at an anvil, wearing the scorched apron of a blacksmith. The plant was founded by order of Peter 279 years ago. Not one Russian politician before or after Peter has had the right to utter the words inscribed on the foundation of the monument, which the

plant workers saved during the upheaval of the revolution: "By the sweat of my toil I created you."

It all began with my question, "Is it profitable to make arms in Russia?" After all, nothing in series production costs less and is more highly valued in the world as arms. "But not in our country," Aleksandr Tikhonovich Vinogradov, deputy general director for commercial affairs, said bitterly. And he went on to prove persuasively that in our country, which held half the world in fear thanks to the arms race, producing arms is extremely unprofitable.

Take, for instance, the restrictions on the right to buy an ordinary hunting rifle. To buy one, a person has to be a member of a hunting society for three years and pay all his membership dues on time—without the right, needless to say, to go hunting. He must comply with all the association's regulations. And only after this probationary period, provided he didn't get on the wrong side of anybody, will it give him a recommendation to present to the local internal affairs directorate.

This so-called permission system is oriented more toward prohibiting than permitting. And it is thanks to this system that the Tula Small Arms Plant has cut production of hunting rifles by 75 percent in the past 15 years and now makes no more than 50,000 rifles per year.

The demand is not enormous. We'll put aside the inquiries stemming from political ambitions. Only the regular kind—inquiries from hunters and gun enthusiasts. This permission-prohibition system, introduced by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, has led to a situation in which the market is now bare. According to A. Vinogradov, any region could instantly buy not just the plant's monthly production but even annual production of hunting rifles. In Siberia, the polar region, and the Far East, waiting lists for Tula's double-barreled rifles are five to six years long. And this at a time when the plant doesn't know how to keep its workers and engineers busy. An idiotic situation, isn't it?

Tula makes not only hunting rifles, but also Kalashnikov assault rifles. The most modern and trouble-free weapon, lighter-weight, with a far greater rate of fire and aiming range and a larger magazine than the Israeli Uzzi celebrated in the West.

The surprising thing is that for these Tula-made assault rifles, the client, the Ministry of Defense, until only recently paid the plant 120 rubles apiece. Now, in a fit of generosity, it is paying 240. The Uzzi, inferior in every way, costs several thousand dollars. In producing this magnificent weapon, the Tula workers are barely making ends meet—the profit they make from the rifles is miniscule. Israel sells its weapons at a great profit.

Things could be different. The arms market, sad as it is for our old earth, has always been enormous. And the plant wouldn't be hunting for foreign currency, but

swimming in it, if it had a chance to earn money to restructure its lines for the mass production of civilian output.

The main reason is the client, which since time immemorial has also been the employer. It is the Defense Ministry's Main Missile and Artillery Directorate. Without its permission, not one rifle can be sold even for pure gold. Really, it's a picture worthy of the Marxist-Leninist classics: Monopolists appropriating the workers' labor.

Meanwhile, this monopoly, while robbing the plant's workers, has long been selling at a loss. The Kalashnikov assault rifle is celebrated as not only the most dependable and formidable carried weapon but also the cheapest, provided to the third world free of charge altogether. Recall the tens of billions of dollars wasted on arms for numerous friends and freedom fighters. A considerable share of them came from the Tula plant's workers.

It would be possible, of course, to organize the sale of the assault rifles abroad under license. But who would issue them? The "late" Ministry of Defense has broken up into three concerns. One of them, Vityaz, owns the Tula Small Arms Plant. The same people are in charge. They are not accustomed to granting freedom to the entrepreneurship that could save the plant's workforce.

I look at the messengers from the Caucasus darting back and forth in the hallway and think they are practical people, and it's in vain that they won't be received favorably. Indeed, if the number of parts fails to tally before a workshift, they don't start assembling rifles. However, they register only the marked parts that have passed through quality control. And I remember a conversation with one of the Tula plant's old-timers, Ye. Sabinin. He said that it is impossible to steal a rifle part accepted by the military quality control people. But those that are in some way defective and are not registered—you can take as many of them as you like. It is entirely possible to assemble a rifle from them. And it will shoot just as well. There have been a fair number of attempts to hide marked and registered parts. But who knows how many unregistered parts have been carried off and how?

None of this would happen if the workers had social protection. But they do not. The production of rifles that would bring an excellent profit has been sharply cut back. Meanwhile, every TOZ-91, with an ornamental engraving, costs 40,000 rubles in the West, while the same weapon with combined barrels costs 20,000. They are made individually, several dozen in all. It's not so much a question of money as of prestige. There's enough prestige, it's foreign currency that's valued these days.

And the Tula arms makers, having worked at the plant all their lives, either leave and forget their craft or start scheming. I understand that one can't defend those who steal arms from the plant. This is a crime. But people have to live somehow.

Is there a solution? I tried to meet with director N. Maslennikov for several months in a row. Unsuccessfully. I tried to speak with chief engineer V. Kuznetsov, who was recently appointed Tula's governor-general. In the empty waiting room, his secretary informed me that the Russian presidential representative was extremely busy and that "an audience had been denied" altogether.

And understandably so. The plant's executives have nothing to say about social protection measures. One can talk about the flawed policy of the former Ministry of the Defense Industry, but the plant management is no less to blame. In the past 11 years, the Tula plant has introduced virtually no new products, nor has it set up or expanded the production of consumer goods. On the contrary, new products that could be placed in mass production and earn many millions continue to be ignored.

The plant used to employ the extremely talented, self-taught designer Sergey Polikov, whose story is a repetition of Levsha's fate. With the only difference that Sergey Vasilyevich survived. His brainchild, a marvelous vertical double-barreled rifle that uses an extremely original operating principle and won a multitude of prizes, never went into series production because plant managers preferred to produce the outdated models that are bought up like hotcakes anyway.

For the designer, it was a grave blow. He quit and, it is said, went abroad.

He had been sent to Tula by the police: In his village near Voronezh, he had been making home-made arms, which is naturally forbidden. Police officials, realizing that they were dealing with a talented individual, sent him to the arms plant. But the talented designer couldn't live on a song with an ailing wife and two small children. And so Tula lost yet another Levsha.

Shop manager A. Khruslov gave me a demonstration of some models. They were unique, magnificent, inimitable. But there were only a few of them. You can't make money on that. Do you think this has made anybody think and worry that the illustrious team of workers and engineers that has existed since 1712 might perish? No. Even at a time when the plant's doors are being pounded down by the need to enhance citizens' personal safety and the Russian Supreme Soviet is about to draft documents on the right to own and use weapons for self-defense, the plant management is trying to pretend that the new times do not concern it. The local newspaper KOMMUNAR published a TASS article entitled "A Gas-Powered Pistol? Not So Terrible!" German arms makers had offered their services in mass marketing the pistol. Yu. Litvintsev, chairman of the oblast soviet of People's Deputies; N. Tyutyunov, his colleague from the city Soviet; and General A. Safonov, chief of the internal affairs directorate, said bluntly that under no circumstances can current production be disrupted and arms production replaced by something else. Yet in the final analysis, a gas-powered pistol is not a crime but a

necessity for every law-abiding citizen. But the Defense Ministry has never listened to anybody.

There is another way the collective could grow rich. During the first conversion program, under Khrushchev, which lasted only two years not just at the small arms plant but in the entire Tula region, the plant went from major arms supplier to high-volume producer of sewing machines. Under license from the famous Tsundapa firm, it annually made 150,000 first-class machines with electric drives and the capability to perform a multitude of operations. This was achieved thanks to the Soviet National Economic Council, which pooled the efforts of the region's enterprises and gave them strength and direction.

A unique feature of this kind of output is that the machine plant producing it inevitably raises the engineering and technological level of its production, with enormous benefit. And during that period the Tula Small Arms Plant rapidly rose to a new level. But then someone in the State Planning Committee and the CPSU Central Committee decided that the Podolsk and Tula plants, which were making 300,000 machines a year, weren't enough. They bought and started up another eight plants. The market was quickly saturated, and production of the Tula sewing machines, along with similar products produced by allied enterprises, was halted. The Podolsk Mechanical Plant was naturally not enough for the country.

Today the enterprise management, in conjunction with the Vityaz Association, is spending tens of millions of dollars on equipment for the mass production of engine blocks. For a future generation of private farmers. It's a good thing, and the arms plant workers are not alone—another defense enterprise near Tula is making the same product. The incident with the sewing machines could easily repeat itself. I'm afraid that there might be far fewer farmers than engine blocks.

The Tula workers are not to blame for the fact that the oblast's economy is structured in such a way that it not so much feeds as shoots. It has been imposed on them, in a way that has left less than five percent of the able-bodied population in rural areas. There is a way out of this problem—especially considering the formidable industrial potential and enormous desire of both the world and domestic markets to enjoy the fruits of Tula's great craftsmanship. All that has to be done is to consolidate the Tula workers' efforts. Ye. Sabinnin said that the arms plant workers, in conjunction with a local combine plant, could set up mass production of excellent refrigerators in a matter of months. The Tula Small Arms Plant could make the compressors for them, and the combine plant could easily stamp the cabinets. The plastic could be made in neighboring Uzlovaya. And so on and so forth.

But for now, it's every plant for itself. One is making engine blocks, while another is making hangers for the underclothes you can't buy anywhere.

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